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Abstract 
 
  
This thesis explores the diagnosis of ADHD among adults in the UK. The condition has only recently 
been defined as a lifelong disorder and extended from childhood to adulthood. Through 
ethnographic research in a specialist psychiatric clinic and with a patient organisation, this thesis 
traces the diagnostic process as it takes place in both sites and also between them. It highlights the 
role of memory practices in the many versions of ADHD that circulate. 
I outline clinical and lay practices of identifying ADHD. Individuals in the support groups identified 
with the diagnosis through recognising themselves in other people, as if in a mirror, which I describe 
as ‘moments of recognition’. In the clinic, the elicitation of medical histories brought contrasting 
memory practices to the fore, as patients sought evidence from their childhood necessary to a 
formal diagnosis. Although these memory practices appear distinct, they are combined in practice.  
This fieldwork led me to concentrate less on the potentially negative medicalisation of human 
experiences, the main topic of social science research in the field, than the ways in which memory 
practices were mobilised. These practices were key to the production of evidence-based diagnosis in 
the clinic and to collective archives in the support groups. Moreover, both types of memory 
practices informed wider relations. Thus, I explore unexpected ways of making kin such as the 
manner in which children, more commonly diagnosed with ADHD than adults, ‘made’ their parents 
in the light of a shared condition. Furthermore, concepts of neurobiology led some research 
participants to recognise strangers as ‘family’, linked by a common factor and celebrated as 
neurodiversity.  
This thesis attends not only to the emerging and mostly unexamined lived experiences of adults with 
ADHD, but it also contributes to an anthropological exploration of social and caring practices more 
broadly. 
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Chapter One  Introduction 
 
In September 2012, I was sitting with members of a support group for adults with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) that, unlike others in the UK, was run in a public place, a well-
known coffeehouse chain. During that evening, it became clear that one of the people sitting amongst 
us was not there to discuss ADHD but to enjoy the coffee.  He asked the small group of three that 
included myself, if this was some kind of ‘meet-up’. The response from one of my companions was 
hesitant, “yes kind of, it is for people with ADHD”. The customer looked back at us with surprise and 
said: “I thought only children had ADHD.” The two men who were sitting with me explained how 
they always had problems as children, one with inattention and the other with hyperactivity, but they 
had not been diagnosed then, which had caused them endless problems and crises as they grew older. 
The customer showed interest and in a friendly manner said that he couldn’t see anything wrong with 
them and asked what they did in the meet-up, what kind of activities. The answer was quick to come – 
“we drink coffee and talk of what ADHD is about, how it affects our life, how to get diagnosed and 
how treatment may be helpful”. One of the men described how being able to meet with people who 
had the same problems was really helpful; it made him feel that he was not alone. Coming to this 
group that night had made him feel that he was with like-minded people, that he could be himself and 
people understood exactly how he felt. The customer nodded and wished us all good luck before 
making his exit. 
I begin with this brief story because the dialogue it contains exemplifies both the public perception of 
ADHD as solely a childhood disorder and the necessity for adults with ADHD to explain their 
difficulties and found a supportive environment to share their experience. This entry scene also 
highlights the importance of support groups as field sites in my research and the methodological 
choice to extend my fieldwork beyond clinical sites in order to capture the lived experiences and 
representations of ADHD in adults.  My visit to this support group happened at the beginning of my 
fieldwork and the questions raised by the customer led me to a series of interrogations of my own. 
How does a childhood disorder, arguably still contested, become re-imagined in adulthood?  Do 
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symptoms remain the same from child to adult?  How differently are they experienced? I wondered 
what changes had taken place to explain that children were no longer growing out of ADHD.  
ADHD was first used as a diagnostic category in the revised third version of the American Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM) in 1987 (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and was the most 
recent acronym for the clustering of symptoms that combine Inattention, Hyperactivity and 
Impulsivity.  Since the second part of the 20
th
 century it has had other  nomenclatures;  ADD 
(Attention and Deficit Disorder with or without Hyperactivity)  (American Psychiatric Association, 
1987; 1980), Hyperkinetic reaction in childhood (APA, 1968) or MBD (Minimal Brain Dysfunction), 
(Clements, 1966)
1
.  What these classifications have in common is that they are all applied to disorders 
in childhood only, and symptoms are said to reduce and wane through adolescence, becoming absent 
in adulthood.  
It was not until the 1990s that ADHD became a diagnosis applicable to adults, formally identified in 
DSM VI (APA,1994) and further reaffirmed through studies that followed children diagnosed with 
ADD/ADHD into adulthood (Barkley et al., 1990; Mannuzza et al., 1993; Weiss and Hechtman, 
1993). Whilst psychiatric classifications made it possible to diagnose children and adults with ADHD 
from the mid-1990s onwards, their uptake in clinical practice in the UK remained rare for children 
until the early 2000s (Jick et al., 2004) and was adopted later still for adults (McCarthy et al., 2012).  
It follows that adults in the UK who are currently over the age of 30 years old could not have been 
diagnosed with ADHD in their childhood: consequently, if they faced difficulties related to 
inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity, they could not have had access to treatment until the late 
2000s when diagnosing adults with ADHD became more commonly supported by the guidance 
published by the  National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE, 2009). My research is 
concerned with this unique moment in time, in which a large cohort of adults living in the UK
2
  can 
only now be considered for diagnosis and treatment for ADHD. We can imagine that the detection of 
                                                          
1
 For further details on these and earlier diagnostic nomenclatures see: (Barkley, 2006; Conners, 2000; Lange et 
al., 2010; Taylor, 2011). 
2
 A conservative figure of the prevalence of ADHD in adults in the UK suggests that 2.5% of the adult 
population may have ADHD,(UKAAN, 2013). 
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ADHD during adulthood will eventually reduce as children continue to be diagnosed and treated at an 
ever  growing rate (McCarthy et al., 2012).  It is this particular congruence of time, place and 
condition that this study aims to address by asking – what are the practices in place that make the 
diagnosis of ADHD in adults possible now? Furthermore, this window of time provides us with a 
particular opportunity to examine how the process of diagnosis can lead to a reconceptualisation of 
the lifecourse. 
In order to explore this question, I situated my research in the juncture between a specialist clinic for 
adults with ADHD and support groups run by adults with ADHD. My movement between one and the 
other allowed me to observe the interplay between the clinic and support groups and to see how they 
contributed in both divergent and convergent ways towards the making of ADHD.   
As my fieldwork advanced in both sets of sites, I was struck by the heterogeneity of the people I met.  
The stories they offered to clinicians and each other seemed varied, presenting very different life 
trajectories within diverse social backgrounds and they reflected an almost equal gender distribution.  
The two men mentioned above were in their late thirties, as were the majority of the people I met in 
the support groups, and had only recently been diagnosed and treated. This thesis asks the following 
questions: what are the implications for living with undiagnosed and untreated symptoms for decades? 
What other means do people develop to counteract the difficulties that ADHD may be causing them 
and those around them?  How are relationships within the family and beyond affected by this 
condition? Attending support groups and being with like-minded people was described as helpful, but 
what was it that took place in the group setting that made it so beneficial? The reference to crisis made 
by one of the two men was echoed many times by others in different support groups and I wondered 
about the fragility of day-to-day life which is put at risk through inattention or hyperactivity. Faced 
with the multiple ways that ADHD is enacted and presented, what were the practices in support 
groups and the clinic that made it possible for this diversity to converge and be bundled into one 
diagnosis?  What do clinicians, patients, support group members, relatives and partners do in order for 
ADHD in adults to stabilise as a diagnosis at the beginning of the 21
st
 century in the UK? 
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This introductory chapter aims to map the context of these questions in four parts to set the 
background for the arguments which this thesis will advance. I will begin by providing medical and 
lay descriptions of ADHD, including criteria and demographic data for the cohort involved and will 
further explore the different ways that ADHD is presented. The second part of this introduction will 
engage with a question that was persistently asked throughout my fieldwork when meeting people 
outside the main sites of my research: is ADHD real or not? Social scientists have been particularly 
interested by this question and this section explores their role in the making of one kind of ADHD. In 
contrast to this approach which considers ADHD as ‘socially constructed’ within a controversial field 
led by Big Pharma and medical hubris, this thesis aims to extend the interest to the practices that make 
ADHD in other spheres too. The support groups I attended provided a pragmatic arena where the 
issues faced by their members were mobilised, not so as to understand what ADHD is in the abstract, 
but to develop first-hand knowledge about living with ADHD. How did people live with the 
symptoms, the impairments, as well as with the controversies and the problems they caused?  The 
medical description of ADHD includes multiple sub-types of hyperactivity, inattention and mood 
dysfunction, as well as a multifactorial aetiology. Thus in this context, I found that multiplicity was 
already an accepted part of the vocabulary of ADHD in the clinic. The fact that there are multiple 
realities of ADHD, rather than different ways to theorise it, will become more evident as I follow and 
elaborate on the practices of clinicians in the making of ADHD.  
The ensuing chapters will show how paying attention to the description of everyday experiences of 
ADHD in support groups presents yet more versions of the condition, relating not only to 
forgetfulness and memory problems, but also to the concept of ADHD as a gift, an asset and an 
alternative form of life. Extending my attention to this less visible arena will reveal  the diversity and 
roles of unexpected actors and actants (Latour, 2005) in the making of ADHD, ranging from stimulant 
medication to old school reports. This thesis will argue that the multiple realities of ADHD are the 
results of practices in the clinic and support groups and of the interactions between them.  It will 
describe how those practices, based on ideas about memory, kinship and ordinary life, that at times 
fuel controversies, are also showing ADHD to be fundamentally a social experience that happens 
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between people and in their relation with the world. Ultimately I am suggesting that the care which 
people give to each other when faced with the fragility of everyday life constitutes a certain way of 
being in the world. What seems a theoretical move towards ontology and a concern for reality is, for 
the purpose of this thesis, also a methodological choice, what Annemarie Mol (2003) described as a 
‘praxiography’.  
Tracing the practices associated with the diagnostic process will help navigate the different sites and 
highlight connections between them. Thus the third and fourth parts of this introduction will describe 
the methods and orientation of my study and provide a rationale for choosing to follow and trace the 
diagnostic process. 
 
ADHD in adults 
Medical and lay descriptions 
 
In the last fifteen to twenty years, ADHD has been re-considered and applied to adult populations in 
the UK. International psychiatric classifications have adapted their descriptions of symptoms to the 
context of adult life, shifting the emphasis from  the school environment to the work place and noting 
that the central feature of this developmental disorder is that ‘symptoms that caused impairment were 
present before the age of 7 years’ (DSM, 2000)3. According to this definition, adults do not develop 
ADHD within their adult lives but suffer from symptoms that have remained undiagnosed since their 
childhood. Thus it follows that adults need to demonstrate evidence of retrospective and persistent 
symptoms which have existed since childhood in order to gain a diagnosis and receive treatments. 
According to the criteria for ADHD given in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (2000), the most common symptoms of ADHD fall into three categories which are 
                                                          
3
 DSM-5 was published nine months into my fieldwork in May 2013. The main changes made to the criteria 
were the age of onset from 7 to 12 years old, and the numbers of symptoms required fell from 6 to 5.  Whilst 
clinicians and support group members were aware of these changes, they did not figure much in my 
conversations with them. DSM-5 was not applied in the clinic for a few months, nor was reference to criteria in 
support groups changed during my attendance. For that reason I have decided to use the criteria 
contemporaneous to my fieldwork unless otherwise stated.  
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inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. An individual is diagnosed to have ADHD with the 
presence of either:  
‘1) Having six or more symptoms of inattention, or 2) having six or more symptoms of hyperactivity-
impulsivity.  
Symptoms for either condition must have persisted for at least 6 months to a degree that is 
maladaptive and inconsistent with developmental level. 
The symptoms and impairments of either condition must be present in two or more settings (school, 
work, home etc.) and must have been present before the age of seven years old.’ 
(APA, 2000) 
This last feature is particularly distinctive of the diagnosis of adult ADHD. Most psychiatric disorders 
in the DSM require that a medical history is taken for their identification, which may typically record 
when symptoms first appear. Thus Personality Disorder’s first onset is situated in teenage years, and 
Schizophrenia typically manifests itself in early adulthood. In the case of adult ADHD, symptoms 
must have been noted prior to seven years of age.  
In addition there must be clear evidence that the symptoms cause significant impairment in social, 
school, or work functioning and must evidence that they are not experienced as part of a psychotic 
disorder (schizophrenia) or better accounted for by another disorder (Mood Disorder, Anxiety 
Disorder, Dissociative Disorder, or a Personality Disorder). 
Based on these criteria, three types of ADHD are identified: 
IA. ADHD, Combined Type: if both criteria IB and IC are met for the past six months 
IB. ADHD, Predominantly Inattentive Type: if criterion IB is met but criterion IC is not met for the 
past six months  
IC. ADHD, Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive Type: if Criterion IC is met but Criterion IB is not 
met for the past six months 
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There are many sources that describe and identify symptoms for adult ADHD including the DSM, 
various rating scales used by diagnosticians, NICE guidance, and also support groups’ websites, and 
research publications (Weiss and Murray, 2003). Given the variety of diagnostic sub-types described 
above, individual experiences are likely to be varied and to combine a range of themes with various 
consequences such as;  
 Difficulties in organising daily activities; forgetfulness;  difficulties in time management and 
procrastination that may be experienced through inability to sustain employment, to meet 
deadlines, to pay bills 
 Physical and mental over-activity; having too many projects going on simultaneously;  
intolerance of boredom which may lead to feeling of restlessness, of being unfocused and 
may cause insomnia and a feeling of exhaustion.  
 Impulsivity and impatience with a low tolerance for frustration are often experienced through 
argumentative behaviour in public spaces, speeding while driving, overspending when 
shopping. 
 Mood swings with faster and less pronounced cycles than in bipolar disorder, often 
experienced as being over anxious, or depressed with low motivation, contrasted with periods 
of elated moods and being ‘the life and soul of the party’. 
There are differences in the way ADHD may be experienced by adults in comparison to children 
simply due to their different lifestyles and positions in life. For example, adults may develop coping 
strategies which can cause problems in their own right, such as the use of alcohol or other substances. 
They have the ability to refuse treatment that may have unpleasant side effects and it may be difficult 
to get collateral evidence from employers and other sources. Adults may themselves be carers of 
children with ADHD and so need to control their own symptoms not only at work during the day, but 
also at home in the evening.  
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As I will describe, the re-conception of ADHD as a lifelong disorder also posits the idea that there is 
no such thing as a cure for its symptoms: treatments alleviate symptoms rather than removing them. 
The way that some support group members put this was to say that ADHD was their normal state of 
being, which medication could only alter for as long as the drug was active. The issue of living with 
ADHD as a normal state will be developed in the thesis as I describe how support groups devised 
practices to supplement what the clinic provided.  
The emergence of Adult ADHD in the UK is not taking place in an isolated environment. The 
situation in the USA, where Adult ADHD has been widely diagnosed, treated and recognised as a 
legitimate disability over the last two decades, can provide a premise for postulating a similar 
development in the UK.  Yet the universal applicability of this kind of classification continues to be 
challenged and cross-national studies have highlighted both variations in prevalence and a treatment 
gap between the USA and the rest of the world (Demyttenaere, 2004; Fayad, 2007). It is beyond the 
remit of this study to attempt a comparative analysis between the USA and the UK, but the American 
experience does not go unnoticed by clinicians and support group members, albeit greeted with some 
ambivalence.  
Demography 
 
This short section is concerned with the data produced by scientific research which complements the 
demographic data relating to the people I met in the clinic and in the support groups presented in the 
methodology section of this introduction.  How common is the diagnosis of ADHD in the UK? 
Prevalence studies have attempted to respond to this question but have shown considerable variation 
in their results, from 0.5% to 26% of schoolchildren in the UK (Singh, 2008), a range due mainly to 
the different methods and classifications used. A commonly accepted rate within the medical and 
scientific community is that 3.6% of children in the UK are affected by ADHD with a high 
proportion, between half and two thirds depending on the studies, experiencing symptoms through 
adolescence and adulthood (Buitelaar, Kan, and Asherson, 2011); it is estimated that 2.5% of adults in 
the UK are affected by ADHD (UKAAN, 2013). Research is recording a growing rate of 
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pharmacologically treated ADHD, doubling in children between 2003 and 2008 alongside a fourfold 
increase for adults, suggesting an increase in the uptake of the diagnosis by clinicians (McCarthy et 
al., 2012). The gender ratio of people diagnosed with ADHD is reported to be close to 1:1 (Matheson 
et al., 2013) with variations between the subtypes  of the diagnostic criteria (Willcutt, 2012) and 
slightly more men than women are affected overall. Few studies have attempted to analyse the socio-
economic status of adults diagnosed with ADHD (de Graaf et al., 2008) and I do not know of any 
such studies in the UK. Studies in other parts of Europe, America, and Australia showed differing 
results, suggesting that further research should take place in order to associate socio-economic status 
with rates of diagnosis in adults. The same is true of studies that have researched the links between 
ethnicity and diagnosis (Dwivedi and Banhatti, 2005). Follow-up studies which have shown the 
persistence of ADHD into adulthood in the 1990s (Barkley et al., 1990; Mannuzza et al., 1993; Weiss 
and Hechtman, 1993), have more recently described the negative outcomes associated with having 
ADHD in all domains of life. Sufferers fare worse than control groups in areas such as education, 
employment, crime, relationships and show an increased propensity to develop other psychiatric 
disorders such as depression (Barkley et al., 2006; Biederman et al., 2006; Brassett-Grundy and 
Butler, 2004; Hodgkins et al., 2011; Jerome et al., 2006; Young et al., 2009). 
Multiple already  
 
The heterogeneity of the population affected by ADHD was consistently acknowledged by clinicians 
and people in support groups alike. To the diversity of age, gender and economic status, can be added 
the varied combination of criteria and subtypes described above: inattention, hyperactivity, and 
impulsivity and their different nomenclatures. In this way ADHD was already multiple, it was more 
than one thing, and through the work, actions, and efforts of all those involved, it was less than many 
(Mol, 2003; Strathern, 2004) in that only one diagnosis is recognised by medical and other institutions 
in the UK. Let me give a brief example: clinicians conceive ADHD in different ways depending on 
what they do. They may think of it as a psychiatric disorder if they diagnose within a mental health 
setting via the DSM; however they may think of it as a learning disability if they diagnose within an 
education setting, like a university.  These two concepts do not exclude one another but depend on 
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different clinical practices such as psychometric tests or assessment tools which highlight particular 
contextual concerns. I argue that there are not several distinct kinds of ADHD that compete with each 
other, but that they are connected and contained within one another.    
The patients and support group members I met were also involved in the making of different versions 
of ADHD. As I will explore in subsequent chapters, they described ADHD in their lives sometimes as 
a curse, sometimes as a gift, and they did not see these valuations as mutually exclusive.  As Mol 
succinctly put it, ‘Not two different people or one person divided in two. But partially connected’ 
(2003:82).  In other words, it was not necessarily a matter for individuals to choose a particular 
version of ADHD, the gift over the curse, or the learning disability over the psychiatric disorder, as if 
these stood next to each other on a shelf. Instead all the different versions were connected, sometimes 
co-occurring and often implicit.  To be clear, clinicians, patients and support group members, rather 
than explicitly discussing the multiplicity of ADHD with me during my fieldwork, would instead 
point to  the contradictions and ambivalent feelings that they had to reconcile. In other words, they 
needed to work and live with the different realities of ADHD.  So far I have mentioned how ADHD 
and its clusters of symptoms can be assembled and enacted differently depending on the practices of 
clinicians, patients, support group members and their families, and next I want to widen the net of 
actors in the making of ADHD to include social scientists and media actors.  
 
Is it real? 
Forces of medicalisation 
 
Social scientists have long been interested in ADHD, and to some extent, the histories of ADHD and 
social science are intertwined.  The increased use of the diagnosis, albeit in its previous nomenclature 
of Hyperkinesis from 1968 to 1980, was paralleled by the rise of the ‘medicalisation critique’. 
Medicalisation, the process of viewing and explaining human problems and behaviours through 
medical means, is an accepted if somewhat tired concept in the 21
st
 century. The representation of 
doctors and medical institutions as ‘a major threat to health’ (Illich, 1977) expending their control 
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over our everyday lives (Zola, 1972; Szasz, 2007), was formulated in the  1960s  and 1970s within a  
context ripe for such critique. On the one hand, medicine and its patients were reaping the benefits of 
decades of investment; new medicines, such as antibiotics, and other technologies were rendering 
doctors more visible, business-like and powerful. On the other hand, the zeitgeist of these two decades 
ensured that state institutions, such as medicine, would be criticised or even demonised for their 
attempt at governing human bodies. Such a critique was forcefully applied against the power of 
psychiatry at the time of its classificatory expansion through the DSM, leading Szasz to define 
medicalisation as ‘psychiatric propaganda’( 2007: xxiv).  The most frequently cited article on 
Hyperkinesis written by a sociologist dates from this period: published by Conrad in 1975, it focused 
on the use of medicine to control deviant behaviours. It argued that the emergence of new medical 
technologies, mainly psychotropic drugs, and their promotion by ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (1975: 16) 
altered the way that children’s behaviours were perceived. From a situation in which ‘disruptive, 
disobedient, rebellious, anti-social, or deviant behaviours’ (ibid.) were managed by families and 
schools, children came to fall under the jurisdiction of medicine and were managed with Ritalin. The 
implication is that Hyperkinesis did not exist before the pharmaceutical companies found a way to use 
the ‘paradoxical effect’ of stimulants on children; the condition was fabricated, ‘socially constructed’. 
Similar arguments were made in subsequent decades; these exposed the impact of modern life first on 
children and then on adults and they denounced the intrusion of medicine in resolving the problems. 
Thus ‘rapid-fire culture’,  constant stimulation in daily life and the inclusion of food colouring  in the 
diet, were suggested as the causes of hyperactivity  (DeGrandpre, 2000; Smith, 2011).  
Materials and practices that shape realities 
 
My intention is not to refute the warnings that sociologists and other critics give about the role of 
medicine in our lives, but to suggest that it forms only one part of the reality of ADHD, one in which 
the economic aggression of pharmaceutical companies, as well the passivity of medicine’s recipients, 
are emphasised.  Denouncing the role of outside forces and the engines of medicalisation (Conrad, 
2007) has limited positive impact on patients themselves, and can in some circumstances exert a 
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stigmatising and disempowering effect (Nathan and Stengers, 2004). This thesis will focus on how the 
reality of ADHD is made in the UK at the beginning of the 21
st
 century and it will acknowledge the 
materiality of ADHD including the practices of those actors and actants involved in this process.  As 
Bruno Latour defined the terms, ‘an actor is a semiotic definition – an actant –, that is, something that 
acts or to which activity is granted by others.  An actant can literally be anything provided it is 
granted to be the source of an action’ (1996: 376). In addition to investigating the role of clinicians, 
patients and others, this thesis pays attention to objects or concepts that act on the making of ADHD, 
for example classifications, psychometric scales, as well as school reports through which new 
meanings are made out of old and transformed relationships. Similarly, I will examine the effect that 
stimulant medications have on people’s lives, beyond their chemical properties, for example, how the 
medication itself can be adapted for everyday activities, such as work or holidays. I sought 
epistemological inspiration from Mol’s influential book The Body Multiple (2003), in which she 
offers a programme for praxiography, ‘a story about practices’ that allows for differences, 
complexities and co-existence to open up and become visible. Mol traced various practices associated 
with different kinds of atherosclerosis, for example, during clinical assessment under the microscope, 
or at home. The multiple bodies thus formed required considerable coordination work, involving 
negotiations between different actors and medical note-writing in order to ‘hang together’ within a 
single patient. Mol’s method that ‘no longer follows a gaze that tries to see objects but instead follows 
objects while they are being enacted in practice’ (2003: 152) highlights the spatial movements 
involved in diagnostic procedures, from GP to surgeon and sometimes, unfortunately, to pathologists. 
To acknowledge the multiplicities and complexities of practice is also to acknowledge the existence 
of different possibilities of becoming. Mol has described this as ontological politics, ‘the process of 
shaping’ reality through practices (1999).  Tracing the practices for diagnosing adult ADHD across 
the clinic and support groups will bring to the fore a kind of ontological politics, one that is concerned 
with pragmatic knowledge production. In the clinic, I observed the way that clinicians used the 
experiential knowledge they had built over the years, sometimes privileging this over the formal 
criteria when diagnosing. In the support groups, I saw how people developed pragmatic knowledge 
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for living with ADHD. Such actions were directed not only at participating in, but also at interfering 
with psychiatric knowledge (Rabeharisoa et.al, 2014). Overall, by following the diagnostic process to 
arenas outside the clinic, this thesis highlights how the combined practices of clinic and support 
groups collectively work to keep together, and to coordinate and uphold the multiple realities of 
ADHD within one diagnosis.  
 
The diagnostic process 
A social process rather than clinical moment  
 
The work of clinicians, patients, support group members and their relatives suggested that one 
element at least kept the different versions of ADHD cohesive. All were involved through different 
practices in the diagnostic process. The term ‘diagnosis’ can be used to describe categories of 
diseases, as well as what clinicians do to identify and apply such categories; both usages are of course 
intertwined as the naming of a disease depends on the availability of classifications (Blaxter, 1978). 
Yet it is worth keeping both applications of the word separate in order to examine what takes place in 
either case. The making of classifications and diagnoses calls upon a wide range of actors and 
institutions which in turn exert a particular societal impact (Bowker and Star, 1999). The work that is 
required to diagnose has traditionally been laid in the hands of doctors and clinicians. It is sometimes 
described as ‘the art of medicine’ and more recently, since the 20th century, as a ‘science’ (Rosenberg, 
2002). The tension between art and science in the work of diagnosing is particularly visible in 
psychiatric clinical events that rely heavily on conversations, narratives and speech events (Gumperz 
and Hymes, 1972).  Thus, distinguishing between different categories and associated treatments calls 
upon the ability to interact with someone who is often in distress, whilst keeping in mind the various 
classifications and criteria. The combination of naming and labelling by one person (the clinician) 
during one moment (the clinical encounter) has come to represent, for most people, the work of 
diagnosis as the clinically defining moment of the disease. 
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I will argue that diagnosing adults with ADHD poses direct challenges to this bounded temporal, 
spatial and hierarchical conception of the diagnostic moment on two counts. First, the health services’ 
institutional structures extend the diagnosis across time by requiring different actors to contribute to 
the process; GPs, specialist psychiatrists, psychologists and health commissioners. I found that the 
process could take up to 18 months for most people diagnosed through the NHS (Matheson et al., 
2013). Secondly, during the ‘waiting period’, patients-to-be engage in exploratory work about their 
conditions of their own volition as well as in response to clinical questionnaires and, during the 
process, reach out to relatives and support groups for insights. Therefore this study will show how the 
clinical moment of diagnosis becomes elongated into a social process stretching across time and 
space.  In considering actors outside the clinic, this study recognises the role and expertise of those 
experiencing ill health in producing knowledge for diagnosing and living with their conditions (Das, 
2014; Pols, 2013; Rabeharisoa et al., 2014). As I come to discuss in Chapter Five, the process of 
identifying what might be wrong in oneself can be described as self-diagnosis. By exploring 
similarities in the practices of support groups and clinic, this thesis attempts to counteract negative 
connotations which may be imputed to the self-diagnosis process when it is viewed within medical 
milieux (Goyder et al,2009; Jutel, 2010). It is worth noting that such an extended process of diagnosis 
can increase the sense of uncertainty that is inherent to concerns about ill health (Chilibeck, Lock, and 
Sehdev, 2011; Jutel and McBain, 2012; Swoboda, 2008) and, for some people I met, particular 
elements in the process intensified this uncertainty and triggered a sense of vulnerability.  
The role of remembering and of family resemblance 
 
As with most psychiatric disorders, there are no biological tests for diagnosing adult ADHD, neither 
blood nor genetic tests, and whilst some neuroscientific tools are being developed, they had not been 
deemed reliable at the time of my fieldwork
4
. Instead the emphasis is on face to face assessments 
where patients can report their ailments via a structured interview and a mental state examination 
which includes a medical history. As I described earlier, a core element of the criteria for adult ADHD 
                                                          
4
 I participated in a scientific conference on 21/09/13 run by the International Multicentre Persistent ADHD 
CollaboraTion (IMPACT), entitled ‘From the Workbench to Clinical Impact’ which explored this specific topic.  
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is that symptoms and impairments must have appeared before the age of seven and clinicians must 
identify retrospective and persistent symptoms which have been present since childhood. There is an 
important caveat noted in a diagnostic handbook : ‘Adults may have only a poor recall of their 
symptoms and behaviours as children’ (UKAAN, 2013: 45). From this conundrum, in which memory 
is at the same time a resource and a want, practices are developed in the clinic and in the support 
groups that place memory at the core of the diagnostic process. Put another way, remembering, as 
well as being a human capacity, is also a utility whereby memories are made into objects of evidence 
(Engelke, 2008; Lambek, 2007).  
Following Antze and Lambek  (1996), we can view how the role of the institutional practices 
described above  encouraged and condoned a particular function for memories during the making of 
identity. For the people I met, memories of childhood that were required for the clinical diagnosis 
were not easily recalled, were often disjointed and needed re-interpretation in the light of persistent 
difficulties. Thus, part of the diagnostic process required of the patient the exact skills for which they 
sought support and treatment; focus, attention and memory. The irony of the situation did not escape 
them and for most this was part of their description of the struggle for recognition. Through 
observations undertaken in the clinic and support groups, this study shows the work and scaffolding 
that was necessary for people to remember childhood events, either through structures offered by 
institutions or through school records and family genealogies, or through practices that they 
developed themselves. The claims associated with memory work, involving the reconstruction of 
childhood, were thus aimed beyond the legitimising of people’s condition towards an attempt at 
confirming a biographical continuity. Recurrently throughout my fieldwork, people described how 
they knew something was wrong, that they had always had been this way yet did not know what the 
problem actually was, and that finding clues in the past helped them understand themselves.  The need 
to engage with activities in order to remember past events suggests that ‘remembering happens in the 
present tense’ (Fernyhough, 2012: 8). This is not to say that memories that are thus constructed in the 
present are made up and false; instead it highlights how memories may be fluid records whose 
retrieval offers the possibility for change. 
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The making of memory and the practices of remembering are an integral part of the relationships that 
we form, individually and within familial situations (Carsten, 2007). In the case of the people I met in 
support groups, the childhood memories that were retrieved through the diagnostic process inevitably 
also implicated personal relationships that were taking place at the time, or at least what was recalled 
of them. The process of turning to the past for possible answers to present problems is a common 
practice in medicine, aimed at tracing the triggers and progression of diseases. More broadly, we turn 
to our past in times of existential crisis when our identity is in question (Antze and Lambek, 1996). 
The possibility that a lifetime of problems could be re-imagined and exposed as a treatable psychiatric 
disorder was experienced in ‘moments of recognition’ by some members of the support group.  Some 
described recognising themselves in chance meetings with strangers who had ADHD, whilst others 
explained how self-recognition was experienced through a child or within other filial relations. 
ADHD is noted in scientific textbooks as highly heritable, with a 70% to 80% heritability factor 
(Franke et al., 2012), and with a high familial risk (UKAAN, 2013: 2). It is often said to be ‘running 
in the family’, and identification sometimes took unexpected forms when undiagnosed parents 
described a sense of vertigo at the genealogical displacement that occurred as they recognised 
themselves in the traits of their diagnosed child.  
Ideas about family resemblance also included siblings, cousins and grandparents
5
 and, significantly, 
strangers who shared common traits and difficulties. I found across my field sites that such cases of 
recognition were based on overlapping similarities rather than on any one common feature. Rather 
than one symptom being common to all people with ADHD, there are a variety of traits and features 
present in different people, which give the effect of making them resemble one another.  Thus, 
clinicians developed a typology for diagnosing ADHD, adding to the scales and algorithms, and group 
members formed bonds on the basis of a neurobiological resemblance. Discussions in support groups 
often referred to the sense of belonging they experienced when attending the group, of being with 
like-minded people and of feeling normal amongst kindred.  My observations and participation in the 
                                                          
5
 The diagnosis of older adults, those that might be grandparents of more than one generation of people 
diagnosed with ADHD, is even rarer than the diagnosis of adults of working age (Brod et al., 2012; Wetzel and 
Burke, 2008). Some participants described their aged parents as having traits of ADHD, but none of them were 
diagnosed.  
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support groups will show that some members set up reciprocal obligations and ‘risk[ed] trusting 
others because they want[ed] to change their lives’ (Stack, 1975:39). Sharing their vulnerability, as I 
will show, brought people closer to each other, opening the possibility of receiving and giving 
support. The practices for diagnosing ADHD therefore catalyse effects beyond the legitimacy that 
they may bring to a contested diagnosis.  The outcome of the process of being diagnosed is of course 
very important for clinicians, patients and many others, but attending to all that is involved in the 
process of diagnosis, including practices of memory and of kinship, can reveal the myriad ways that 
people have devised to live and work with ADHD.  
 
Methods and orientation 
Field sites  
 
In order to track and observe the broadened diagnostic process described above, I chose to situate my 
fieldwork across clinical and non-clinical sites in England during a twelve-month period.  Moving 
from one site to another allowed me to evaluate how sites might relate and to see how their practices 
either diverged or linked up.  The clinical site had formal statutory duties and obligations as part of 
the NHS, which also gave its practices legitimacy; without the clinical diagnosis, treatments could not 
be accessed, and recognition of disability/impairments would be withdrawn.  Support groups belong 
to a different sphere of reference; they could be described as informal, often having charity status, and 
would have difficulty functioning without the co-presence of a clinical space for ADHD. Through this 
lens the imbalance of power seems obvious, but as the chapters proceed, these two sets of sites will be 
shown to contribute together to the making of the diagnosis of ADHD in adults. The connections in 
their practice that I will come to discuss, partial as they were, produced a common advocacy towards 
the recognition of ADHD in adults as a legitimate disorder. I am suggesting that neither set of sites 
could achieve such advocacy and legitimisation on their own, and that by occupying a common space 
of ‘activism’, they contributed to the stabilisation of the diagnosis, however temporary this may prove 
to be. My aim will not be to compare in a binary fashion clinical and non-clinical practice; instead 
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throughout this thesis I will explore the network of relations between individuals, patients, clinicians, 
group members, parents and relatives, to show how these actors made and unmade the diagnostic 
process of ADHD. The next two sections present the context to my fieldwork and include a detailed 
account of the make-up of the clinic and support groups.  
Clinical site  
 
In my preparation for research at the clinical site, I spent twelve months establishing a role and reason 
for my presence, securing approval from the local NHS Trust, meeting with the team and the lead 
clinician, whilst concurrently seeking ethical approval from the National Research Ethics Service 
(NRES)
6
.  The clinic is situated in the outpatient department of a large psychiatric hospital in London. 
It shares consultation rooms with other specialist services covering eating disorders, autism, 
addictions and psychotherapy. This is a specialist clinic for adult ADHD and is well known for 
contributing towards research nationally and internationally as it has accumulated long-term data on 
adult diagnosis and treatments. Thus it is often visited by clinicians who wish to improve their clinical 
knowledge and it provides a substantial number of sessions for training Specialist Registrar trainee 
psychiatrists.  Sharing clinical knowledge developed over the years as widely as possible is an 
important part of the daily practices of the clinic. Clinicians who work in this specialist clinic could be 
described as ‘clinician-scientists’ in that they all engage with research, often internationally, and they 
publish widely, whilst continuing to assess and treat patients. In view of the increasing specialism and 
technological advances in medicine, clinician-scientists ‘are seen as the essential conduit between the 
bench and the bedside’ (Wilson‐Kovacs and Hauskeller, 2012: 499). These professionals bring 
expertise of new and emergent fields into the clinic, shaping practice around new technologies whilst 
retaining face to face encounters with patients (Featherstone and Atkinson, 2014). 
                                                          
6
 The application process for ethical approval in researching in the NHS is often portrayed as cumbersome and 
lengthy and the drawbacks of this process, such as the standardisation of ethical concerns onto linear forms of 
paperwork, are debated in the research community (Stewart 2008; Chenhall, Senior, and Belton, 2011; 
Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). Nevertheless, I found that the prolonged process was also useful in promoting an 
evolving formulation of the issues that I might encounter in my fieldwork and led me to seek advice and build 
relationships with partners who were supporting my research proposal. 
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I joined the clinical team for four days a week over ten months and conducted administrative work, 
organising the teaching and visiting sessions for local and international doctors.  During that time I 
was based in the clinical office with nurses and psychologists, liaising with other administrators and 
psychiatrists and attending business, clinical and research meetings.  As agreed with the lead clinician 
and after seeking consent from patients, I observed assessments, mostly towards the second half of my 
fieldwork. I observed sixteen different assessments spread over a total of 48 hours and interviewed 8 
clinicians. Assessments were conducted in two parts, a structured interview called Conners’ Adult 
ADHD Diagnostic Interview for DSM-IV™ (CAADID) and the Mental State Examination (MSE) 
which is the standard psychiatric interview. These assessments were performed by specialist nurses, 
Specialist Registrars (trainee psychiatrists, SpR) and consultant psychiatrists. The team consisted of 
six nurses, one psychologist, one psychologist assistant, one SpR on rotation and six consultant 
psychiatrists who also worked across other services, such as the autism clinic, and were involved in 
research with a partner academic organisation. In addition there was a team of administrators and a 
team leader who also worked across other services.  
The main activity of the clinic was to perform assessments on adults who were mainly over 30 years 
old and with a gender ratio of 52% male, 48% female. The clinic received referrals from across the 
UK and saw approximately 1,000 patients a year of which around 400 were for new assessments. The 
other patients attended follow-up appointments where their treatment was monitored and adjusted.  
The treatment of ADHD in adults remains a contested practice in the UK, and, more often than not, 
General Practitioners are unwilling to prescribe and monitor the pharmaceutical treatment, namely 
stimulants, which are classified Class A drugs. The clinic often fulfilled this role for the initial 
prescribing and titrating of medication until the GPs eventually took over. The clinic also offered 
psychological treatment in the forms of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) for individuals or 
Psycho-educational programmes for small groups. I could not observe any CBT or Psychoeducational 
groups as it was felt by psychologists that my presence would interfere with the therapeutic 
relationship. 
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The specialist adult ADHD clinic was part of the mixed economy of health services that has been 
implemented in England and Wales over the last two decades. As a specialist service it had to 
generate income and did that on the whole through the commissioning branch of the NHS, the 
Primary Care Trusts
7
.  The arrangements were complicated, time consuming, and involved numerous 
communications between agencies which sometimes led to funding being refused for particular parts 
of the service offered by the clinic. Thus some patients might be funded for assessments only but not 
for treatments, or for pharmaceutical treatment but not for psychological therapy. Furthermore, in an 
era of declared economic austerity, concerns for the financial viability of the clinic became a worry 
for the clinical team and formed the basis of many informal conversations.  
In addition to attending the clinic on a daily basis, I was also given access to a number of events and 
conferences that were organised within the NHS trust and by a partner organisation, UK Adult ADHD 
Network (UKAAN).  UKAAN is a network of clinicians and scientists whose aim is ‘to support 
clinicians in the development of clinical services for adults with ADHD’ (UKAAN 2013). The main 
activity of UKAAN is the delivery of training accredited by the Royal College of Psychiatry, the 
dissemination of research findings and organisation of national and international conferences. I 
attended the three-day specialist training programme for psychiatrists in November 2012 and attended 
four international and two national conferences between 2010 and 2013. Many of the clinicians that I 
met in the clinic played a crucial role in setting up UKAAN in 2009 and in subsequent years, the 
patient organisation AADD-UK also contributed and joined the network.  
Patient Organisations and Support Groups sites 
 
Identifying the support groups for my fieldwork sites was a process that spanned five years. From 
2009-2010 I conducted a short piece of ethnography as part of an MA degree which involved contact 
with support groups for adults with ADHD. My focus at the time was on health movements (Brown 
and Zavestoski, 2005; Epstein, 2008) and I found that there were two national Patient Organisations 
                                                          
7
 Primary Care Trusts were replaced by Clinical Commissioning Groups towards the end of my fieldwork on 
1.04.13.  
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for ADHD in the UK. Attention Deficit Disorder Information and Support Service (ADDISS) was set 
up formally in 1998 by parents of children with ADHD and they subsequently developed groups for 
adults; AADD-UK was more recently set up in 2009 with the explicit intention of representing only 
adults with ADHD.  I kept in touch with the founder of AADD-UK which led me to enter into a 
collaborative agreement with the organisation when developing my PhD research proposal. Both 
AADD-UK and ADDISS supported my attendance at support groups and consequently I attended two 
groups from each organisation. Support groups were loosely affiliated to a national Patient 
Organisation and I found that each of the groups had unique features which distinguished them from 
one another, regardless of their affiliations. As part of the collaboration mentioned above, I conducted 
a survey of adult ADHD support groups in the UK in the summer of 2013, partly to update AADD-
UK’s data and to better understand their activities8.  At that time, 23 support groups responded; these 
were distributed across the UK around the main urban centres, and met mostly monthly with an 
average of fifteen people attending each group. Most groups ( 74%, 17/23) were facilitated by 
individuals who identified themselves as having ADHD, and their activities always included a place 
to discuss and share, sometimes called ‘sharing circles’ (Borkman, 1999). They provided advocacy 
(48%, 11/23), sometimes offering structured courses (26%, 6/23), formal counselling (21%, 5/23) as 
well as yoga and mindfulness.  Most groups had been founded since 2009 (60%, 14/23), the year of 
the publication of the NICE guidance for ADHD.  
The heterogeneity of the cohort I described earlier was replicated in the support groups who were as 
different from each other as they were from the clinic. Due to the local and historical context, their 
organisational structures differed and so did their style and approach which I attribute mostly to the 
personalities of the facilitators. They were all adults who were diagnosed with ADHD and their own 
struggle for recognition and treatment galvanised them to start local groups. Some groups and their 
members were more interested in the science of ADHD than others, and some groups offered more 
recreational or therapeutic activities than others. They all had in common a ‘sharing’ space in their 
meetings which consisted of members discussing issues of concern to them and receiving advice and 
                                                          
8
 Published online on http://aadduk.org/ on 18/2/14. 
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acknowledgement. Yet each group ran those ‘sharing’ moments differently; group size and greater or 
lesser levels of organisation lent different qualities to the conversations taking place. Nevertheless, 
they had in common an external orientation towards advocacy and activism which brought a 
coherence that I observed as I moved from one group to another. As far as I was aware, none of the 
support groups received funding from pharmaceutical companies, but two received grants from their 
local authorities as well as charity funding.  
The four groups I attended were some of the longest established and were founded between 2001 and 
2007; Groups C and D were based in London, Group A in the west, and Group B in the north of 
England. They met monthly, fortnightly and even, for one group, weekly. I attended 31 support 
groups’ sessions across the four sites, totalling 72 hours, and conducted ten semi-structured interviews 
of members of those support groups.  In between the sessions I had regular contact with some 
members through emails and internet forums. The gender ratio of those attending was similar to the 
average I mentioned earlier and one group had a younger cohort than the others. In regard to ethnicity 
and class, I did not find that I had sufficient data to come to any meaningful conclusion. Furthermore, 
as Rapp (1999) suggests, definitions of such categories are static, and for the support group members I 
met, their experiences seemed more fluid.  Some people, who described themselves as unemployed, 
were educated to university level, while others who were working described their inability to build 
careers due to their symptoms.  Some were successful doctors but their personal lives were in chaos; 
others still were just out of prison and entering rehabilitation centres. Similarly, the boundaries 
between groups and the clinic were fluid: some people attended more than one group, and some 
members of a group might also be patients in the clinic I worked in. Doctors could be found both 
working in the clinic and attending as members of support groups, or a group member could be a main 
speaker at a scientific conference.  
The ethnic origins of members were not discussed in groups, or at least not when I was present; at 
most, origins were hinted at in conversations when discussing treatments that may or may not have 
been available in other parts of the world.  Research at population level remains inconclusive as to the 
effect that ethnicity may have on the diagnosis of ADHD (Dwivedi and Banhatti, 2005) and it tends to 
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amalgamate notions of ethnicity with culture (Brewis, Schmidt, and Meyer, 2000; Caldararo, 2002). 
Furthermore, most research published on this issue is in relation to children, using data collated from 
proxies, mostly parents and teachers, which renders the translation to adults problematic. During the 
five-year period that I had known two out of the four groups I attended, their membership changed 
entirely, except for the facilitators and I. This longitudinal perspective highlighted how support groups 
changed over time with implications as to what activities and conversations took place.  
Despite the heterogeneity across sites and people described above, I found over the period of my 
fieldwork that the patients I met in the clinic showed more severe symptoms of ADHD and more 
often than not their lives were in serious turmoil, involving the police and social services. This 
difference could be explained in part by the fact that patients who were referred to a national specialist 
clinic were often referred by other medical institutions in the wake of a crisis. It also seemed to me 
that some patients had had little access to support, either from families and relatives or support 
groups. In contrast, members of the support groups were actively seeking help and advice, even if in 
some cases their lives were in turmoil and crisis too. 
 
Words, voice and anonymity 
 
Some of the vocabulary used in this thesis circulates in debates and controversies within the field of 
ADHD, in academia and in clinical practice too.  The choice of some words over others, such as 
impairments and symptoms or disability and diversity, quickly positions the writer or speaker on one 
side of an argument or another.  My intention is not to ignore the debates, nor is it to try to resolve 
them; instead my intent has been to consider the texts and speeches as ‘localized events, with their 
own matter and their own practice’ (Latour, 1993).  The role of discourse in medicine is central to its 
activity and especially so within psychiatry (Wilce, 2009). The majority of the practices I encountered 
in the clinic, but also extending into the support groups, are discursive –  sometimes in the form of 
textbooks, psychometric scales, wall displays of pictures and hand written posters, or at other times in 
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speeches, advice and stories. Paying attention to the use of language in these circumstances can point 
towards its rhetorical force, the intention behind the words to persuade and convince (Carrithers, 
2005). Most of the time the will to persuade was conspicuous as there was much at stake for all 
parties; receiving or giving a diagnosis and treatment was of great concern to the people I met.  
Nevertheless, the discursive practices I observed and sometimes participated in were doing things in 
their own right, rather than being the façade for hidden intentions.  
On many occasions the auditory quality of the conversations seemed to be representative of the way 
the people I met experienced ADHD and its symptoms. The stories that were told by patients and 
group members in chunks and half sentences, with constant digression, jumping from one topic to 
another represented what it must be like to experience impulsivity or lack of focus. At times it made 
for very lengthy interviews and disjointed conversations with stories that were not neat, tidy or 
predictable and I have tried to retain some of that flavour in the transcripts.  
Some terms were used in all sites of my fieldwork with such emphasis and repetition that they became 
reference points, like beacons, in my fieldnotes.  Words such as ‘strategy’, ‘recognition’, ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘forgetting’, have multiple theoretical backbones and, inspired by Wittgenstein’s morphological 
method
9
, I have explored some of them in this thesis. In brief, rather than defining these words 
precisely, describing their essence, I explore how their use created different variations as  a ‘pole of a 
description, not the ground floor of a theory’(Wittgenstein, 1988 : § 633). Wittgenstein explained that 
his intention in applying this method to philosophical problems was to open the possibilities for 
rethinking concepts in their complexities and ‘suggest possibilities of which you had not previously 
thought…and you are able to look around the field of the use of the expression and to describe the 
different kind of uses of it.’ (Wittgenstein in Baker and Hacker, 2008: 321). My intention is to bring 
forth connections between the uses of a word and encourage a broader understanding (Wittgenstein 
                                                          
9
 The morphological method is part of a broader methodological concept of ‘ubersichtliche Darstellung’ applied 
by Wittgenstein, sometimes translated in English as ‘perspicuous representation’ or ‘surveyable representation’ 
which he considered central to his later work. The genealogy of the method can be traced amongst others to 
Goethe’s morphological study of nature, and to Spengler’s use of the method in the historical context (Baker 
and Hacker, 2008). 
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1972). Crucially the use of the words will remain situated in the context in which they were 
exchanged in my fieldwork (Chauvier, 2014). 
Similarly the rhetorical choices I have made in this thesis will indicate how I have decided to 
represent the events that took place in my fieldwork and beyond. Ethnographies are never the direct, 
unmediated, representation of fieldwork (Van Maanen, 2011), and I have used certain writing 
techniques which require some explanation. Below I provide a kind of lexicon that supports the 
description that follows in the subsequent chapters.    
 Patients, names and anonymity 
‘Patient’ is a term shadowed by the politics of words in the mental health field. For some it has been 
synonymous with the idea of a passive actor in a dependent relationship with a powerful professional.  
In the last decades other terms, like ‘customers’ or ‘clients’, have been suggested to endow this 
subject with some agency. Such terminology coincides with an increasingly business-led and market-
like approach within healthcare (Mol, 2008). ‘Patient’ was used in my fieldwork in the clinic as well 
as in scientific conferences to describe adults who were assessed and treated for ADHD. It is included 
in this thesis in that context. Overall, clinicians referred to their patients by their surnames.  Patients 
addressed clinicians as ‘Doctor’ and I replicate these conventions in the thesis when describing 
clinical interactions. Similarly the people I met in support groups presented themselves and addressed 
each other by their first names and I have retained this mode of address too.  Nevertheless all names, 
first and family names, used in this thesis are fictional in order to secure anonymity. For some 
individuals and groups with international and national renown or those whose activities were unique, 
preserving anonymity proved to be more problematic.  I elected to keep the names of the national 
institutions due to their involvement in the public domain, but have withheld the names and locations 
of local organisations. 
In some situations, when the details of individuals were such that they could be identifiable, or when 
clinical and administrative records of attendance could lead to individuals being traced, I have decided 
to present their situations through composite stories.  On two occasions I bring together accounts of a 
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number of people discussing the same topic, grouped by gender, age, and sites, and from this material 
I have created a new and composite story that is representative of the experiences of people I met.  
These stories are not fictional but are based on fieldnotes taken in the clinic or the support groups. 
Most of my fieldnotes were written after the support group sessions or the clinical assessments as I 
felt that writing in those contexts would be inappropriate and disrespectful.  Some of the 
conversations I report in this thesis are based on these fieldnotes, whereas others, when indicated, are 
taken verbatim from interview transcripts. Informed consent was obtained for all interviews 
conducted with clinicians and support group members as well as for clinical observations of patient 
assessments.  Verbal consent was also obtained from support groups at each session I attended as I 
routinely re-introduced myself, something for which I was teased as the months went by. 
 Support group, self-help groups, mutual aid 
The terms used to describe the activities of groups of people that gather together around a particular 
health problem are varied and change in time (Epstein, 2008). From the 20
th
 century onwards, the 
terms ‘patient groups’, ‘self-help’ and ‘mutual aid’ have often been used interchangeably in the 
English speaking world and the increase of the phenomenon in the 1970s led some social scientists to 
define the terms more precisely. Katz and Bender described self-help thus;  ‘Self-help groups are 
voluntary, small group structures for mutual aid and the accomplishment of a special purpose’ ( 1976 
in Katz, 1981: 135). Others have made a distinction between self-help and mutual aid, one 
emphasising actions by an individual to help herself and the other as ‘individuals joining together to 
assist one another either emotionally, socially, or materially’ (Borkman, 1999: 4). The terms ‘support 
groups’ and ‘patient groups’ have sometimes been used synonymously to describe the involvement of 
professionals in running the groups (ibid.).  It is worth noting that these are definitions pinned by 
sociologists onto others and that self-descriptions used by those attending the groups are even more 
varied.  
The groups I attended called themselves ‘support groups’ rather than self-help groups, and therefore 
this is the term I will use in this thesis.  I refer to the people attending the support groups as 
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‘members’, as some facilitators did, but the arrangements they had did not include formal 
memberships. One had a register of attendance but the others did not; another asked for a small 
financial contribution for the coffee and tea, but the others did not. All agreements made in regard to 
attending the support groups were made informally, verbally, and were renewed each time as 
attendance varied from one session to another.  
 
Thesis outline and Chapter summaries 
 
In order to address the main interest of the thesis, that is the process for diagnosing adult ADHD, its 
structure follows a reversed chronology that commences from the point at which the formal diagnosis 
is given in the clinic and moves backwards in time to describe the actions, inventions and interactions 
necessary to reach that point. Proceeding in this way has two important consequences for the overall 
argument of the thesis. First, it suggests that the diagnosis is not a determined and inevitable ‘end-
product’, as I show that the process relies on a number of actions and actants within local and 
historical contexts that may alter the outcome. Secondly, the reversed chronology of the chapters 
emulates the journey of patients who needed to explore their past in order to makes sense of their 
present and it thus aims to understand each stage in view of the preceding ones. Importantly, this 
reversed presentation ends when Chapter Eight returns to where the thesis started and describes how 
living with the diagnosis is an on-going process rather than an ending.  
To begin, Chapters Two to Seven unpick what it takes to diagnose and be diagnosed with adult 
ADHD. Chapter Two is concerned with the way the medical diagnosis is enacted in the clinic, and by 
examining the practices involved globally and locally, it shows the central role of memory and 
recollection in that process. The theme of remembering is explored further in Chapters Three and 
Four, but this time in the support groups where members engage in their own explorations for 
identifying ADHD before attending a clinic. In the support groups the practices of memory were 
enacted through mnemonics and technological aids as well as being embodied into remedial 
strategies.  
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From Chapter Five, I focus on the interplay between clinic and support groups, highlighting 
similarities and contrasts in their practices and demonstrating their partial connections (Strathern, 
2004). 
Chapter Five moves further back in time in the diagnostic process and examines how people describe 
their very first encounter with ADHD as potentially relevant in their lives. The role of recognition in 
lay and medical practices of identifying  ADHD is highlighted and the chapter suggests that a similar 
classificatory model is applied between the set of sites –  a phenomenon best described by 
Wittgenstein as ‘family resemblance’.  Chapter Five connects two main themes involved in the 
making of the diagnosis of ADHD in adults, namely memory and kinship. The chapter shows 
recognition to be one element of memory in the way that recognising entails a recollection process, as 
well as being part of relational practices, when recognising someone is already to acknowledge them.  
The following two chapters are therefore concerned with the role that kinship plays in the diagnostic 
process, through filial relations in Chapter Six and then through relationships with strangers in 
Chapter Seven. One particular moment of recognition is examined in Chapter Six, in which parents 
unexpectedly recognised themselves and their own difficulties in their diagnosed children and 
embarked on a reconstruction of their own childhood. The chapter’s main contribution to the overall 
argument of this thesis is to show how the recognition of a parent in her child, in itself a common 
occurrence, becomes an important extension of the diagnostic process for ADHD in adults. Thus 
parents are ‘made’ by children; firstly through the medical criteria that stipulate that ADHD in the 
child must precede ADHD in adults, and secondly through an upstream flow of knowledge from a 
child diagnosed with ADHD to an undiagnosed parent.  
 Chapter Seven examines how relations made on the basis of sharing common difficulties also apply 
outside the family circle extending into the support groups. The process of constructing such relations 
acquires a political dimension through the common search for recognition and resources. The chapter 
shows that, rather than using the discourse of ‘neurodiversity’ that describes a positive variation on 
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neurobiological norms, the bonds formed between members are discussed through the language of 
kinship, that is, caring, sharing and reciprocity.  
At this point, the process involved in giving and receiving a diagnosis of adult ADHD has been 
described and, in Chapter Eight, I return to the beginning to explore what people have to do to live 
with the diagnosis. Receiving a diagnosis makes treatments available and I describe how, in the 
context of ADHD where no cure is provided, stimulant medications have to be adapted to the 
specificity of each individual’s life and in that process medications participate in the making and 
maintaining of relationships.  Overall, this chapter suggests that living with ADHD requires 
endurance, which falters at times when events become overwhelming and at other times is revived 
and strengthened. I illustrate how the fragility and vulnerability of ordinary life described by the 
people I met can also be understood as life-affirming and creative through the form of pragmatic 
knowledge production.  
I end the thesis by revisiting its main ethnographic and methodological themes, putting them in the 
context of other academic work to argue that the diagnostic process for adult ADHD, as it exists in the 
UK at the beginning of the 21
st
 century, can only be accomplished through the combination of lay and 
medical practices, which together, are working to stabilise the classification of ADHD, even if only 
provisionally.  
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Chapter Two:  ADHD from childhood to adulthood: how children 
stopped ‘growing out of it’ 
 
 ‘The concept of ADHD is steadily permeating into adult psychiatry, but there is still resistance. Some 
of that resistance can be traced to history. The attempts of medicine to limit the use of drugs of 
dependence (including stimulants) made their value for ADHD hard to accept. The drive to avoid 
medicine becoming an agent of social control created alarm that exuberance might become 
medicalised. The attempts of classifications to make clear demarcations between normality and 
disorder, were threatened by the possibility that ADHD is but the extreme of a normal range of 
variation. It may therefore be helpful for adult psychiatrists to remember how significant they have 
been in the long history of ADHD. From Crichton’s descriptions in the eighteenth century, to 
Wender’s influence on the DSM-III definition, there have been mutual influences between child and 
adult formulations.’ (Taylor, 2011). 
During my fieldwork, I attended and participated in a number of conferences, some organised by and 
for scientists,
 
and others by a Patient Organisation
10
. There were many common features between 
these events, shown notably by speakers who presented a ‘state of the field’ to the audience.  Their 
narrative began by describing the ‘prehistory’ (Taylor, 2011) of the concept of ADHD and was 
followed by an account of the main stages of scientific development which have led up to the present 
classification.  Such presentations seemed to respond to a question commonly posed by people I met 
who were not familiar with ADHD:  ‘don’t children grow out of it?’ The above quote from a 
prominent contributor to the science of ADHD in the UK at one of those conferences, presents some 
of the obstacles that might have contributed firstly to the low acceptance of the notion of ADHD in 
adulthood, and secondly to the idea that history might be helpful for increasing the up-take of the 
concept by clinicians.  The questions I am asking in this chapter are related yet reversed; how did a 
childhood disorder become conceivable for adults? Whereas Professor Taylor’s emphasis was to 
                                                          
10
 I attended four international and two national conferences organised by UKAAN (UK Adult ADHD Network) 
between 2010 and 2013. I attended two national conferences organised by ADDISS (Attention Deficit Disorder 
Information and Support Service) in 2012 and 2013.  
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elucidate the reasons why the notion of adult ADHD was struggling to establish itself, I wish to keep 
the category of ADHD open and ask — what kind of world makes the translation of ADHD from 
childhood to adulthood possible?   
Therefore the first section of this chapter will plot the history of ADHD, as a category and 
classification. My account is inspired by the context of the clinic I spent time in, so as to highlight the 
entanglements between events at a macro and micro level. I will draw on an interview with a clinician 
to explore how bureaucratic and scientific practices of bridging and harmonisation at local and global 
level made it possible for adults to be diagnosed with ADHD. Thus I will trace movements between 
sub-fields of psychiatry, namely neuropsychiatry and developmental psychiatry, as well as between 
different classification systems such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) and the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD).  The fluidity and changeability of the notions I 
describe suggests, perhaps  unpredictably, that the present conception of ADHD is not the result of a 
‘linear development of continuous and cumulative knowledge or a sequence of sudden turning-points, 
discoveries, inventions and revolutions plunging a suddenly outmoded past instantly into oblivion…’ 
(Serres, 1995: ).  Instead ADHD emerges out of clinical and bureaucratic practices that are tentative 
and changeable, that rely on the relations between people, classifications and institutions, and on the 
translations necessary between them. This is not to say that ADHD (or its history) is fabricated, or that 
it does not have a purchase in reality. On the contrary, it is precisely the action, involvement and 
entanglement of the people I met with classifications and other bureaucracies which make ADHD 
what it is in the UK.  
The second part of the chapter will focus on the practices that I observed in the clinic and in asking – 
how do we know what ADHD is in the clinic? – it shows the central role that remembering and 
forgetting plays in the diagnostic process.  More specifically I examine the administrative measures 
that have been put in place in order to compensate for the forgetfulness of patients and the resultant 
high ratio of non-attendance to appointments. Exploring how a clinic adapts , or not, its administrative 
practices to the specificity of the patient, leads me to ask a similar question of the clinical procedures, 
and examine what it takes to be a good historian, a crucial skill in the diagnostic evidential tool box.  
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The administrative and clinical procedures I describe highlight the paradoxical practices involved in 
diagnosing ADHD in adults:  on the one hand, patients are recognised as facing difficulties with 
recall, yet, on the other, recollection is central to the diagnostic process. These contradictions, mixed 
messages and double binds (Bateson, 1972; 1956) have to be held together through pragmatic 
solutions. 
 
Pushing back the history of ADHD 
 
The historical presentations given in conferences varied in their level of detail, but on all occasions 
they contained an example of the ‘prehistory’ of ADHD which started with the story from 
‘Struwwelpeter’ (Slovenly Peter), a children’s book written by Heinrich Hoffman in 1845 (Hoffmann 
et al., 1999). This book of morality tales written for children has one character amongst others, 
Fidgety Phil, who has now acquired the status of eponym for ADHD (Budrys, 2005). The nursery 
rhymes describe Phil, who cannot stay still at the table; 
‘He wriggles and giggles and then I declare, swung backward and forward, and tilts up his 
chair just like any rocking horse.’ (Hoffmann et al., 1999). 
He eventually falls down, bringing the table cloth and everything with it crashing to the floor. One 
hundred and fifty years on, the anecdote resonates with the experience of people with ADHD. The 
fact that the author had a medical background, a physician who became a psychiatrist, also seems to 
support the view that ‘Struwwelpeter can be considered the first description of ADHD symptoms by a 
psychiatrist and, thus represents an important document of medical history’ (Thome and Jacobs, 2004: 
306)
11
.   
Within the contested field that is ADHD, where the concept is disputed as being a modern 
phenomenon and a recent social construction, it is important for people living and working with 
                                                          
11
 For ADHD history through other arts, such as painting and poetry see (Bonazza et al., 2011; Kast and 
Altschuler, 2008) 
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ADHD to establish an official history which demonstrates how people experienced forgetfulness and 
hyperactivity in their past. The concept of history as the site for truth was never made more evident 
than in an article published in 2009 by one of the foremost clinician working with ADHD: ‘History of 
ADHD pushed back to 1798! [H]istorians can now assert that the initial medical description of ADHD 
began in 1798 – a remarkable 210 years ago’ (R. Barkley, 2009: 2)12.  The article suggests that the 
description of patients’ symptoms by Alexander Crichton, a Scottish physician corresponds closely to 
the contemporary criteria for ADHD. What is often held as the most ‘scientific’ reference of this kind 
is the work of Sir George Still at the turn of the 20
th
 century, who described case studies of children 
that showed ‘defects of moral control as a morbid manifestation, without general impairment of 
intellect and without physical disease’ (Still, 1902: 1079). Often referred to as the ‘founding father of 
Paediatrics’, he is also credited, in the context of ADHD, with a biological explanation of behaviours 
– yet the language of his explanation is anchored in moral judgement.  He defined defects of moral 
control as ‘the immediate gratification of self without regard either to the good of others or to the 
larger and more remote good of self (Still, 1902: 1009).  Through his observations, he described 
children as undisciplined, over emotional, not able to sustain attention, nor to learn from the 
consequences of their actions. 
So far these historical examples have been concerned with the retrospective interpretation of 
symptoms in children. What of adults? Mostly when examining adult ADHD, it is the history of the 
disorder in children that is discussed but the relations between the behaviours observed in children in 
the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, and their relevance for adults of the same period, goes unexplained. 
Furthermore, the examples of ADHD in adults during past eras are drawn solely from the literary and 
cultural world, not from medicine. Thus Lord Byron’s restlessness and creative mind or Mozart’s 
peculiar and eccentric behaviour have been compared to ADHD-like behaviours (Ashoori and 
Jankovic, 2007; Fitzgerald, 2001). Such an approach to historical analysis has been critiqued.  
Historians of medicine have pointed out the difficulties of trans-historical comparison of prototypes 
from different eras; for example, symptomatic behaviours are only coherent within the cultural 
                                                          
12
 The date has been pushed back again to 1775 see Barkley and Peters (2012). 
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context in which they are proposed (Berrios, 1999; Smith, 2012). Such use of historical and 
retrospective diagnosis is better considered to represent the ideological battle that is taking place in 
the present (Smith, 2010). Nonetheless this historical narrative is now, by sheer repetition if nothing 
else, accepted, and its linear description of progressive understanding can be found in numerous 
manuals and articles relating to ADHD ( Barkley, Murphy, and Fischer, 2008; Doyle, 2004; Hodgkins 
et al., 2011; Lange et al., 2010; Taylor, 2007). Little reference is made to the idea that ADHD was a 
disorder of childhood that would resolve itself during maturation.  How was it that children were no 
longer growing out of it? Seeking historical evidence of ADHD in the distant past, as if a static object 
of analysis, does not answer this question.  
There are other historical inquiries into ADHD, some trace the role of psychotropic medicine and in 
particular stimulant medication (Rasmussen, 2008), while others have highlighted how ‘the brain 
race’ of the cold war period contributed to the making of ADHD by changing schooling expectations. 
Yet others point to the effect of additives used in the food industry in the 1970s (Smith, 2011, 2012)
13
. 
In the clinic, conversations were pragmatically orientated towards histories of clinical and 
administrative practices. From the start of my fieldwork, I found myself intrigued by the unfamiliar 
description of ADHD as a ‘neurodevelopmental disorder’ and I subsequently realised that this term 
was omnipresent; the clinic itself was part of a Neurodevelopmental Disorder Service; the clinicians I 
worked with published in a medical journal called Neurodevelopmental Disorders; scientific 
conferences were regularly entitled as such. As my conversations with clinicians showed, this is a 
recent concept in psychiatry
14
, and new ideas and hopes are being attached to the prefix ‘neuro’ 15, 
claiming diversity (neurodiversity) and complexity (neuroplasticity) rather than linearity and 
convergence
16
.  
                                                          
13
 For other social inquiries into the history of ADHD see (Lakoff, 2000; Rafalovich, 2001; Singh, 2002). 
14
 A search in PubMed showed that the first publication with the term anywhere in the text was in 1968. (Keith, 
1968). 
15
 See (Rose, 2013) for an in-depth and critical look into other uses of the prefix ‘neuro’.  
16
 The following descriptions of neurodevelopmental disorders, executive functions and working memory are 
based on information I gathered in the clinic through informal conversations, training and conferences.  
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One crucial element in the reconceptualisation of ADHD as a lifespan condition, is that of a 
neurodevelopmental disorder which affects individuals from birth onwards, even if its presence is not 
evident all of the time (Buitelaar, 2011).  ADHD is only one of a number of conditions that are 
classified thus; there are also learning or intellectual disabilities, autism spectrum disorder and motor 
disorders
17
. Common to all these condition is that impairments, often related to social functioning 
become apparent early in the development of the child. The age of onset becomes in itself a diagnostic 
clue for differentiating between conditions as symptoms that may appear similar may point to 
different diagnoses if observed in different years of childhood. Thus symptoms of impulsivity may be 
attributed to a Personality Disorder if they start in the teenage years, whereas the same symptoms 
would be linked to ADHD if they occurred before the age of seven. Similarly, difficulties in social 
interactions may be linked to autism if they are observed before the age of three years old, but 
considered part of ADHD if they emerge later on. The neurodevelopmental concept implies that there 
is an organic basis for disorders within the brain of the individual throughout her life. 
 
Working memory rather than textbook memory 
 
Of particular importance within neurodevelopmental theories is a focus on the impact of executive 
functions on cognitive abilities including working memory (Bishop and Rutter, 2008; Brown, 2002).  
Executive functions are described in terms of neurological activities that take place within the front 
lobes of the brain and which are related to sustaining attention, forward planning, self-monitoring, 
organisation and generally controlling and monitoring the processing of information. The common 
analogy used in self-help literature is one of the ‘chief executive’ of an organisation or the ‘conductor 
of an orchestra’ who ensures that all runs well and stays in tune.  The scientific terminology varies 
between different authors and disciplines (Barkley, 2012; Brown, 2013) but all agree that working 
                                                          
17
 The WHO defines neurodevelopmental disorders as ‘disabilities in the functioning of the brain that affect a 
child’s behaviour, memory or ability to learn.’ http://tinyurl.com/p8de5bl Accessed on 16/12/2013. 
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memory plays a crucial role in ADHD impairments. Baddeley, who played an important role in 
developing working memory theory, described working memory as: 
‘a system for holding and manipulating information during the performance of complex cognitive 
activities such as reasoning and active learning. As such, it can be regarded as the temporary memory 
system that underpins coherent thought.’ (Baddeley in Alloway and Gathercole, 2006: xii).  
 In other words working memory is related to the ability to keep information available while at the 
same time performing a task; it is the ability to retain the beginning of sentence when someone speaks 
in order to understand the point made at the end.  A clinician with personal experience of ADHD 
offered me this metaphor in explanation: 
Dr Karl: “Working memory can be thought of in terms of a computer’s RAM, that is how 
many programs you can have open at the same time. The bigger your RAM, the more 
different things you can do simultaneously with ease.  Working memory helps you hold 
several concepts in your head at the same time… It’s not quite the same as multi-tasking, 
because the process comes effortlessly to non-ADHDers. They don’t even realise that they are 
doing it, it just comes automatically. So the ADHDer exhausts himself trying to do the same 
amount in a much smaller space.”  
In this context, forgetfulness is not about forgetting knowledge of the past, or at least not of the distant 
past, but of forgetting the ‘just-past’ and not being able to hold information within a kind of elongated 
present. By describing this short term memory as working memory, Baddeley (1999) added a sense 
that it was not a passive activity: even if we are not aware of retrieval and storing activities, memory 
is working constantly. People I met explained how they knew something was wrong, even if they did 
not know what, because of persistent absent-mindedness. The examples of forgetting that my 
participants shared with me, of not completing tasks or losing items, all related to everyday and 
ordinary actions. When they are performed without difficulty, these are practices repeated through 
habit, literally without thinking, or learnt by rote and embodied. Bloch suggested that the working 
memory theory can help account for our ability to ‘access our knowledge extraordinarily fast and 
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fluently…The actor does not necessarily know that she knows nor what she knows, nor how she has 
acquired her knowledge’ ( 2012: 193). Driving exemplifies a process of learning that takes place 
through repetition up to the point when it becomes ‘second nature’  and various sequences of actions 
can be repeated without thinking consciously about what is taking place
18
. Whilst I agree with Bloch 
that a large part of our knowledge is accessed without our being conscious of it, I also found Lave’s 
caution, that psychological explanations of learning and retaining mechanisms can locate ability and 
disability solely in the individual, to be equally important (1996). Therefore this thesis will pay 
attention to the way working-memory may be discussed by clinicians and patients as well as to the 
practices, mainly collective, that attempt to remediate and support a better functioning; in other words 
the thesis aims to situate memory in its live working context rather than presenting it as a an inert 
textbook.  
 
A foot in each camp 
 
Dr Goodman is a consultant psychiatrist with decades of experience in the UK and abroad and an 
extensive historical knowledge of the field of mental health and learning disabilities. Like other 
clinicians I met at the clinic, he was one of the few specialists concerned with adult ADHD in the UK. 
At the time he worked within a neurodevelopmental disorder service, sharing his time between 
sessions at the adult ADHD clinic, and acting as the lead clinician for an inpatient unit.  I observed his 
assessments in both settings and had a number of informal conversations in between appointments – 
our discussions were often jovial and light in tone.  As with other participants in the clinic and support 
groups, I found that formal interview techniques introduced a serious and sober mode of 
communication despite my best efforts to conduct them in a conversational style
19
. I asked Dr 
                                                          
18
 Some participants have described difficulties with driving such as keeping focus and judging distance. Some 
research has shown a greater propensity by adults with ADHD for road incidents and traffic penalties (Jerome et 
al., 2006).  
19
 I conducted formal interviews towards the end of my fieldwork when all participants had known me for 9 to 
12 months. The issues raised here hint at the performative aspects of interviews, and my interviewees all had 
very strong views and reasons for ensuring that their message was convincing and that their participation would 
help towards the legitimisation of a contested disorder (Denzin, 2001; Holstein and Gubrium, 2004). 
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Goodman a question about the name of his service, the neurodevelopmental disorder service, and how 
this term came to be used in psychiatry.  
Dr Goodman: “Developmental psychiatry was a kind of another name for child psychiatry in 
the old days, the branch of psychiatry that deals with conditions that arise in the 
developmental stages. So, nowadays, with I think, a growing interest in neuropsychiatry, 
better imaging techniques, other kind of investigations, an organic basis can be shown in 
almost every condition.  Personality Disorder is now supposed to have an organic basis, so it's 
kind of, the boundaries have become more and more blurred.”  
His reference to new technology provides a timescale for the conceptual move towards attributing an 
organic and biological basis to psychiatric conditions. Imaging technologies have been used in 
research rather than clinical assessments since the 1980s but as Dr Goodman is also pointing out, the 
technology in the last decade has improved.  It is now used to explore the neuro-anatomy of disorders 
like  ADHD by studying static maps of the brain (structural imaging) and dynamic maps of neural 
activity (functional imaging).  To this picture of scientific progress, Dr Goodman adds that 
disciplinary boundaries between developmental and neuropsychiatry are no longer so pronounced. It 
suggests a progressive change, rather than a complete replacement which, as he explains more 
specifically about ADHD, leaves space for different concepts to co-exist:  
Dr Goodman: “ADHD was always kind of stuck between neuropsychiatry and developmental 
psychiatry.  I think nowadays people start to talk about developmental neuropsychiatry which 
is I think a bridge between the two. So, neuropsychiatry is a branch of psychiatry that deals 
with mental disorders that have an organic basis and brain kind of basis; whereas 
developmental psychiatry deals with conditions that arise from childhood and then persist into 
adulthood, like mental disabilities, autism and ADHD. For conditions like ADHD, which has 
a presumed organic basis, therefore within neuropsychiatry, but also is a childhood condition 
that arises in the developmental period and persists into adulthood, then I think it has a foot in 
each camp.” 
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In describing different branches of psychiatry bridged by this new model of neurodevelopment, Dr 
Goodman is pointing out how disciplinary models and concepts persist in time and continue to be 
situated in different camps. Whilst there may be new scientific technology for understanding 
psychiatric disorders, like imaging tools, the way psychiatry is done remains grounded in institutional 
structures whereby psychiatrists specialise in working with children or adults, with brains or 
behaviours.  On the one hand, Dr Goodman described a new neurodevelopmental concept, which 
provides new explanations and a new narrative bringing together different stages of life, and 
conceiving the individual as a whole. On the other hand, Dr Goodman situates this meta-narrative 
within a fragmented and moving field of practice between child and adult psychiatry. More than that, 
there are practitioners and clinicians behind the disciplinary sub-types of neuro and developmental 
psychiatry who actually do the bridging, as he continues to describe in reference to his training days: 
Dr Goodman: “I remember talking to my consultant about [the organic basis of disorders], we 
were seeing a patient together and we saw somebody with a delusional system and 
hallucination and I would say – what we need to do is to distinguish whether this is 
schizophrenia or a brain disorder. He said – “schizophrenia is a brain disorder” [laughter].” 
Claude: “There is a neurodevelopmental theory of schizophrenia?” 
Dr Goodman: “Yes absolutely, yes it was Murray who did some work about two decades ago. 
Although it kind of manifests itself around typically late teens, childhood onset schizophrenia 
is very rare. This hypothesis says that schizophrenia is actually there when you are born, it 
just manifests itself later on, so it is a neurodevelopmental disorder, and I think that's 
generally accepted. Now, of course it’s not the only explanation [laughter].” 
This comment on schizophrenia as a brain disorder, with an organic basis rather than a psychological, 
remained with Dr Goodman for a couple of decades.  The bridging took time, it took a lot of research 
and building, but it seems that a neurodevelopmental concept of schizophrenia developed by Murray 
around the time of that conversation in the 1980s is now well accepted (Murray and Lewis, 1987; 
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Rapoport et al., 2005).  The role of individuals and interactions between colleagues in establishing 
concepts was made even clearer when Dr Goodman discussed the clinic we were in:  
Dr Goodman: “The history of the ADHD clinic, kind of reflects that [ADHD has a foot in 
both camps], because the ADHD clinic before Professor Jones and myself were involved, 
started within the neuropsychiatry section.  That was because one of the neuropsychiatrists 
had a special interest in ADHD, so he started a clinic which was essentially devoting one half 
day of his week to see patients specifically with ADHD. Then when he retired and there was 
no interest from other neuropsychiatrists to take that on under the roof of neuropsychiatry, the 
neurodevelopmental section so to speak, showed an interest, and we kind of took it under our 
wing.”20 
Beyond this disciplinary positioning, individual clinicians pursue and develop their interests and 
expertise through meeting colleagues and patients. Institutional and bureaucratic boundaries can be 
negotiated when it comes to new and emergent concepts such as adult ADHD.  Where it should be 
based was left to pragmatic and practical circumstances, if not to humanitarian considerations through 
the medical principle of reducing suffering.  Indeed some of the actions taken by clinicians towards 
delivering services can be seen in the light of a tradition that combines medicine and social activism 
(Bassuk and Carman, 1996; Loomis, 2015) where,  as Paul Farmer advocated , ‘science is always 
already part of an “activist” agenda’(2008). A number of clinicians shared the thought that they 
considered their role to be of advocacy when services were denied to patients despite national policies 
and guidance, such as when GPs refused to prescribe stimulant treatments recommended by NICE.  
The restructuring of the clinic, from Neuropsychiatry to Neurodevelopment, could be explained 
through a discourse of scientific progress in locating ADHD within developmental concerns, or even 
managerial interests in costs and resources. But Dr Goodman points out that this departmental shift 
was about handing over care, the care of existing patients, whereby the clinic and its patients were 
taken under the wing of clinicians.  
                                                          
20
 See (Young and Toone, 2000) for a description of the first NHS adult ADHD clinic.  
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‘Repairing a plane while keeping it flying’ (Bernstein, 2011)21 
 
The imminent publication of the DSM-5 during my fieldwork provoked me to ask about the inclusion 
of the neurodevelopmental concept in the new version of the diagnostic manual. The DSM-5 task 
force, after years of consultation, published its manual on 31/5/13 with a revised structure 
emphasising a lifespan approach, organising the texts in an almost biographical manner. The disorders 
that are diagnosed mostly in childhood are placed at the beginning of the book and the disorders 
associated with old age towards the end. The task force makes its intention very clear in the 
introduction:  
‘To improve clinical utility, DSM-5 is organised on developmental and lifespan considerations… This 
organizational structure facilitates the comprehensive use of lifespan information as a way to assist in 
diagnostic decision making (APA, 2013: 13). 
The manual gives a prominent position to the neurodevelopmental concept through its internal 
structure and names its first chapter after it. In this chapter, neurodevelopmental disorders are briefly 
introduced as ‘a group of conditions with onset in the developmental period [which] produce 
impairments of personal, social, academic, or occupational functioning’ (ibid.: 31). The introduction 
also highlights that co-morbidity between disorders is frequent and clinical presentation will likely 
‘include[s] symptoms of excess as well as deficits and delays in achieving expected 
milestones’(Ibid.).  In the space of thirteen lines the DSM lines up the complexity and difficulty of 
identifying specific ailments by listing all eventualities in an inventory; clinicians have to look for too 
much or not enough of particular symptoms, they also have to consider that these may be layered on 
one another and may be relevant to different categories, in the context of age norms. Much criticism is 
made of the DSM, its validity and impact, including the very project of categorising human 
behaviours as if they represented ‘the nature or reality of the varieties of mental illness’ (Hacking, 
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  Commenting on the DSM revision process, Bernstein asked how the improvement of the classification could 
take place without disrupting clinical practice.  
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2013:  6) 
22
. However the explicit inclusion of the age context and life stage in diagnosis provokes 
also a more holistic consideration of individuals. In particular it considers temporal factors to have a 
crucial impact on life trajectories of individuals, and suggests that impairments may be experienced 
differently at different moments in life with a potentially cumulative effect over time.  I asked Dr 
Goodman what he thought of the addition into the DSM-5
23
:  
 
Dr Goodman: “There is a tendency to talk about lifespan conditions, you don’t have 
childhood schizophrenia and adult schizophrenia or childhood ADHD and adult ADHD. You 
have ADHD that manifests in similar ways perhaps with differences in different age groups.” 
According to this view, the idea that childhood could have distinctive disorders no longer holds. 
Instead ADHD may be expressed and experienced differently due to different life circumstances 
prevailing in childhood, adolescence and adulthood, but organically, it is the same thing. 
Just as Dr Goodman suggested, scrutiny of previous editions of the DSM show that the concept of 
neurodevelopmental disorders was established through small changes over time. The previous 
version, DSM-IV, mentioned no neurodevelopmental disorder. Instead it had a distinct childhood 
section with a first sentence at pains to diminish the theoretical basis for such organisation:   
‘The provision of a separate section for disorders that are usually first diagnosed in infancy , 
childhood, or adolescence is for convenience only, and is not meant to suggest that there is any clear 
distinction between childhood and adult disorders’(APA: 1995: 39). 
Written 19 years before the recent version of the DSM-5, this caveat seems to be paving the way, 
albeit quite slowly, for the removal of a specific childhood section.  It seems that it was just a matter 
of time before a distinction between child and adult disorders would be erased, and this implication is 
                                                          
22
  Hacking’s main point here is that DSM is used by clinicians for bureaucratic reasons rather than clinical 
ones; they use the prototypes that they become familiar with. My data will concur and provide some nuance to 
this view as, even in the UK, the DSM is explicitly referred to by clinicians in their daily practice; see Chapter 
Five.  
23
 The change of numeral use for the DSM from Roman (DSM-IV) to Arabic (DSM-5) has not been formally 
explained, and may be the result of a pragmatic decision to make forthcoming revisions easier to enumerate.  
P a g e  | 52 
 
also evident in the previous edition, albeit more subtly
24
.   Is this indicative of a broader change in the 
conception of childhood or even of its disappearance (Aries, 1962; Postman, 2011; Sommerville, 
1982)? The official history and the neurodevelopmental paradigm present a continuous person, yet 
they retain the marks of breaks and of transitions between a state of childhood and one of adulthood. 
As much as childhood is a concept understood differently within specific cultures, its biological 
context remains within a life course that includes adulthood (Stephens, 1995).  I would suggest that 
the categories of ‘child’ and ‘adult’ are not stable precisely because ‘the contour of each comes to be 
formed in relation to the other’ (Das, 2014: 60). Thus rethinking ADHD in terms of a lifespan may 
affirm the concept of the child as a potential adult, and also blur the boundaries between the two 
states, so that ways of being that were thought of as specific to children are now considered relevant 
for the ‘whole’ person.  
Of further significance in the transition between DSM-IV and DSM-5 was the removal of the 
behavioural emphasis that had been established since 1968 when the DSM-III was produced. The 
DSM-5 replaces the concept of behavioural disorder by a shift of focus towards the brain, a focus 
which is then coupled to the notion of development. This change represents a kind of double 
reductionism where brain and developmental change are set as norms that naturalise, biologise and 
quantify ways of being.  It is after all in the zeitgeist of the 2000s to describe psychiatric illnesses 
through the medium of the brain and neurology, as aptly mapped  by Rose (2013) 
25
. But the addition 
of ‘development’ to the concept is also part of a positivist idea of science and progress and a cultural 
representation of lifecourse specific to the western world (LeVine, 2007).  
In the context I have discussed so far, ‘development’ refers directly to the individual’s cognitive 
changes across a lifetime; just as it is also a meta-narrative applied to biology as it is to environment, 
                                                          
24
 This gradual change of perception is arguably part of a broader shift in our conception of disease progression 
through the development of genetic sciences.  The period between the 1990s and 2013 coincides with very 
visible scientific advances, such as the mapping of the genome, which have forced a reconceptualisation of ‘life 
itself’. For an overview see Lock and Nguyen (2010), Rose (2007). 
25
 The decade of the brain, launched in the 1990s by President Bush, has now been revived by President Obama, 
in the hope of doing for the brain what was done for the genome, that is to build a map of its activity. See New 
York Times 17/02/13 http://tinyurl.com/nrzkrdy  Accessed 8/05/2014.  
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economics and politics.  It is a discourse that assumes a move forward, or more to the point, upward, 
from lower to higher in an implicit hierarchy whereby children, people or countries require 
developing to reach normative levels of functioning. This logic of development produces ‘a feeling of 
inevitability’ (Hacking, 2002: 22) and implies that if individuals or nations fail to progress and 
develop to their expected potential, then they are seen to be lacking, behind and backwards 
(Armstrong, 2011; Timimi et al., 2011). Furthermore, developmental notions such as turning points 
and milestones confirm the sense that the course of a life moves forward step-by-step, within 
normative frames. Such notions have implications for the way people perceive and discuss their lives 
– an idea which forms an important part of this thesis. Sophie Day (2007) showed how the description 
of a life course as undisrupted, planned and predictable may favour a particular kind of narrative best 
constructed by the well-educated; it lays the responsibility of failure and success with the individual.  
Day’s work with sex workers foregrounds how an inability or unwillingness to follow such a pre-
mapped biography can have unhealthy consequences: 
‘Health problems can follow from rather than cause biographical disruption. They are a 
consequence of the refusal to live out a story of progress, to embody the integration and 
reintegration mandated by the state, and to tie a peculiarly complicated series of publics and 
privates into a coherent whole’ (ibid: 229-230). 
Trying to fit within the normative expectations of an already delineated life course, yet wanting to 
retain what made it one’s unique and personal story was part of the ambivalence presented by people 
in the clinic and support groups. The narrative of the neurodevelopmental concept is doubly powerful 
and convincing as it moves responsibility from individuals onto the brain, and posits development as 
normative progress.
 
Developmental norms are often translated in educational techniques that are 
rigidly applied to meet particular milestones. Amongst the people I met, these pre-figured norms were 
often experienced as obstacles which highlighted their weaknesses and obscured their strengths.  
In a small pamphlet, Michel Serres (2006) pays homage to bridges, some from of his childhood, some 
ancient, some modern, He subtitled this work ‘Homo Pontifex ‘in order to position architecture at the 
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core of human experience. Of particular relevance is his discussion of bridges as symbols of relations, 
using ‘bridge’ as a verb rather than a noun, to bridge and bring together:  ‘we bridge everything that 
comes into our hands’(ibid.: 42 my translation). In his hands, bridging becomes a method of 
translation, of change and transformation and of reaching towards the other side. He points out that 
just as bridges have tolls giving authorisation to cross over, relations require mediators
26
, contracts 
and agreements.  In other words there must be some exchange in order to form new relations. Dr 
Goodman talked of the emergence of the neurodevelopment model as a bridge between different 
branches of psychiatry and as the combination of different concepts to make a new one. In his view it 
was not a theoretical replacement, a revolution, a break or a paradigm change (Kuhn, 2012). If there is 
a cost to bridging, as Serres suggested, then it may be that the double reductionism I described is an 
after-effect of the new concept of neurodevelopment.  This should not overshadow the opportunities 
created by an act of reaching out, and just as bridges make it possible to reach new landscapes, re-
conceiving difficulties, such as forgetfulness and impulsivity, in neurodevelopmental terms may also 
bring about new modes of existence.  
The addition in the DSM-5 of a chapter on neurodevelopmental disorders is significant, if only 
because it legitimises the use of the term. It is not contentious to state that psychiatric concepts have a 
tendency to seep into everyday vernacular, and the acceptance of a new term in that field is but the 
first step in the process of making certain concepts ubiquitous.  
Tracing the changes of names, terms and concepts also highlights how this process occurred 
tentatively over decades; nothing tells us that the present configuration is the necessary end point of 
years of research and clinical practice. In fact what we know now as ADHD is as controversial and 
unsettled, if not more so, as the symptoms described in 1968. The scientific practices that have 
influenced the current nomenclature were not foreseen 45 years ago; nor are we now able to see all 
the different steps, including the stumbles and trips that led nowhere, that were necessary to get to this 
point. Such is the forgetting that most classifications go through in their lifetime, and this of course 
                                                          
26
 In an earlier book, Serres uses the term ‘parasite’ which could be defined as an operator that interrupts an 
exchange, or more simply as a middle man. I use ‘mediator’ for better intelligibility in English and in reference 
to Latour (2005).  
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gives a sense of finitude to the last version published (Bowker and Star, 1999). For everything that is 
included in a classification, many other things are disregarded or removed, yet their traces endure 
nonetheless. 
 
Taking a ‘crosswalk’ to harmonisation 
 
Dr Goodman, describing the hand-over of the clinic between disciplines, is one such trace and other 
traces can be found in the making of classifications. The DSM is one of a number of mental disorder 
classifications
27
, and it is often linked with the World Health Organisation’s International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). These systems have run in parallel for decades with notable 
differences and, for each revision (the ICD is on its 10
th
 version), task force groups are established to 
attempt to bridge the gaps, as Dr Goodman explained when I asked him what impact the changes in 
DSM-5 will have on the ICD classifications:  
Dr Goodman: “Just judging by the history, the ICD-9 and DSM-III had very little in common; 
the DSM-IV and ICD-10 were much more similar, in terms of the conditions that they 
included, still some differences. The phraseology that was used, before the ICD-8 And DSM-
II, were not so close, so there is a tendency for these two classification systems to kind of 
converge, I suspect that the ICD-11 will follow suit.” 
Claude: “But it has a long way to go, it is still much stricter in its criteria than the DSM-IV” 
Dr Goodman: “I don’t know, I haven’t heard anything specific about the ICD-11 widening the 
diagnostic criterion , but I suspect this is the tendency , that's the way it would probably go. 
Changes like the age of onset between seven and twelve, the number of symptoms, the types 
of ADHD, maybe even the name. It would be interesting, because the ICD hasn't got ADHD, 
it still calls it Hyperkinetic disorder, but as I was saying there is increasingly more overlap 
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 There are other classifications system developed and used in China or France for example.  
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between the two. I wouldn’t be surprised if there is a common name between ICD-11 and the 
DSM-5.” 
Dr Goodman’s intuition is based on his historical knowledge and, if one checks the online ICD-11 
revisions, his guess is validated
28
. It should not be a surprise since the World Health Organisation and 
its members participate and exist in the same world, with similar concerns as those involved in the 
revision of the DSM. Neuroimaging technologies and developmental notions are not restricted to the 
American Psychiatric Association. 
In conversations with clinicians during a training session
29
, there was a sense that the two systems 
were considered to be different and clinicians were surprised at the use of the DSM rather than the 
ICD criteria for diagnosing ADHD. They felt this was quite significant, as the official classification of 
mental disorders for the use of mental health professionals in the National Health Service in the UK is 
the ICD-10
30
. If the ICD-10 is used as normal practice why should ADHD be different?  More 
specifically they wondered how a diagnosis done through the DSM criteria would then be coded and 
recorded, as all NHS institutions use the ICD coding system for statistical purposes. How do you 
diagnose with one classification system and record the outcome with another?  This accounting role of 
medical classification systems has fuelled controversies for many decades, and is sometimes 
described as ‘diagnosing for dollars’ (Wylie, 1995), to emphasise the links with health insurance 
reimbursement. Mapping the different classificatory versions and moving between them may be 
disorientating; nevertheless I think it is worth exploring some historical details that have led to this 
situation.  
Bowker and Starr (1999) showed how medical classification systems, like the ICD and DSM, were 
formulated in an attempt to categorise and account for mortality in order to improve the state’s 
interventions in public health. By combining the identification of disorders with a codification 
                                                          
28
 A neurodevelopmental disorders category including Attention Deficit Disorder has been proposed to replace 
the present Hyperkinetic disorder. See online ICD revision: http://tinyurl.com/on7cmpg Accessed 20/05/2014. 
29
 In November 2012 I attended training sessions over three days delivered by UKAAN, a course accredited for 
Continuous Professional Development for psychiatrists. 
30
 See Royal College of Psychiatry press release. http://tinyurl.com/qjkllk2   Accessed 20/05/2014. 
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process, the DSM and the ICD attempted to standardise interventions in the hope of stimulating good 
practice as well as identifying the resources needed to support such interventions. To categorise 
illnesses and disorders provides the means to quantify their prevalence, and to plan for the resources 
required and the associated cost of treatments.  In the DSM, that combination of clinical and 
economical concern was made explicit in the third version, albeit in a reluctant and cautionary 
manner: 
‘The use of this manual for nonclinical purposes, such as determination of legal responsibility, 
competency or insanity, or justification for third-party payment, must be critically examined in each 
instance within the appropriate institutional context’ (APA 1980: 12). 
Statistics in the DSM, up to 1980, referred to the collating of medical information to further 
knowledge and scientific understanding, a process described in the DSM-II as  the ‘statistical coding 
of psychiatric case records’ (APA 1968: ix). But, as is made clear in the ensuing version, the manual 
was also used for non-medical purposes, including assessing reimbursement for treatment, which 
became a major use for the codes by the time DSM-IV was published (Dumit, 2006; Wylie, 1995).
31
  
As Bowker and Star (1999) showed, the process of developing this classification was achieved 
through continuous and often problematic interactions with numerous and varied bureaucratic 
agencies, amongst which health insurance companies featured prominently. Thus the coding for 
reimbursement and resource allocation for health costs in the USA became the remit of the ICD, 
including the costs for mental health disorders, which are diagnosed through the use of the DSM.  
How do you diagnose with one classification system and record the outcome with another?  In the 
USA, as in the UK, only ICD codes are accepted by the health insurance companies that process 
reimbursement claims. As this has been the practice in the USA for over 3 decades, institutions have 
had to produce reliable and consistent translations from one system to another in order for payments 
                                                          
31
 The connection between DSM and health insurances remains a major source of controversy as it is seen to be 
providing pharmaceutical companies with a vast market for their products. Furthermore a recent publication 
showed that 56% of the DSM panel members had one or more affiliations with a pharmaceutical company, 
suggesting a substantial opportunity for influence and lobby.(Cosgrove and Krimsky, 2012; Cosgrove et al., 
2006).  For more on the links between the pharmaceutical industry and DSM see (Frances, 2013; Kutchins and 
Kirk, 1997) 
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and reimbursement to be processed.  This translation process was formulated through a table of 
conversion (DSM on the left and ICD on the right) which was named ‘crosswalk’, a process that has 
now become so complex that it requires an automated translation software engine
32
.  Of course some 
codes have the potential to get lost in translation, thus the Hyperkinetic syndrome of childhood, coded 
314, or any syndrome making reference to Hyperkinesis in the ICD has no direct equivalent in the 
DSM.  Stranger still, the ADHD sub-type hyperactive/impulsive has no code in the DSM, despite 
being named, nor does it have any equivalent name or code in the ICD. It is difficult to know if these 
are glitches but it is likely that the published versions of the ICD and the DSM make the translation 
unstable in time as the delay in adapting new names and codes leaves the ‘crosswalk’ out of date. In 
this version, tens of diagnoses are without any correspondences at all or are out of date (Thompson 
and Pincus, 1989). And the continuous process of revising the ‘crosswalk’ twice yearly, whilst 
showing signs of rapprochement, is never ending and lags on average a decade behind. The APA has 
already announced that the ICD-11 coding due to be published in 2015 will not be used in the USA 
for a decade or more
33
.   
When Dr Goodman described the standardisation of these classifications from a historical perspective, 
the mismatched, ill-fitting work I have just described disappeared; instead he offered a vision of 
convergence between the two classifications which, in time, will come to be harmonised and ‘sing 
from the same hymn sheet’34. Fleck (1979) used this musical analogy to great effect in describing a 
process of tuning between different parties in order to be comprehensible to each other and to enable 
new concepts to be gradually accepted. As I have shown, it is a tentative process, one that is never 
totally achieved and, in the case of the classification systems described above, there are still dissonant 
notes or codes that can be heard and noticed. Fleck also pointed out how the sense of harmony that is 
found once controversies or ill-fitting correspondences are resolved, also obscures the process of 
                                                          
32
 The American Psychological Association Practice organisation: http://tinyurl.com/7y58rqw Accessed 
20/05/2014. 
33
 ICD Codes for Some DSM-5 Diagnoses Updated. Psychiatric News October 2013: http://tinyurl.com/lvytm55 
Accessed 20/05/2014. 
34
 This metanarrative of harmonisation is found in the names of DSM revision working groups (DSM-ICD 
Harmonization Coordination Group) and repeatedly in articles published on the subject (First, 2009; Jablensky, 
2009). 
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attunement. He called this ‘the harmony of illusion’, not to deny the reality of the new fact agreed 
upon, but to highlight firstly that this reality depends on the work necessary to access it and secondly 
that it is not as an objective fact discovered, already complete. In other words, as Young succinctly 
puts it, ‘there is no representing without intervening’ (Young, 1997: 10). 
The revisions of the DSM and ICD, with all their meetings, field trial reports, conferences, 
consultations, as well as the translation and alignment work required, are steps and practices towards 
producing knowledge. What I have shown is that this process has a trajectory that twists and turns, 
speeds up and slows down, depending on the trials and errors of many people and institutions; in other 
words  the traces I have followed suggest a labyrinthine  model of knowledge production rather than a 
straight line (Stengers 2010: 187). 
 
Remembering forgetfulness 
 
In the first part of this chapter I asked how a classification which was specifically allocated to children 
was translated to fit adults. I have shown how the emergence of a new concept, neurodevelopmental 
disorders, gradually changed the perception of ADHD away from a behavioural model towards a 
lifespan vision that combines brain and progress. I examined classificatory texts as actants in the 
making of ADHD with the same ‘activity, the same materiality, the same complicity, the same 
historicity, as any other event’ (Serres and Latour, 1995: 130). I have proposed that the 
neurodevelopmental turn in psychiatry has implications for the ways that people conceive and discuss 
continuity in their lives, a crucial element in the psychiatric diagnostic process and therefore of 
importance to this thesis.  In the second part of this chapter I want to continue exploring what ADHD 
might be like from a medical point of view and I focus on forgetfulness as an actant within local 
administrative and clinical practices of the clinic.  
The issue of DNA (Did Not Attend) is particularly high on the agenda for NHS managers since it 
impacts on costs generally and on waiting times specifically. A range of tools are used to analyse the 
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rate of non-attendance and the factors involved. Advice from the NHS institute suggested to managers 
that they should consider organisational factors as well as specific services parameters that could 
contribute to individuals not attending their appointments. Patient factors, as they are known, include 
age, childcare, prohibitive transport costs and also categories such as ‘too unwell to travel ‘or ‘the 
nature of illness’35. Thus services adjust their expected rate of DNA to their specific patient group. In 
the case of the adult ADHD clinic this meant taking into consideration the fact that the propensity to 
forget appointments may be part of the reason for the referral in the first place. It is worth noting that 
the overall rates of not attending psychiatric appointments were estimated to be 19% in 2003, ranging 
between 15% to 28% depending on sites and specialisation, in contrast to an average of 11% in the 
NHS as a whole (Mitchell and Selmes, 2007). Outpatient referral statistics in England in the last 
quarter of 2014 were recording 8% DNA
36
. The figures collated in 2012 by the clinic I was based in 
ranged from 0% to 4% with an average of 1%.  At first glance those figures are surprising; what could 
be the reason for such difference between the local and national rate of non-attendance? Studies on 
this issue across all NHS services, including by the National Audit Office, list the main reason for 
non-attendance as ‘forgetting’ followed by ‘too unwell’ (Dockery et al., 2001; Hamilton et al., 2002; 
Mitchell and Selmes, 2007; Pal, Taberner et al., 1998). It is therefore rather paradoxical that a clinic 
specialising towards individuals whose main symptoms are related to forgetfulness had such a low 
rate of non-attendance.  
There are many ways for managers to ensure that targets for DNAs are set and met. The specific 
definition of DNAs, differentiating between first appointment and follow-up appointments, or even 
the quality of data collection, could explain the disparity in the figures shown above.  But my 
observations in the clinic suggested that there were other kinds of actions too that could suggest why 
the figure of DNA was so low. To explain this I want to explore the practices of the administrative 
and clinical team prior to and during the appointment day, starting with the referral which indicates 
the beginning of the clinic’s involvement with the care of individuals.  The description arises from my 
                                                          
35
 For further details on the list of factors see NHS institute website for the document Reducing Did Not Attend 
see http://tinyurl.com/3opjwnf Accessed 20/05/2014. 
36
 See (NHS England 30/5/14) http://tinyurl.com/q6yvgdl  Accessed 20/05/2014. 
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participation in administrative tasks in the clinic, for which I received training through verbal and 
written instructions provided by senior administrators.  
When a referral was first received a number of administrative tasks were required; it needed to be 
dated, stamped and scanned into an electronic register in order to track its progress. Then followed a 
triage process: what kind of intervention was requested? Was it a new assessment, a follow up 
assessment, a second opinion, or a medication titration? The referral was then entered into the 
electronic patient record, or a new record created if appropriate and then added to the waiting list. The 
funding from referrers needed to be confirmed, a process which could take up to 8 weeks
37
. When 
funding was confirmed, the patient was allocated to a clinician, then a paper file was created to 
include the referral letter and other information, such as previous assessments. At that point, a 
‘bookable letter’ was sent in order to confirm that the referral had been accepted and to request that 
the patient contact the clinic to make an appointment. The bookable letter was accompanied by one 
questionnaire for the patient and another one for relatives. If the patient had not made any contact by 
the time they had reached the top of the waiting list, a phone call was made to book a date. This was 
followed by a letter of confirmation of the date with basic information about the clinic and further 
questionnaires, this time much longer pre-assessment scales running to 26 pages.  Behind the explicit 
administrative role of these communications, lay an implicit reminding role for the patient that was 
acknowledged by the team. One administrator described it as ‘keeping the patient on track’ during the 
months of waiting, because as she said “they are really bad at remembering appointments”. Finally 
two or three days before the appointment a ‘courtesy call’ was made by the administrator to remind 
the patient of the scheduled time and the necessity to bring the pre-assessment rating scales with them 
to the clinic
38
. On the day of the appointment, communication with the patient became the role of the 
clinical team, mostly nurses but sometimes also trainee psychiatrists. If a patient had not presented at 
the reception desk at the time set, the clinician would attempt to contact them by phone. If they were 
successful, they rescheduled the appointment there and then, as patients would usually still be at home 
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 This clinic is a national specialist clinic and receives referral from the whole of England and Wales; the cost 
of assessments and treatment is expected to be funded by the local NHS commissioners. 
38
 By the end of my fieldwork this was done by automated texts.  
P a g e  | 62 
 
or at work having forgotten the appointment. Patients were rescheduled sometimes three or four times 
and became well known to the team, even before attending the clinic. When patients were seen at the 
clinic they often forgot to bring the pre-assessment rating scales with them, and so were asked to fill 
them in during the break between the two assessments.  
For the team, the patient’s forgetfulness created work; administrative tasks, phone calls, accessing 
electronic patient records, contacting reception to book rooms,  accessing doctors’ calendars. But it 
also created time, as nurses and doctors often found themselves with a spare 90 minutes; in fact this 
occurred so frequently that nurses completed other administrative tasks such as assessment report 
writing, as a matter of routine as if it were scheduled within their working day. DNAs were the source 
of contradictory feelings in the clinic; on one hand a DNA could be a relief on a busy day, it gave a 
chance to do reports, emails etc. But it also meant that you could not perform your main task of 
carrying out assessments. Staff knew that DNAs meant no income for the clinic. This is rather 
complex because, as NHS staff, their employment was strictly speaking not reliant on the income 
made by the clinic: like all other NHS staff they were public sector employees. Yet, the overall 
organisation that hosts the clinic, the NHS trust, could have decided that low activity and therefore 
low income meant that the clinic would no longer be viable and therefore liable to closure.  
The administrative practices I have described exemplify the routinisation of forgetfulness as an actant 
within the clinic. Taking the advice of the NHS institute seriously, the clinic explicitly adapted its 
administrative procedures to address the needs of its patients, specifically those symptoms that would 
inherently create obstacles to being assessed and treated.  In this way, forgetfulness orients the work 
that is done or not done in a specific way; attention is given to the likelihood, greater than for most 
people according to diagnostic criteria, that the appointment might be forgotten. This is then 
operationalised through the use of technical mediators; the letters and phone calls, the electronic 
calendars, do the remembering and reminding. Embedding concerns to palliate the effect of 
forgetfulness into the daily administrative practices of the clinic also has the effect of stabilising a 
particular version of ADHD, one in which forgetfulness and consequently disorganisation is central. 
Law’s description of this entanglement between practice, instruments and reality is helpful here: 
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‘[ ] it is not possible to separate out (a) the making of particular realities, (b) the making of particular 
statements about those realities, and (c) the creation of instrumental, technical and human 
reconfigurations and practices, the inscription devices that produce these realities and statements. 
Instead, all are produced together’ (Law, 2004: 31 Italics in original).  
The implication that realities may be made in this way is political, because whilst some paths towards 
a reality are taken, others are precluded. The practice of organising appointments by taking 
forgetfulness into consideration produces a particular kind of ADHD. The persistence, attention and 
care given to supporting patients in attending their assessment are not to be taken for granted, they 
depend on being practiced. And whilst Law goes on to declare that ‘[r]eality is no longer destiny’ 
(ibid.: 40), as he was well aware, it may be for better or for worse.  
Towards the end of my presence in the clinic, concerns from commissioners of services led managers 
to decide that patients’ appointments could only be rescheduled once in order to reduce the waiting 
list. Thus the ‘nature of illness’, namely forgetfulness as a factor to consider when dealing with 
DNAs, was given less weight than the need for increased productivity and a shorter waiting time. A 
decision of this kind can be explained in economic terms, and the discourse of austerity and financial 
difficulties was part and parcel of everyday talk in the office. But it is also likely to be a typical 
dilemma faced by many organisations, including the NHS, to respond to the specific needs of its 
patients whilst at the same time managing the complexity of balancing competing demands. If 
managing the complex range of needs across a large organisation becomes too unwieldy to achieve 
day by day, it will be simplified and reduced (Callon, 2002). Most support group members would 
support the aim of reducing the waiting list as they often experienced very long waiting times, often 
up to 18 months. Some people would benefit from such change, if they were able to set up their own 
reminders with the help of relatives, friends or technology.  Yet such change would mean that others, 
who may or may not have a network of support and whose forgetfulness is pervasive, are not seen, 
assessed or diagnosed as they repeatedly Did Not Attend. By changing administrative practices, the 
clinic transferred the responsibility for the memory-work it used to perform onto the patient. Such an 
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expectation might be beyond what some people could achieve, making it less likely that they would 
be assessed, diagnosed and treated.   
The administrative practices I have described in the clinic along with caring practices aimed at 
alleviating the problem of forgetfulness together facilitated the externalisation of the process of 
remembering. The capacity for remembering was aided by embedding actions into the daily tasks of 
the clinic as a matter of routine, just as we may habituate ourselves to keeping our keys in strategic 
places in order to find them without hesitation.  In this section I have shown how the clinic attempted 
to reconcile the differing temporalities of the lived experience of ADHD (shifting focus, ambivalence 
and poor working memory) with the temporalities of a scientific diagnostic process (organised, 
focused and good memory). It is memory’s capacity to ‘mark a movement between insides and 
outsides’ (Bowker, 2008: 226) in the way that we use it to describe ourselves that I want to continue 
exploring through clinical practices.  
 
Being a good historian 
 
The assessment at the clinic was made up of two parts:  first a very structured and scripted list of 
questions aimed to elicit examples from the patient showing how different symptoms manifested in 
their everyday life, in childhood and adulthood.  The second part was like a semi-structured interview 
that included medical-history taking, with a main line of inquiry, and flowed like a conversation in 
order to explore the wider context of the patient and his mental health state. Thus, the stories of past 
events that a patient could recount were at the core of the overall assessment. There are no 
observational,  behavioural or biological tests for diagnosing ADHD, a fact that forms part of the 
argument contesting the validity of the diagnosis of adult ADHD (Timimi and Taylor, 2004). From 
the point of view of clinicians, and of the diagnostic tools, there was plenty that they observed in the 
assessments that could aid towards diagnosing, but which was not considered reliable. It was pointed 
out in training sessions for psychiatrists that an assessment was not a ‘natural’ environment within 
which the behaviours displayed could be trusted to provide evidence for the presence or absence of 
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ADHD. According to this view, people who did not display signs of disorganisation might be actually 
highly disorganised, but advance booking meant they would have had plenty of time to prepare for the 
appointment, or they might not appear hyperactive as the anticipation of attending the assessment 
might increase their level of adrenaline, which would in turn have a calming effect if they had ADHD.  
Crucially these examples from the training session were accompanied by an important caveat; the 
absence of observable symptoms during assessment does not rule out their presence at other times, 
and therefore does not rule out the diagnosis of ADHD. This was explained to me by a clinician who 
described ADHD symptoms as being context-dependent. He said that individuals with ADHD adapt 
their behaviours to different situations, or avoid those situations altogether. He continued by pointing 
out how patients can learn to mask  some of their symptoms and that the clinic also tends to have that 
effect on people as they are nervous and keen to do well
39
. It follows that if observations of 
behaviours do not reflect the persistent nature of symptoms, as they can be masked voluntarily or 
involuntarily, then other means of evidence must be gathered.  It is worth quoting the diagnostic 
manual at length as it explains how this should be approached:  
‘The reason for [behaviours not being reflected in clinical interviews] is the sensitivity of the 
symptoms to stimulating and salient situations, which can normalize behaviours for short periods of 
time. The evaluation of current symptoms should therefore be based on accounts of behaviours and 
reports of ADHD symptoms during a typical day in the life of the patient.’  (UKAAN, 2013:45) 
The aim of the assessment is therefore to collate different accounts of events that are representative of 
the symptoms associated with ADHD; accounts from the patient, from relatives and institutions such 
as schools or employers. I want to stress that the accounts are of past events, that remembering is 
required from either patients or their recourse to documents, in order to give a fuller picture of the 
present. In an exploration of ‘the memory practices in the science’, Bowker (2008) discusses how the 
past is reconstructed for its use in the present through technologies and efforts that may vary 
                                                          
39
 We could think of this as an instance of ‘negative knowing ‘defined by Van Der Geest (2013) as ‘the paradox 
of noticing things and people more in their absence than in their presence.’ The absence of visible symptoms 
therefore alerts clinicians and makes them perceptive to the strategy in place. 
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depending on the era. He points out how memory practices play a central role when collectives and 
institutions are trying to make sense of information. In particular he suggests, in reference to the work 
of cybernetics, that ‘if we completely know a system in the present, and we know its rule of 
change…then we don’t need to bring to mind anything of the past. Memory…is a metaphor needed by 
a “handicapped” observer who cannot see a complete system’ (ibid: 8). Clinicians were describing 
their own inability to observe the person as a whole during assessments. Hence, the need to call upon 
records of past events, verbally or through documents, in order to get a more complete picture. The 
implication for patients was that it was not what they did but what they said that would be recorded as 
evidence in assessment interviews.  
From my observations of assessments and interviews with clinicians, it became clear that some 
patients were better at giving those accounts than others; they were what clinicians sometimes refer to 
as either ‘good’ or ‘poor historians’. When I asked a clinician what it takes for a patient to be a good 
historian, I was told quite straightforwardly that it meant that a person was able to provide a range of 
examples of events in their past everyday life that related to symptoms of ADHD.  This is not so easy 
a task as it first appears. In the structured interview there were 48 questions for individuals to answer, 
requiring examples of being forgetful, disorganised, and restless amongst other symptoms. Patients’ 
responses to this set of questions were often complemented by written documents like school reports 
and relatives’ testimonies.  Furthermore, as with clinical assessments in other parts of medicine, the 
clinician diagnosing adult ADHD came to expect a particular kind of story in content and form (Garro 
and Mattingly, 1994).  The narratives needed to present some coherence, not necessarily structural but 
within logic internal to the ADHD concept.  It might be that a patient would jump between stories 
relating to different age spans, or that different symptoms were amalgamated in the recall of one 
event. If these events were related to particular criteria, then even with gaps or with little elaboration, 
the clinician could then write the medical history. Even if very few events were recalled by the 
patient, additional material provided by schools or relatives usually produced enough evidence for 
clinicians to write a medical history.  
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The characterisation of a patient as an historian, sometimes poor, sometimes good, was a narrative 
trope in the clinic which was formulated with a twist peculiar to the diagnosing of ADHD in adults.  
In addition to the working-memory problems I described above, scientists also suggested that adults 
with ADHD ‘may have only a poor recall of their symptoms and behaviours as children’ (UKAAN, 
2013: 45). It is hard to tell if this problem of recall is related to difficulties of retrieving specific 
childhood memories in the general population or if it relates to adults with ADHD (Mannuzza et al, 
2002). Furthermore, some research indicates that whilst adults who had been diagnosed as children 
had good recall of symptoms (78% accuracy), adults who had not been diagnosed until later in life did 
not have such good recall (27%) (ibid.: 1886). The people I met in support groups and the clinic were 
included in the latter category. Some could recall memories of events that were not especially worthy 
of notice, such as days spent at school, or regular visits to relatives, giving details that were not 
necessarily accurate (Neisser, 1988). The point that Neisser makes in discussing what ordinary 
memories may be made of, is that: 
‘it is relatively easy to remember events in a way that is accurate with respect to some overall 
characteristic of the situation; such as recollection always has some degree of validity even if 
it suggests nested details that are by no means accurate themselves. The episode-as-
remembered …will be truthful in some respects and yet very far from historically accurate’ 
(1988: 365). 
The diagnostic manuals have a pragmatic approach, maintaining the central role of retrospective 
diagnosis but diversifying the evidential sources, a kind of triangulation of recall. Thus the DSM-5 
states: ‘adult recall in childhood symptoms tends to be unreliable, and it is beneficial to obtain 
ancillary information’ (2013: 61).  The role of informants who may be able to recall childhood 
behaviours is therefore crucial to confirm or even affirm the diagnosis of ADHD in adults. The clinic 
provided questionnaires to relatives and encouraged them to attend assessments with the patient. If 
this tactic did not succeed in gathering enough retrospective data, clinicians would seek permission to 
ring parents or relatives, often as far afield as New Zealand or Canada, in order to gain what was 
described to me as ‘contemporaneous data’.  
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Considering what makes a good historian also begs the question as to who the historian actually is – 
the patient or the clinician? The clinicians I met were placing the history making firmly within the 
realm of the patient. Yet the medical history is taken by clinicians and entered into reports and files. 
Without the work of questioning, clarifying and bringing forth the relevant recollections, the history 
thus collected would have no use within the clinic. So there are skills and practices that can facilitate 
this process which were an important part of clinical training for trainee psychiatrists. The interaction 
between patient and clinician was of great importance, but the work of remembering, central to the 
diagnostic process, was not facilitated by one (the clinician) and done by the other (the patient). 
Instead the good historian, as described in the clinic, was a patient who could provide a range of 
examples through a dialogue with a clinician, not only from their own recollection as this would be 
unreliable evidence, but also augmented by other sources.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been concerned with exploring what ADHD might be like in the context of the clinic. 
My interest in practices led me to describe a range of actions taken by clinicians, administrators, 
scientists and patients so as to show the crucial role that remembering and forgetting played in the 
making of ADHD. I aimed to show the complexity and open-endedness of the process involved in the 
classificatory work at a global level, and the routine, habitual yet intuitive actions of clinicians and 
administrators of the clinic. Different kinds of ADHD have been introduced through versions of 
diagnostic manuals over time as well as through the clinic’s variable emphasis on forgetfulness within 
its appointment procedures. Of note for the remainder of this thesis is that the recent conception of 
ADHD within a neurodevelopmental paradigm, which promotes notions of progress and normative 
achievements, is combined with a diagnostic assessment technique based on recollection. This thesis 
will pay attention to the kind of stories that are shared in the clinic and support groups in the light of a 
retrospectively obtained diagnosis that may impose a particular structure or obfuscate alternative 
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storylines. The next chapter moves my inquiry into support groups to ask how ADHD appears and 
examine the practices which contribute to the diagnostic process.  
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Chapter Three  The scaffolding of memory: the support structures 
for remembering  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter tracks the process of diagnosing ADHD into the support groups I attended and asks how 
we might know what ADHD is in that setting. The last chapter showed that a crucial element for 
identifying ADHD in adults in the clinic was related to practices of remembering, which we could 
think of in terms of institutional practices of memory. Similarly, for the members of the support 
groups that I met, remembering and not forgetting played an important role in their practices, 
discursive and otherwise.  As will become apparent, support group members spent a lot of time 
engaged in activities aimed at achieving a better understanding of how they could manage their 
forgetfulness: how not to forget appointments persistently or over-run deadlines due to absent-
mindedness.  Similar amounts of time were spent by the groups’ members recounting to each other 
past events and their experiences of living with ADHD, which for one group, became a formal 
activity that classified and recorded a version of ADHD. In this chapter I am interested in exploring 
the tools that supported and sustained peoples’ ability to not forget as well as to remember; I detail the 
practices that group members used to provide effective scaffolding to memory.   
Some clarification of the term ‘scaffolding’ is necessary before I present my ethnographic examples. I 
came across it in relation to ADHD at an expert workshop examining the transition of adolescents 
with ADHD into adulthood. A few months prior to my fieldwork, I had been invited by Professor 
Jones, a lead psychiatrist in the clinic, to attend this pre-conference workshop as part of my 
preparation for fieldwork.  In attendance were child psychiatrists, paediatricians, adult psychiatrists, 
psychologists and educationalists and a representative of a patient organisation.  This group of 25 or 
so experts aimed to produce guidance and recommendations for setting up transitional services in 
order to tackle the perceived difficulties for adolescents needing to access adults’ services. Early on in 
the workshop I noted the high frequency with which the word ‘scaffolding’ was used, possibly 
because I was not too familiar with the metaphor, but soon enough the participants themselves 
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remarked on it too. A brief conversation followed about the value of this idiom. Some attendees were 
opposed to it, others less so, until the conversation moved on. The term scaffolding was used to 
describe a support system for children and adolescents put in place in order to improve their social 
and educational functioning, often through ‘a very supportive family and an organised regime at 
school’ (Grant 2014:14). As described by participants of the workshop, the transition period from 
adolescence to adulthood was typically a time when the scaffolding was removed as young people left 
home. At that point problems of inattention and hyperactivity often came to the fore as the props and 
support systems were no longer there. In other words, the scaffolding masked the problems so that 
these were invisible until the support was removed.  Subsequently, I found that the scaffolding 
metaphor is very common in educational milieux as well as in neuroscience and computer science 
(Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009). Just as in the workshop I attended, there are mixed views concerning 
its usefulness (Maggioli, 2013; Stone, 1998). Engaging with these debates is beyond the scope of this 
chapter but as I came across the term at other conferences, mostly used by clinicians but also by 
patients’ organisations, I found that the metaphor of scaffolding for describing support systems was 
helpful to think with.   
Through my observations and conversations in support groups, I observed how adults constructed 
support for themselves, structuring an array of tools in order to facilitate the process of remembering.  
It is in that sense that I discuss the scaffolding of memory, a process of mediation between a 
technological structure and individuals, singly or in groups, that facilitated remembering and kept 
forgetfulness at bay.  Rather than the image of a structure that hides a building, I envisage a structure 
that facilitates access to areas of a building that would otherwise be out of reach.   
My discussion of memory, remembering and forgetting in this chapter and in the thesis as a whole, 
has a social science orientation, in that it explores memory figured as social activities which evolve 
within and rely upon a specific cultural context (Bloch, 1998; Fivush, 2011; Halbwachs, 1997; 
Neisser and Fivush, 1994). That is to say that the process of remembering is mediated through 
collective experience of intersubjective relations and of human-to-objects relations (Bowker, 2008; 
Carsten, 2007; Middleton and Brown, 2005). 
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Antze and Lambek ( 1996) provide a broad map with which to view issues related to memory, 
identities and the cultural practices put in place by institutions. They suggest that when individuals or 
collectives are questioning or being questioned about their identity, it is to their past and the practice 
of memory that they turn. Antze and Lambek argue for an approach to memory through practices, 
including the kind of discursive practices which I encountered in my fieldwork, something that 
Bowker summarises by asking: ‘What is memory, that a person may practice one?’ (Bowker, 2008; 
8). The implication is that remembering depends on a societal context that facilitates and encourages 
it which, I argue, applies in the case of the diagnostic process of ADHD in adults. I base my 
exploration of these themes on the empirical data which I collated in my fieldwork. The scientific 
debates on the reliability and stability of memories (Fernyhough, 2012) that have yet to be resolved, 
however interesting, are beyond the remit of this chapter; instead I explore the things that participants 
shared with me and each other about memory and the way they talked about remembering and 
forgetting.  
In this chapter I suggest that those practices and tools for remembering and not forgetting which are 
used in the support groups are central for living with and understanding the symptoms of 
hyperactivity and inattention. In response to the difficulties with both short and long term memory as 
recognised by clinicians (Tripp and Wickens, 2009; UKAAN, 2013) and support group members, the 
people I met had to work at producing the kind of remembering required for the diagnostic process.  
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss how patients and support group members made use of old 
documents such as school reports in order to demonstrate that the problems of hyperactivity and 
inattention were already present in their childhood.  Rather than taking for granted the strategic and 
evidential role of such documents, I take note of the materiality of the documents (Hull, 2012; Riles, 
2006) and question what the school reports may be evidence of (Csordas, 2004). I will suggest that 
school reports acted as mediators to memories, in that the language used in them triggered detailed 
recollections, which in turn were seen as evidence of biographical continuity (Lambek, 1996). In other 
words, and extending Lambek’s statement, remembering may be a human capacity as well as a utility 
whereby memories are made into objects of evidence (Engelke, 2008; Lambek, 2007). 
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I follow this section by examining the work that support group members carried out with each other to 
enumerate and list various experiences of living with ADHD.  I suggest that the process I observed 
equates to the making of an archive, a repository of lived experiences which attempt to give an 
authoritative versions of ADHD. I show how this archive sometimes accords with the formal and 
medical diagnosis, and sometimes it does not. 
The last section of this chapter is concerned with the kind of support members of the groups put in 
place for themselves in order to contain their forgetfulness. Whereas the support described in the 
previous sections was aimed towards early life events and autobiographical memory, the technology 
discussed in this section is concerned with short term memory and alleviating forgetfulness of the 
near-past.  It was during conversations about phones and computers that support group members often 
discussed such techniques as ‘strategies’, a topic which I explore in more depth in Chapter Four.  
 
“Memories are about what happened then, but they are also about who we 
are now.40” 
 
Documents handed over by XX  on  ../../…41 
See scanned copies of relevant documents only in correspondence tab 
 Birth certificate 
 Psychological report from court diversion team 
 School ( college) report , including exclusion reports (torn and seller taped)  
 DVLA traffic violation records 
 Parking tickets 
 Utah self-rating scale  
 GP referral letter 
 Letter from Natwest Bank  
 
PG on behalf of Dr Y dated  ../../… 
 
Many patients came to their assessments with folders and bags full of papers which they shared with 
clinicians; this practice was explicitly encouraged in the letter of appointment sent by the clinic. The 
                                                          
40
 (Fernyhough, 2012: 283). 
41
 Anonymised from patient notes. 
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list above, more extensive than most, was shown to me by a specialist nurse and entered in the 
electronic notes of a patient as a record of the documents he had brought with him in a plastic bag. 
With the exception of the Wender Utah Self-rating scale (Ward, 1993), all other documents were 
reports from institutions commenting on particular aspects of this patient’s life, a mix of health reports 
and records of transgressions. The recording, listing, scanning and storing of such forms is an 
important part of the administrative procedure involved in the diagnostic process. What was handed 
over to the clinician in a plastic bag is rendered into a prescribed logic during the ensuing diagnosis.  
As the note suggested, not all documents in the bag were selected and scanned suggesting that the 
clinic followed different criteria for what to include in the file.
42
 The medical file is just one example 
of the materiality of the diagnostic process. Rating scales and psychological tests are others, but the 
file as a governance record is particularly well suited to bringing forth evidence of  the ‘social life of 
things’ (Appadurai 1986) as it is invested with agency by a number of contributing actors (Hull, 
2003). In the case of ADHD, the social life of the file starts well before it becomes embedded into 
medical documentation as individuals gather records of life events for evidential and, arguably, 
existential purposes as they reclaim their past for uses in the present.  
 
Support group members and patients in the clinic spent months tracing documents, negotiating letters 
and reports from a wide range of administrative agencies and discussing in support groups what 
would be useful.  This process involved interpreting and imagining how certain behavioural 
symptoms could be materialised into acceptable evidence, derived from documents initially issued for 
entirely different purposes; in other words creating new usages from old paperwork.  As Latour 
explained, there is no fixed and determined role for these documents, rather, they are in themselves 
‘participants in the action [that] authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, 
render possible, forbid and so on’ (Latour 2005: 72 ). Hull’s discussion of the materiality of 
documents and bureaucracy (2012) demonstrates further how elements such as the aesthetic of the 
document, its circulatory role and the emotions attached to it are often all combined within the 
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 As I did not have access to the electronic clinical notes of this patient, I did not find out exactly which 
documents were not selected.  
P a g e  | 75 
 
substrate of one piece of paper. Symptoms of inattention are thus enacted through traffic offence 
records or driving license suspensions, speeding tickets, and accidents. These records are then copied, 
circulated and shared with hospitals and other institutions for varied purposes.
43
  
 
The documents that were discussed the most by all my participants inside and outside the clinic were 
school reports from primary and secondary schools. As I described earlier, the psychiatric diagnostic 
criteria for ADHD in adults are based on the concept that ADHD is a lifelong disorder. The questions 
asked during assessments are related equally to present adult experiences and to childhood life events. 
For example, in relation to Criterion A(e) of the DSM-IV (2000), clinicians ask:  
 Do you often fail to pay close attention to detail and make careless mistakes?  
 When you were a child, did you often fail to pay close attention to detail and make careless 
mistakes? 
(Conners et al., 2001: 21) 
 
The patient is then expected to provide specific examples of events that would either confirm or 
disprove these difficulties. Depending on the examples provided, the following boxes would be ticked 
by clinicians:  
 Careless mistakes in school work 
 Missed items/problems knew how to do 
 Didn’t go back over work to check answers 
 Rushed through work without thinking through 
(ibid.) 
 
From my observations in the clinic, patients relied heavily on their old school reports to provide 
responses to these detailed questions.  This reliance should not be a surprise given that school reports 
have been singled out in the DSM and other diagnostic tools as ‘beneficial ancillary evidence’, 
capable of counteracting the unreliable recall of childhood symptoms in adults with ADHD 
(Mannuzza et al., 2002; Miller et al., 2009).  One clinician explained how he considered reports from 
                                                          
43
 This is now done electronically; documents are scanned into electronic copies or created directly on 
computers and stored in databases. At face value this could be considered a process of de-materialisation, the 
making of virtual records. Hull suggests that files and records have not dematerialised but their ‘thingness’ is 
changed from paper to silicon, and that ‘electronic technologies have increased rather than decreased the 
proliferation of paper documents’ (Hull, 2012: 260). In the clinic, I observed electronic forms being printed then 
scanned to be re-entered in the electronic file.  
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institutions such as schools or the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) more reliable than 
self-reports, as they brought some objectivity to the accounts. Thus, new support group members who 
had yet to be diagnosed were advised to start locating school reports for the crucial role these would 
play. As Paul described, this process could be quite difficult:  
Paul: “I found some old school reports from public school, we are talking around O-levels 
and they are very very telling. I got them put away somewhere, because these [ADHD] 
assessments, they are understandably aimed at young people who are either at school or left 
school not long ago. When they ask you - “do you have any school reports, or would your 
parents have them?"  You say - well -   your parents are geriatric or pre-senile and your 
school reports are forty to fifty years old [laughter], you probably haven't got them.  But 
actually I did find some mid-seventies school reports.” 
During one assessment I observed, a patient was asked about his symptoms of inattention and he 
proceeded to take out his school reports from an envelope.  His collection included four years of 
reports that consistently described him as being distracted and distracting to the rest of the class, of 
having the potential to get better grades if he applied himself more, and they mentioned his being 
restless and fidgety. Whilst the clinician seemed satisfied, the patient went on to explain how he could 
still see the detention room where he spent so much time bored and frustrated.  For several minutes, 
he described intensely his ‘friends in boredom’, the tricks they had planned, the teachers who had 
caught them until he was eventually interrupted by the clinician..   
The school reports that I saw, in the clinic and in the support groups used a similar template. They 
were usually of A4 size, browned with age, with lines and boxes in which information was entered by 
teachers and administrative staff; the name, age and form of the student, the term and the year of the 
report and boxes in which teachers from different disciplines wrote a line or two to describe the 
student’s achievement or lack of it. Usually there were columns in which examinations marks were 
entered and sometimes the ranking of the child in relation to others pupils. The bottom of the report 
was left for the head teacher to summarise the overall performance of the child, including her 
P a g e  | 77 
 
behaviour. Finally the signatures of the head teacher and, importantly of the parents, sealed the 
document.  The style of writing was succinct and formulaic, with such predictable lines as ‘could do 
better’ being recognisable to most.  
Here, I am interested in asking what the school reports do in themselves rather than in examining their 
explicit and implicit intentional uses
44
. I look at them as powerful objects that are rediscovered in 
attics or such places of storage. Why are they kept for decades?  From the numerous conversations 
about school reports that I witnessed in support groups, the vast majority of members who went 
looking for their reports succeeded in finding them, even when it required some detective work.  Yet 
school reports are rarely used past secondary school: it is as if they lose their bureaucratic value and 
usefulness as soon as school days are over.  In comparison, birth certificates are regularly requested 
throughout one’s life for various administrative reasons.  Similarly childhood immunisation records 
can be requested into adulthood for some employment purposes and international travelling.
45
  
Despite being redundant to their primary purpose, whether that be communicative or disciplinary, 
school reports are commonly kept and stored.  
 In her examination of the documents produced in an Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU), and their 
use by families, Heimer suggests that ‘the bureaucratic uses of documents often assume that someone 
outside the organisation will have a rather different relation to the subjects of the documents” 
(Heimer, 2006 :21).  Forms and documents are designed so as to limit the possibility of addition and 
improvisation, yet they are also sent into the world to be used, adapted, reinterpreted and reinvented.  
Just as the documents created in the NICU are often the first descriptions of the new born child’s 
physical life (Heimer, 2006), the school reports are the first records of the social life of the child 
outside the family environment and are kept as mementos.  They contribute to the biographical 
records collected by parents, kept along with ultrasound prints and curls of hair, to mark another stage 
in the life of the child. Documents participate in the stories that are told by parents to their children, 
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 School reports can also be seen in in terms of disciplinary power; see Foucault in O’Farrell (2005:102). 
45
 During my fieldwork, I was made aware of an inquest into the death of a patient, which examined school 
reports as part of an investigation into the validity of the ADHD diagnosis and treatment that had been given. 
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they trigger questions by children and as such ‘must be understood as elements of a conversation’ 
(Heimer, 2006: 103). 
Just as school reports travel back and forth between school and home, the narratives embedded in 
them circulate between parties. Beyond recording the academic life of the child, school reports are 
records of the relations between the child, the parent and the school institution, noting whether or not 
the child contributes to the life of the school.  The comments found in the school reports that support 
group members shared with me often referred to disruptive behaviour which affected other pupils or 
the smooth running of the school.  Equally frequent were comments recording traits of absent-
mindedness and not contributing enough or paying attention.  In this context the teachers’ comments 
can be seen as descriptions of the relation between themselves and the child, who is presented as 
sometimes absent, sometimes overwhelming.  The reports I saw were from primary and secondary 
schools in the 1970s and unsurprisingly none included any mention of ADHD or even formalised 
words such as impulsive, inattentive or hyperactive
46
.  Instead, the reports focused on the relations 
between the child and the institution, itemising frictions and discords using language that still 
resonates for adults today.  ‘Makes careless mistakes’, ‘Appears not to be listening’, ‘Dreamy or 
preoccupied’, ‘Frequently arriving late’, ‘Difficulty in sitting still’, ‘Talks during activities when this 
is not needed’, ‘Difficultly awaiting your turn in the classroom’, are a few examples that could be 
found interchangeably between old school reports and new diagnostic tools
47
.   
As I saw in many assessments, the linguistic and descriptive bridge between the school reports and the 
assessment questions elicited detailed memories of childhood events. Often the recollection of school 
days was expressed with humour and a sense of confirmation of a coherent biography. Once they had 
read their school reports, support group members would commonly comment how the report showed 
that they had not changed since childhood, that they had always been the same forgetful or restless 
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 See Chapter One where I note that some of the history of the diagnosis of ADHD showing when the diagnosis 
became available to clinicians in the DSM-III(1980) and in practice in the UK in the late 1990s.  
47
 These examples are all from the Diagnostic Interview for ADHD in Adults (DIVA) ( Kooij and Francken, 
2007), one of the diagnostic tools used in Europe, and since 2013 in the UK. In the assessment interviews the 
examples above are formulated into questions, whereas in the school reports they are used as statements of 
observations.  
P a g e  | 79 
 
person. In other words the reports confirmed a sense that if something was wrong, it had always been 
there
48
. 
Sometimes recollection was tinged with ambivalence, as Simon described when we discussed how he 
felt about having his recent diagnosis:   
Simon: “So, there's the organisation stuff, that’s really showing in my school reports, always 
late that kind of thing. But there is the reports versus reality: when you are at school at eleven, 
twelve years old, the day to day feeling is so different to the end result. If I tried to think hard 
enough about the day to day I'll probably think of unhappy kind of things because the 
homework issues were so stressful, thinking back to then it’s probably giving a negative spin 
to things.”  
 Claude: “What do you mean negative spin?” 
Simon: “It might be bad [having the diagnosis] because it causes me to think more negatively 
about these things.  Although it does not affect me now, it affects my interpretations of the 
memory, next time I look at that memory. So that's why it’s, it’s difficult. I am not bothered 
by it, but it makes it… it brings up the negative more strongly. But it doesn't mean it should 
not be necessary to go back in time if it is needed for the diagnosis.”  
What was striking in the way Simon discussed the act of remembering through school reports was his 
reluctance and resistance to the intrusion this caused into his memories. The school reports as 
mediators of memories were distorting what he recalled about his time at school, yet reflecting on 
them was considered a necessary step to take. Simon’s comments denoted an uncomfortable tension 
between the contents of the reports and his own memories. 
                                                          
48
 There is an extensive literature critiquing or augmenting the concept of biographical disruption (Bury, 1982) 
with those of biographical continuity and biographical reinforcement (Williams, 2000). In brief, this literature 
suggests that chronic illness does not always create a biographical disruption; in some circumstances, becoming 
ill reinforced an identity (Carricaburu and Pierret, 1995). In others it was the disruptions in people’s lives that 
caused illness (Day, 2007; Skultans, 1999).  Here I am suggesting that for the people I met, school reports were 
confirming a sense that the problems they were facing in adulthood had always been present. As I will describe, 
finding out that ADHD might be relevant in their lives may have caused some disquiet, and for most 
participants, the school reports helped make sense of their current difficulties as a continuity in their lives.  
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We can think of school reports as mediators ‘that transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning 
or elements they are supposed to carry’ (Latour, 2005:39). In order to respond to clinicians’ queries 
about childhood life events, patients were calling upon old documents to scaffold and prop up their 
practices of remembering and, in that process, turned reports into evidence of biographical continuity. 
Thus the old documents that were discussed and shared in support groups became directly involved in 
the diagnostic process in the clinic.  
In the next section I want to explore how one support group and its members constructed a memory 
bank, an archive of lived experience which both described and produced a version of ADHD. In 
addition to using old documents to support their remembrance of past events, I will show how group 
members also engaged in a collective process of recollection and recording which served as a point of  
reference and classification. 
 
“Sharing is like taking medicine through the ears” 
 
The four groups I attended were far from homogeneous in their practices, their membership, or their 
views on ADHD and its treatment. Nevertheless members in the four groups shared an orientation to 
support each other collectively, developing practices in particular ways, such as a system of 
accountability in order to improve their organisational skills
49
. In Group B, specific circumstances led 
members to develop a system of recording members’ experiences of ADHD in order to learn from 
each other and to find ways to alleviate their difficulties.  I liken the recording process they used to 
the making of an archive where memories of events are deposited and retrieved when needed, which  
Bowker defined as  ‘practices that allow (to some extent) useful/interesting descriptions of the past to 
be carried forward into the future’ ( 2008: 7). I am interested in the implications of making collective 
records in this way for members themselves but also, more broadly, for the concept of ADHD that is 
thus being enacted.  The etymology of the word ‘archive’ as described by Derrida (1996) has 
prompted me to explore its dual role in assigning origins and in affirming authority. My intention is 
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 See Chapter Eight. 
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not to apply a critique of these practices through a Freudian and psychoanalytical lens, as Derrida did, 
where archiving is a sickness, a feverish search for origins.  Instead I aim for a different undertaking 
in noting how the practices of memory involved in the making of an archive also create a collective 
endeavour that provides a means for members to live better and to improve their lives.  
When I first attended the support group in the north of England, I was struck by the busyness of the 
room. There were eighteen to twenty people, mingling and chatting in a large space that could have 
accommodated twice that number. People moved around, made tea, went in and out through the open 
back doors to smoke cigarettes. Some sat on armchairs and settees arranged in a circle in one half of 
the room, chatting or using their smart phones. The other half of the room was occupied by tables and 
chairs also arranged in a circle, and a couple of members were sitting there writing. The volume of 
speech was quite loud, and to my non-English ears, the accent was also very noticeable, sometimes 
sounding as singing would, with rising and falling tones where I did not expect them. All this activity 
gave a sense of excitement that was palpable, and heightened by the visual stimuli too. Three of the 
four walls were covered with posters of one sort or another and the fourth wall was made of large 
windows and a glass door, which provided natural light during the daytime.  One wall had pictures, 
some of famous sportsmen and actors with their signatures and dedications, as well as coloured prints, 
posters and drawings. 
The other two walls were covered with handwritten posters, written on flip charts using black markers 
and displayed in two lines one above the other, with each poster close to the next. There were over 
thirty posters, each with a different title written in larger script and underlined; some headings were 
the familiar descriptions of ADHD found in criteria and classification, for example impulsivity or 
inattention. Others were descriptions of emotions such as anger or depression, and still others were 
headed by categories such as relationships or addiction. Below each of the headlines numerous bullet 
points followed listing descriptions of situations related to the title. For the posters dedicated to 
impulsivity, descriptions included ‘making the wrong decision when at work’, ‘not thinking before 
talking gets me into trouble and fights’, ‘I got into debts because of it’. The comments were 
sometimes written in the first person and at other times seemed more general. The posters also 
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contained responses to the difficulties described such as ‘recognise the triggers and move away from 
the situation’, ‘avoid doing shopping online’ or ‘put items in online basket and not purchase on the 
same day’. 
After a few weeks of attending, I noted that the display looked neglected, with a couple of gaps in the 
rows, and more posters threatening to fall off as the blue tack lost its adhesive property. I remember 
feeling some sadness at the sight of the display, disused and uncared for. Retrospectively I can see 
that the display had become part of my experience of attending the group, just as it was for the other 
members, as it was often referred to and called upon during discussion. People would point to a 
particular poster to back up a point they were making, or a facilitator would suggest that newcomers 
read them whilst having a cup of tea.  It was not like wallpaper lining the room, but an integral part of 
the group rather like having another member in the room, a kind of lived and live database, an ADHD 
archive.  I asked Caroline, one of the facilitators, about the falling posters and she started to explain 
how busy they had been. As they were about to start a new course, all the posters would be replaced 
anyway. As she continued to give me details of this training course, it also became clear why I had not 
witnessed the making of the posters, as they were made and accumulated over a discrete period of 
time during the year as part of a module. As a new course was about to start, the process would begin 
again and the display would be renewed. 
Caroline explained that she and the other founder of the group, Tessa, had been doing a lot of 
networking over the years with various institutions in their cities in order to raise awareness of ADHD 
in adults. They had made contact with a well-known university in the area which was offering support 
to students who might have ADHD. Caroline and Tessa had contact with the local probation services 
and criminal justice workers and with employment agencies too. They offered to deliver basic 
awareness training on adult ADHD to frontline workers so that they could signpost individuals to the 
support groups if they felt this might be helpful.  They were clearly successful, as I met a number of 
individuals in this group who started attending as a result of the initiative. As Caroline continued, she 
told me that they were encouraged by this success and took up the offer of help given by a member of 
the group who had business and marketing experience. They registered as a social enterprise and 
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developed a training course for young unemployed adults with ADHD. They then protected the course 
they had devised under copyright legislation. Subsequently they were commissioned by the local 
employment agency to deliver this course to twelve young adults in order to facilitate their access to 
work by explicitly addressing difficulties associated with ADHD
50
, including accessing medical 
diagnosis when appropriate.  
The course as it was described to me
51
, was fifteen weeks long, delivered over three days per week 
and attended by twelve men and women. In this particular cohort members ranged between twenty 
and 40 years old. They met to explore ADHD, to work out how to alleviate and build awareness of 
symptoms in an attempt to diminish the impacts in their own lives and in the lives of those close to 
them. The last five of the fifteen weeks, were dedicated to seeking employment, working on 
application forms and practicing interview skills. The main part of the course focused on personal 
experiences of ADHD and its associated symptoms, inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, as well as 
such topics as addictions and relationships. Each of the ten weeks was devoted to a specific topic. 
From each group discussion, notes were taken and one person wrote these onto a poster that was then 
placed on the wall of the room for display. The notes recorded experiences which were specific to 
individuals, yet recognisable and familiar to most members. Some described ways to approach certain 
social situations better and so avoid unwanted consequences. Responses also highlighted ways to 
‘harness’ behaviours and turn them in to positive assets. Thus one poster noted, ‘hyperactivity when 
channelled can provide endless creative energy’. Each poster included testimonies of events, often 
disastrous and tragic, with responses that were set out in no particular order. Thus the effect produced 
when reading the posters, was of a list of variations on a theme, which were not separated into bad 
and good categories. The categorising functioned on a broader level, so that, taken as a whole, the 30 
or so posters formed a description of ADHD as lived and experienced by those in the group. It 
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 The course that was about to start towards the end of my fieldwork was the third of its kind to be 
commissioned.  
51
 My attempts to get the facilitators to agree to my attendance on the course were not successful. Caroline and 
Tessa felt that individuals shared very personal issues and that it would affect the dynamic of the group if I were 
observing. Instead they agreed and facilitated conversations with some of the people who were attending the 
course. I met with three out of the twelve registered. My description is therefore based on their reports as well as 
on those of the facilitators.  
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included elements of the formal diagnostic criteria as well as recording impacts on participants’ lives. 
For example, the posters headed ‘addictions’ were wide ranging, noting the use of alcohol or cannabis 
to treat sleeplessness, or the urge to search for thrilling but dangerous situations.   
The course took place in the same room as support group sessions but on different days. As the course 
progressed, posters were added to the display which could also be seen by the support group
52
. The 
posters were regularly used in this setting, even though they were not written by the support group 
attendees. On one occasion, an individual was describing their persistent difficulties in staying out of 
trouble. He described how he often found himself in situations where he could not control his 
impulsivity and got into fights with total strangers when he could have walked on. He was visibly 
upset, and other people in the group were showing and expressing their support. At this point Caroline 
pointed to one of the posters and read out loud –‘by focusing on my thoughts and emotions I can 
become more aware of my impulses and can try to control them’. She explained that this thought had 
been shared by someone who also had arguments all the time, and who had found himself without any 
lasting relationships. Caroline continued to explain how calming activity, like yoga or mindfulness, 
could be really helpful but that the most important thing was to share your feelings with others and to 
listen to what other people have to share. Pointing towards the wall full of posters she said; “sharing is 
like taking medicine through the ears”, something that Caroline repeated at least once during every 
session I attended.  I asked her about this motto and she explained that it encapsulated the work of the 
group. Sharing, in her sense, meant both contributing and listening in the group. Not only would 
sharing your problems, memories or experiences be beneficial to you, but it would also benefit the 
others who were listening.  
The metaphor of medicine within the motto, suggests not only that ADHD needs to be treated, but that 
sharing one’s experience and listening to others is a worthy alternative to pharmaceutical treatment. 
Another reading implies that sharing, like medicine, has to be performed regularly for lasting effect. 
Regular attendance was frequently encouraged by the facilitators, just as clinicians reminded patients 
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 Four members of the course also attended the support group. I had conversations with two of those and a third 
member of the course came to speak with me at the suggestion of the facilitator.  
P a g e  | 85 
 
to comply with their treatment programmes. The motto seemed to capture the ambivalent relation that 
this group had with medical explanations for ADHD. As the months passed, I became aware of an 
assertion that behavioural theories had been damaging to people with ADHD, as mothers were often 
blamed for bringing up their children badly. Neuroscientific explanations had been helpful in 
dispelling this idea.  Nevertheless there was a certain mistrust of a medical approach to explaining and 
treating ADHD, or at least not a total acceptance. Thus discussion of pharmaceutical treatments took 
up very little of the sharing time. The topic was often accompanied with the caveat that it should be an 
individual decision, implying that the group did not have a role to play. As the conversation resumed 
with the irony that was so prevalent in these sessions, Amy, sitting next to me, added that it was really 
important to only speak one at a time, so as not to overdose on the medicine.  
As people shared their stories, they might point to a poster, and read out a line that they felt expressed 
their situation. Some responded by highlighting that they felt could be helpful to the person who was 
telling their story. In effect, the display of posters performed the role of a repository for the 
description of experience which could then be accessed by others, just as a live database can be 
shared. As I observed the use of this archive, the retrieval of information was used as both reference 
and predictor - the experience that you have had and recognise here does not have to be the end of the 
story. In other words, the past can be made useful for the present.   
At face value, the lifespan of this archive was limited; on one of my visits to the support group I found 
that one of the two walls dedicated to display this archive had been cleared of any posters, and the 
other had some newly written ones. As the meeting started, and I had time to look at the new display, 
I noticed one poster that stood out amongst the neat new lines. This poster was on paper yellowed 
with age, broken along some edges, and not hung as neatly as the others. Later that day I asked 
Caroline about it, and she explained that as a new course had started, they put away the old lists in the 
cupboard, and made space for the new, except for that one, as the person who wrote it had asked that 
it should remain on display. The old poster had a number of notes and bullet points that were written 
as records of this person’s school life and early work experience. These described experiences of 
bullying and stigmatisation, and the writer wanted to preserve the display as a reminder to the group, 
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for themselves and for others. The archive was therefore an accumulation of records of different ways 
that people experience, live, struggle with and adapt to ADHD. The recording, the displaying, and 
then the storage was a process that made a repository of ‘collective memories’. 
Derrida’s examination of The Concept Of The Archive, as he first entitled his lecture (1996), helps 
foreground some of the implications that attached to memory practices within the support group. 
Taking us back to the Greek etymology of the word, Arkhe, Derrida identifies two principles 
combined in one: that which is the origin, where things begin, and which by that virtue provided 
authority and power.  The materiality is crucial in that an archive is a place, a space, where records are 
kept and where power may be exercised by allowing or denying access, for example. In the case of 
the support group, the archive was the room where people met, and the facilitators were its archivers.  
It seemed that access to this archive was not limited for those who attended the course, but was in fact 
positively encouraged for all that entered that room. Of course one could argue that the archive was 
only made available by the presence of the facilitators, and that the records, the raw material as it 
were, required interpretations by the archiver. But that is not exactly what my observations revealed, 
as references were made frequently without the mediation of the facilitators. The sharing practice 
associated with the making and the using of this archive had, in my view, a more powerful impact. 
Returning to Derrida’s definition, the French words also deployed in the English translation to 
describe how origins and authority may be intertwined, are revealing: ‘Arkhe we recall, names at once 
the commencement and the commandment’ (ibid.: 9). The beginning and the order. Authority is thus 
gained through the work of recording, listing and classifying that asserts where things have started. In 
this way the group was collating and locating the varied experiences of its members in past events, 
sometimes in childhood, sometimes not, that might explain how their difficulties had begun. By 
listing and categorising the experiences of many members, the archive also made forgetting possible, 
if only temporarily; one does not have to remember and keep in mind all of the ways that ADHD can 
be experienced and treated if this knowledge is recorded and made retrievable. For members of the 
groups whose forgetfulness and memory was problematic, this constituted an important benefit.  
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When one entered the room, one simultaneously entered the archive itself and became immersed in 
the lists and displays. In this way one was reminded of the snares of impulsivity or inattention and of 
ways of living better with them. The latter of the two principles found in Arkhe, the order, can reveal 
both the classifying role of the archive and the authority that emanates from it. An archive contains 
records that have been selected and preserved, it is never an exhaustive list. Certain things may have 
been destroyed, others excluded and therefore rendered invisible to future inquiries (Bowker and Star, 
1999). The archive and its content define what is remembered. The way it is organised, how its 
elements are grouped, named, how it is displayed is also a creative act. The categorising and listing 
that took place was an attempt to produce an authoritative record and a point of reference for its 
members. In its details, this archive was made of individual stories rooted in specific circumstances; 
in its totality, it was an ideal, an abstracted version of ADHD and it was precisely the combination of 
these elements that gave it authority.  
This version of ADHD sometimes coincided with formal classifications, but sometimes it did not. It 
was the experiential knowledge that it contained which was valued.  The power of this listing was 
therefore found in the accumulation and sharing of experiential evidence for ADHD, which is 
classically associated with self-help groups (Borkman, 1999). In this case, the representation of these 
experiences in an archive, as an object and a space, asserted a broader authority and legitimacy. 
Bowker suggests that archives can be classified into two categories: a formal kind that emphasises 
control and chronology and makes a ‘presentation of the past as rational reconstruction from the 
present’ (2010:213). In contrast, the other kind of archive evolves without an explicit plan, and is 
made of the things we leave in our wake, through our habits and customs.  The archive that Group B 
was making strikes me as a combination of both: the recollections being recorded were somehow 
controlled, classified and ordered through the facilitators of the group while the archive itself evolved 
in an unpredictable way and was dependant on physical traces left in a particular place
53
. The support 
group’s version of ADHD was an assemblage of ways of being, with contradictions and uncertainties, 
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 The process of reviewing the DSM-IV as described in Chapter Two is similar. 
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which was left open ended, for others to continue.  Through time the recollections of living with 
ADHD within the support group also changed and reflected the group’s changing membership.  
I consider that the work of producing this archive also contributed to the diagnostic process that took 
place in the clinic, as it helped individuals to identify, classify and categorise events in their lives 
which could be used as evidence.  Furthermore, the records augmented the framework and support 
already in place to remember past events: as an alternative to the structure offered by school reports 
and other documents, support Group B constructed their own scaffolding of memory.  
The supportive practices in place for remembering were at times targeted towards ‘not forgetting’ in 
the present. To conclude this chapter, I want to briefly describe the role that technology, namely 
phones, played in ‘not forgetting”. The practices associated with these devices were not related to 
archiving and creating a memory bank of past events (Dib, 2013). Instead participants used their 
phones to support the flow of actions and time. Reminders on a phone could help avoid 
procrastination taking hold, or missing an important appointment, or they could establish habitual 
practices through prompts.  As participants said, they purposefully and strategically used their phones 
in ways that would compensate for the difficulties they experienced. As I show further in Chapter 
Four, the strategies were transformative in that they altered behaviours as much as they altered selves.  
 
Pre-frontal cortex device 
 
The metaphor of the computer RAM as a way to explain the mechanics of working-memory is apt in 
considering some of the strategic tools that I observed when attending support groups. One of the 
members of support Group B suggested that her smart phone was her pre-frontal cortex; it was her 
working memory and it allowed her to keep in mind all the things she needed to do. As she spoke, she 
was handling a well-used smart phone, her forefinger swiping and tapping alternately, obviously 
opening apps or other software which the rest of us in the group could not see. We could all imagine 
what she meant, even those who did not own a smart phone (as I did not at the time). We were all 
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familiar with the calendars, the alarms and other means for keeping track of events and tasks
54
. Her 
comment was part of a conversation about the problems and solutions associated with being 
disorganised and forgetful.  
Mobile devices were literally held and displayed constantly during these conversations, not only to 
demonstrate their capacity, but also to actively do some remembering: what was that last blog that 
talked of ADHD at work? Apps were used not only to provide information that had been stored, but 
also to trigger conversations on individual preferences and practical uses for these. In conversations 
about pharmaceutical treatments for ADHD, it was very common to see people search for that elusive 
information by consulting their phone: is that new drug slow release? What is the chemical base for it, 
Dexamphetamine or Atomoxetine? Smart phones were used in this way as referees, called upon to 
confirm one point of view over another. As well as retrieving data, they were used to record new 
information such as addresses, pictures and more. Individuals were still forgetful, but the burden of 
remembering was transferred to these electronic objects, and provided a technical solution. 
The strategic position given to mobile devices by group members was also visible on the most popular 
website forum in the UK for adults with ADHD. The AADD-UK website was well known to all the 
people I met in my fieldwork, clinicians and support group members alike, for its comprehensive 
electronic library, its information about local services
55
 and for its forum. In line with the slogan of 
the forum ‘This is a peer-to-peer support forum! Here we are learning to support and advocate for 
ourselves and others with ADHD’, many of the forum contributions were from adults diagnosed, or in 
the process of being diagnosed, with ADHD. A number of boards were available to engage in 
conversations; one board named ‘symptoms, diagnosis and treatment’ had themes such as medication, 
coaching, and ‘non-medical treatment, aids and strategies’. In this last theme, one thread of 
conversation was dedicated to ‘useful apps’ where individuals were sharing their knowledge of 
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 Since my fieldwork, Microsoft has launched an ‘intelligent personal assistant’ on mobile phones which 
combines all these features and more as it retains information about the use of the phone to support and predict 
future requests in order to ‘be the most productive version of yourself’ http://tinyurl.com/qek3kn7  Accessed 
on 10/11/2014. 
55
 I conducted a survey of support groups in the UK on behalf of AADD-UK which they published on their 
website. (See Jousselin, 2013). The website is still very active at the time of writing. See http://aadduk.org/ 
Accessed 10/11/2014. 
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particular apps and software that could help alleviate ADHD-related symptoms. One kind of app that 
was particularly popular and marketed under different names, turned a to-do list into a game, even a 
quest, so that for every task completed points were awarded. As one contributor explained: 
‘It’s sooooo cool!! You get an achievement when you’ve done something, it motivates you to 
get more points. It’s a good reminder list. So washing up is set to appear daily and I have 
assigned it 50 points in the “stamina” category. If I have a stressy email to read and respond 
to, it’s 100 points in the “spirit” category. You can look back at everything you’ve achieved 
so far. I love it!’ 
 
It would be easy to consider these devices only as memory tools, as the metaphor of the pre-frontal 
cortex suggests, and to think of them as external support to remedy a deficit, or to extend memory 
keeping.  But I suggest that a dialogical relation between the tool and the individual occurs.  By 
highlighting the mediating role of devices, I am suggesting that neither the tool nor its user is quite the 
same once they have met. The communication device has become an organiser and a reminder, and 
the user is not defined by his forgetfulness any longer. It takes the interactions between user and tool 
for these specific new modes to come into being. Both tool and user produce each other through the 
possibilities they offer one another. The outcome of that exchange is mostly stable and predictable, as 
we know what to anticipate when we use a calendar. Nevertheless, as I show below,  the interactions 
with electronic devices and the support they offered were sometimes unpredictable and not always 
welcome.  
 
During meetings, conversations were often punctuated by moments when cohesion became 
fragmented and discussions between two or three people would start, soon followed by others forming 
parallel groups and debates. Inevitably smart phones were involved, either as triggers for bringing in 
new topics or through searching for pre-recorded information. This would lead to ten minutes, 
sometimes more, of a disjointed period, of in-between time. As the volume of speech increased, so did 
the sense of excitement, until the facilitators – when they extricated themselves from their phones – 
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would try to re-assemble the group into a cohesive whole. As I was a participant without a smart 
phone, these unexpected breaks in the rhythm of the group always left me reeling, as if experiencing 
aquaplaning whilst driving; an unexpected and uncontrollable loss of direction. One moment the 
group would be discussing one topic, in conversations that everyone would follow, and the next 
moment brouhaha and confusion would take over.  By attending groups regularly, I eventually 
became accustomed to these sliding moments, and was less surprised, and became aware of when they 
would begin.  
I mentioned my sense of displacement to another member who did not have a smartphone, and would 
often use this chaotic pause to stand up, walk around and sometimes make a cup of tea. We both 
remarked on our common phoneless status, me saying that I was slowly moving towards acquiring 
one, possibly, and him explaining that he was actively avoiding them as they were too distracting. He 
described how he had a really poor attention span so he was easily distracted and could not really 
watch TV any longer because he could not concentrate and focus his attention. He had used smart 
phones in the past to help with planning and organising and he thought that that was quite useful, but 
he had ended up spending too much time on the internet. It became unbearable as he would be using 
two, sometimes three screens or devices at the same time; watching TV whilst searching on his IPad 
and tweeting on his mobile. He described how this would give him a real buzz, like brainstorming all 
the time, and having lots of ideas but in the end it was exhausting and caused insomnia. He knew, he 
told me, that the benefits of the electronic reminders and notebooks were in the end not worth the 
problems they caused; he could not cope with all the emails and other flag-ups that he had set, and 
ended up not responding. So now, he said, he stayed away from mobile devices, but he still used 
computers at home and work. Instead he was practicing mindfulness meditation which was helping 
him to focus and be less forgetful. As he showed me, he still used little tricks like having his keys 
around his neck and making lists daily, but he thought that meditation was what really helped him to 
keep in mind the things he needed to do. For this person, the benefits that could be gained from using 
mobile devices did not counterbalance the unexpected and negative effect that they had on his life: in 
this way they were comparable to the unwanted side-effects of medication.  
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Conclusion 
 
By exploring what ADHD is like in the support groups, and what such groups contribute to the 
diagnostic process, I have highlighted the central role of memory practices. In the clinic, remembering 
was aided through institutional and bureaucratic procedures, whereas in support groups it was the 
interpersonal practices of memory that I foregrounded. In both settings, remembering and not 
forgetting took much effort and work. Going beyond the scientific recognition that patients with 
ADHD will experience more difficulties than most people with long and short term memory 
problems, I explored the support groups’ scaffolding for remembering which they put in place in 
order to compensate for their difficulties.  In some cases, the people I met accessed existing structures 
such as school reports and other documents in order to aid their memory of childhood events. In one 
case, support group members produced an archive-like record of past events, collectively supporting 
each other to remember. In turn, these memories became evidence towards demonstrating that their 
present problems had been persistent since their early years.  In other cases, the props used by support 
group members were related to improving their lives in the present by not forgetting to complete 
tasks, which they discussed in terms of strategies. I have argued that the technologies used, namely 
school reports, the archive and mobile devices all acted as mediators. As individuals gained greater 
understanding of their difficulties in the context of their lifespan, school reports were re-imagined as 
evidence of difficult relationships in childhood. Similarly, as individuals reduced their tendency to 
procrastinate, the phones themselves became ‘smart’ and turned into personal assistants. The next 
chapter extends my examination of support groups’ strategies which are put in place to improve 
peoples’ lives in the hope that their ADHD related difficulties would be alleviated and absorbed into 
daily life.  
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Chapter Four Techniques and strategies: absorbing inattention            
into everyday life 
 
Living with untreated symptoms 
 
Clinical assessments for ADHD in adults, as I described earlier, are lengthy, consisting of two tasks 
which together last for 3 hours. Typically, the two parts would be conducted by different clinicians. 
First, a specialist nurse conducts a structured interview, then the patient has a break and a consultant 
psychiatrist performs the Mental State Examination. This division of labour allowed for the 
consideration of different opinions and made the process more manageable as three hour sessions 
were considered to be too demanding for one person to perform alone. 
The assessment I observed earlier in my fieldwork gave me a sense of the demands on patients’ 
attention and resilience. A patient, a woman in her late thirties, came into the consultation room 
accompanied by a friend and was from the start visibly restless and unable to control her body 
movements.  She removed her shoes and climbed on the chair, she sat with her feet underneath her, 
yet was unable to keep them still, and as the assessment went on, she would at times get up to pace up 
and down the room. As she was asked to provide examples of impulsive behaviours in her everyday 
life, she started to describe how she often behaved without thinking and how she was unable to 
control or stop herself from acting impulsively
56
.  
Pam: “Like the time when I was about ten years old and I jumped in the big pool without 
knowing how to swim; even later I have jumped out of cars while they’re moving. I just felt 
like it. When you get that monster, the skin will burst. I’m like a dog in a cage, scratching and 
barking.” 
Pam said this whilst clasping her upper chest and throat as though she was unable to breathe from the 
tension.  She then grabbed something from her bag, an elastic band, and started to pull and stretch it. 
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 This is a transcript based on hand written notes during the assessment and augmented with fieldnotes written 
after the assessment.  
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She continued to play with it whilst talking in sentences that came out in bursts, not quite finishing 
one before starting another. 
Pam: “Sometimes I play music so loud, and that helps, because I can’t think or hear anything, 
and then I can feel a bit more relaxed. You know, it feels like I need to lock myself away, so 
that I don’t do the wrong thing in front of my children, and to do that all the time is tiring, I’m 
exhausted. I don’t really know what’s wrong.  What do you reckon, what should I do? ”  
At that point the elastic band she was stretching snapped, and she let out a cry of pain; “Ouch”. She 
immediately took out a bag full of elastic bands and explained: 
Pam: “I’ve got them with me all the time, so that when I need to be a bit quiet, like now or in 
the bus, then I can use them. That was my son’s doctor who suggested it, and it kinds of keeps 
me under control.” 
At the end of the assessment, as I accompanied Pam and her friend back to the entrance of the 
building, she explained how the mental health services that she had consulted before were, in her 
view, useless, only interested in giving her medication and with no time to see her. She said how the 
assessment she just had was the opposite, but probably too long, as she was now exhausted and 
worried about having to drive right through London and beyond.  I agreed with her that it was really 
tiring to be assessed for three hours, as I was myself feeling the strain and I wished her good luck as 
she walked away.    
This small excerpt from an assessment highlights how individuals who attend the clinic try to make 
sense of what they are experiencing prior to receiving a diagnosis and treatment. Pam explained that 
she did not know what was wrong yet she knew that there were some things she could do to help 
herself in her everyday life such as the elastic band pulling or the loud music. I came across similar 
stories over and over again as people described many years of developing their own solution to 
problems that otherwise remained unresolved.  Most of the people I met in the support groups 
described these efforts for living with disabling symptoms as ‘strategies’, a term that was used 
repeatedly and often with great emphasis.  The term ‘strategy’ represented a hopeful move to me, an 
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orientation towards the future as much as an attempt to gain or re-gain control over events every day, 
and reduce the negative impact of symptoms.  
The three support group members I present in this chapter described very different attempts and 
strategies which were orientated towards a better future but most importantly aimed to make everyday 
life in the present easier.  Sometimes what they put in place worked, but only insofar as it was 
repeated, re-enacted and thus habituated with the help of technologies.  I will show how the work to 
establish regimes of behaviours becomes burdensome and how uncertain and changeable the balance 
is between hope and despair, optimism and anguish. I will suggest that support group members 
consider medical treatment itself as a strategy when they are faced with making unsustainable efforts 
to lessen the impact of symptoms: they see treatment as something they do, rather than as something 
they take.  
In previous chapters, I discussed the practices used in the clinic and support groups in order to arrive 
at a diagnosis of adult ADHD. I have argued that practices of memory, both institutional and 
interpersonal, play a crucial role in the diagnostic process, over time and in different settings. I 
described the work and structures which are accessed and put in place by clinicians and support group 
members not only to help with remembrance of childhood events, but also to assist with being more 
awake in the present and not forgetting tasks.  
In this chapter, I reach further back along the timeline of the diagnostic process and explore how 
people describe living with symptoms in the absence of a formal diagnosis or treatment. The people I 
met were on the whole over 40 years old and, as a result, had been living with the accumulating 
impact of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity for decades. The implication is that people lived 
their everyday life in childhood, adolescence and then adulthood with a range of difficulties which 
were caused by being forgetful, having difficulties in keeping their attention on the tasks at hand, or 
being unable to rest and sleep. As one-off events, these problems are annoying but in their persistence 
through consecutive life stages, they are actually disabling. They demand endurance and adaptation 
from the individual and/or her direct social environment. Whilst Pam said that she did not know what 
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was wrong, the accumulation of problems and difficulties over time alerted her to the fact that this 
condition was not something that everyone experienced. This kind of suffering, ordinary and 
cumulative rather than exceptional and discrete, is easily missed or ignored by observers.  
Often people described how they had found ways to alleviate the impairments they faced as a matter 
of survival after too many disasters or crises that left them with no money, no relationships or sense of 
worth. These strategies were attempts to absorb problems into their ordinary lives, so that their impact 
was reduced. One support group member explained how such strategies provided means to move 
forward to a better life and not become ‘stuck in a repeated disaster zone’.  In her exploration of 
health, disease and poverty in India, Veena Das (2014) discusses how suffering can be absorbed into 
everyday life, so that it almost disappears behind the business of carrying on, of living and surviving. 
Almost, because if one pays attention to the details of daily practices and conversations, Das argues, it 
will become clearer that this absorption ‘scars [life] with a sense of things not being quite right, even a 
sense of suffocation and foreboding’ (ibid.: 1).  
Das’s work on suffering has been concerned with describing how violence, often extreme, can be 
integrated into ordinary life, not through transcendence or an escape from reality, but instead by ‘a 
descent into the ordinary’(2007).  The notion of absorbing suffering into everyday life activities is 
particularly helpful in describing how the people I met discussed their own attempt to live with the 
consequences of being forgetful and hyperactive. In contrast to the extreme violence that was 
experienced by Das’ participants, Pam and members of the support groups described how they lived 
with persistent, continuous and cumulative everyday difficulties by adapting as best they could.  
The techniques and strategies that were described in support groups, social media and the clinic as 
ways of living with distressing symptoms reminded me of the transformative practices that Foucault 
famously named ‘technologies of the self’ (1988)57. In his later work, Foucault described how his 
                                                          
57
 I have used Foucault’s concept here but I also found De Certeau’s (1984) contrast been strategy and tactics 
helpful to think with in regard to issues of temporality and power. It is worth noting the contemporaneity of the 
two authors as The practice of everyday life (1984) was published the year of Foucault’s death in 1984.  
It has been argued that Foucault, when examining everyday practices, had focused on the analysis of power and 
its loci in institutions, to which De Certeau reacted by concentrating on the everyday practices as the loci of 
resistance. My discussion in this chapter will be based on the terms and actions used by support group members, 
P a g e  | 97 
 
interest moved from the examination of domination and power shown in his previous work ( 1972, 
1975) to an exploration of ‘the modality of relations to the self’ (1984:338). He explored ancient 
Greek practices of knowledge production and proposed that the notion of caring for oneself, 
‘epimeleia heautou’ was representative of a particular attitude towards one’s self, towards others and 
towards the world which was embedded in practices and techniques. In other words, the 
transformative practices deployed to look after oneself were also the basis for knowing about 
oneself.
58
 In this chapter I am concerned with exploring how caring for oneself was part of a process 
of self-knowledge and of becoming adults with ADHD. I am not suggesting that such practices were 
means of receiving a diagnosis of adult ADHD, but instead, that by looking after themselves people 
enacted particular versions of ADHD. As I describe in detail, it was through the strategies they put in 
place, to use their terminology, that they began to understand what might be wrong with the way they 
experienced the world.  It seems to me that these practices and techniques were important in bringing 
immediate relief, and in time, for enabling  their understanding and recognition of what might be 
wrong.   
For the remainder of this chapter I use ethnographic examples to explore the techniques that people 
deployed, some more strategic than others. The first part introduces Paul and Clara who highlight how 
some strategies act directly on the body initially but also improve interactions with the world. In the 
second part I examine how Garry conceived playing chess as a means to become both more awake to 
the world and to paying attention to others.  Finally I conclude this chapter by returning to Clara, who 
described the potential cost of living by strategies in an attempt to absorb her difficulties into 
everyday life. Her account shows how hope and despair become co-existent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which highlighted their ambivalent relations with medical institutions and models, neither rejecting them wholly 
nor accepting them fully.  
 
58
 Foucault argued that the ancient Greek notion of caring for oneself was suppressed when it was supplanted by 
the more recent Christian concept of knowing yourself ‘gnothi seauton’. The mot d’ordre ‘know thyself’ was, 
according to Foucault, based on a renunciation of the self and assumed that knowledge can be acquired without 
an impact on the self, without a transformation of the self (Foucault, 2005). 
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The casual straightjacket 
 
Early on in my fieldwork as I attended Support Group B, I met a number of people who were keen to 
participate in my research. Some I saw regularly, others I communicated with through emails.  I 
interviewed Paul after a few months of correspondences; In his fifties, he held a professional post and 
arranged to see me in his office, where, apart from a couple of interruptions, we were left to converse 
in private. When I first met Paul, I found him very articulate and well spoken, with a calm demeanour 
that was somewhat in contrast to the prevailing mood in the room. As we started chatting in his office, 
I noticed once again the gentleness in Paul’s personality. He discussed local history and I responded 
to his curiosity about my French background.  Paul had clearly given some thought towards our 
meeting as he explained that we could have an interview lasting 45 minutes and then have lunch with 
his partner, Wendy.  During the interview he described at length his lifelong problems with 
forgetfulness; he gave very detailed examples from his childhood and early adulthood including how 
he had first heard of ADHD through a friend who had been diagnosed with the condition. At the time 
his partner (now ex) was convinced that Paul had ADHD, whilst Paul completely rejected the idea.  A 
decade and a divorce later, as his new partner made similar suggestions, Paul started the process 
which led to his diagnosis a year before we met.  We continued our conversation in a local sandwich 
bar where we met his partner as planned. Our conversation moved from topic to topic but mostly 
returned to stories of Paul’s forgetfulness. Wendy explained: 
“ If you want to know what ADHD is like, all you have to do is to live with Paul for a couple 
of days; constantly losing things gets very distressing – keys, wallets.  On one occasion he 
lost the keys to the apartment we were renting on holiday and once we got home he’d lost his 
wallet”.59  
As we were standing up to leave, Paul put on his jacket, and at that point opened it to show me.  His 
jacket, a regular casual but smart jacket from the outside had a number of pockets with zips fitted on 
the inside. ‘Wendy did this for me’, he said.  He had a pocket for his keys, one for his wallet, one for 
                                                          
59
 Fieldnotes transcript.  
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his watch and one for his mobile. He explained that they were not interchangeable; the pockets were 
specifically sized for the objects destined to occupy them. He had learned to place each object in the 
right pocket without thinking, but more importantly he had also learned to be aware of an object’s 
absence when a pocket was empty. He would then look for the missing keys or wallet, and locate 
them fairly easily as they were often in the immediate vicinity. His trust in this system was built 
through the experience of becoming very sensitive to whether the pockets were empty or not and of 
being made aware of important objects through their absence. The irony in having developed this 
technique did not escape him: he called the coat his ‘straight jacket’. But along with his partner, he 
was very pleased that the disruptions caused by forgetfulness were kept at bay. 
With the help of Wendy, Paul had found a way to stop his forgetfulness impacting negatively on their 
lives recurrently
60
. He did this by calling upon a personal technology, the jacket, and training himself 
and his senses to become alert to changes in the garment. In other words, what his memory couldn’t 
keep track of, his body with the help of the jacket could. As Foucault wrote, the Greek word 
“epimeleia heautou’,  which means  taking care of one’s self … describes a sort of work, an activity; it 
implies attention, knowledge , technique.’(1984:359). In Paul’s case, the work of looking after 
himself was achieved through Wendy’s adaptation of the jacket, and the training he put himself 
through so that the technology of the jacket functioned habitually, without requiring conscious 
thought.  Following Foucault, we can think in terms of a physical regimen that aims to regulate an 
activity that is important for healthy living (1985). Whilst the jacket was not restricting Paul’s 
movement, as the term ‘straightjacket’ suggests, it was restricting his tendency to forget objects that 
played an important part in his everyday life; bank cards, phone, keys.  The jacket forced Paul to pay 
attention to the presence or absence of these objects; in other words it focused Paul’s attention onto 
the materiality of life around him, which, if ignored, got him and his partner into trouble. In Paul’s 
                                                          
60
 Throughout my fieldwork I had the opportunity to meet patients and support group members accompanied by 
their partners, relatives, people who cared for and helped them. My meeting with Paul and Wendy highlighted 
how much partners contributed to the stories, providing me with an understanding of the impact of symptoms on 
relations with others. Crucially, it also made visible the caring that takes place in daily lives which I would not 
have been party to otherwise. 
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words, the use of strategies such as the jacket meant that he felt ‘in control of life rather than buffeted 
by it’. 
Foucault  used the notion of regimen in an earlier text (1975) to describe power relations more 
overtly, using the political connotation of the word which bears notions of truth (1997).  Here I am 
interested in the notion of regimen which Foucault developed in his later work, as a ‘whole manner of 
forming oneself as a subject who had the proper, necessary, and sufficient concern for his body… It 
defined a circumstantial strategy involving the body and the elements that surrounded it; and finally, it 
proposed to equip the individual himself for a rational mode of behaviour’ (1985: 108)61. In the next 
section I explore further how strategies towards living a better life are applied through concerns 
associated with managing the body, a topic that another participant, Clara, discussed at length.  
 
Strengthening the muscle 
 
I met Clara in the same support group as Paul; we arranged to meet in a local café for an interview 
and did so approximately a month later. A woman in her mid-thirties, Clara was visibly energetic, and 
at first impression seemed healthy, something that became a topic early in our conversation as she 
ordered a fruit smoothie. She had yet to be formally diagnosed and had only recently started to attend 
the support group.  I asked her to describe the kind of difficulties she experienced. Clara explained 
that she always felt she had difficulties and problems with completing her work at school, that she did 
not do so well in college and so did not go to University. Instead she had been working with children 
for a decade, an occupation in which she found that her high level of energy was enjoyable and 
                                                          
61
 It is worth noting as a preamble to the next section, that the French word used by Foucault, ‘régime’, 
encompasses the meanings of both diet and regimen in English: it refers to a system of government as well as to 
dietetic practices.  Thus the model used for describing practices and procedures that can be found in organising 
state institutions can also be applied to individuals. It could be argued that the intellectual move Foucault made 
and described towards the end of his life had a basis in the word ‘régime’: 
‘Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in 
the interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how 
an individual acts upon himself, in the technology of self.’ (Foucault, 1988: 18) 
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acceptable
62
. However, she described severe problems with disorganisation and inattention that, in her 
view, were holding her back from achieving what she wanted.  She had recently gone back to 
studying whilst working in a healthcare environment where she was diagnosed with dyslexia and had 
been strongly advised to attend an ADHD assessment. Whilst she was waiting for the referral to be 
processed, she was given advice on what might help her:  
Clara: “This person, she said - Oh you need to make sure you have exercise every day, that 
you drink lots of water, have regular snacks. And I am like… you need to ask me who I am 
before you tell me what to do! You just described errrm. If you were to ask somebody – who 
does these things? – they tell you –  Clara ! Because that's what I do, that's what I’ve always 
done.” 
Clara was already following the healthy living habit of taking water, regular snacks and exercise even 
before ADHD had been mentioned to her. Indeed she had struck me as very healthy and sporty, as she 
was to confirm by describing how she walked everywhere and practiced martial art. Yet the 
techniques for looking after her health in general, soon became related to her newly suspected 
diagnosis as she went on to explain:  
Clara: “I look after myself, I always carry water with me, I don't drink tea or coffee.  I have 
done it recently with this job, because when you visit people they offer you tea or coffee, but I 
know it’s not really helpful to me, it’s not a matter of not being able to go to sleep at night… 
but I’ve just gone off topic…” 
Claude:  “That’s ok.” 
Clara: “But it’s more that I get so tired, and you know, I live on like, oat cakes, nuts, and 
chocolate, and I am just constantly eating all the time, to keep myself going and to keep 
myself up. Because there is this theory with ADHD that it's not that you are more energised, 
                                                          
62
 Clara did not explicitly describe her work with children as a strategy, but it could be understood as an act that 
transformed her and made her feel better. In the sense that ethics is concerned with the way we behave (Stengers 
and Zournazi, 2002), this strategy was also an ethical act, aimed at making her behaviour compatible with her 
environment.  
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but you have more of a sleepy brain that needs to be woken up, so when I am working, I am 
exhausted trying to concentrate on something. I can go to kick boxing and do an hour of 
punching and everyone gets tired and I can keep going for ever, but when I need to 
concentrate on writing or something at work, I am exhausted.”  
Clara continued speaking without any prompting from me and the energy she described was also very 
audible as she spoke fast with hardly any pauses.  
Clara: “Like I walk everywhere, I get my energy up, I eat a lot of fish, maybe not tuna, 
because of the mercury thing, but I am super healthy, I hardly drink, don’t take drugs. The 
only thing I do is chocolate. I don't really do coffee only like if I have to do something really 
boring, I have like an expresso, it's a bit like a trick… So I do all I can do, but maybe I don't 
do all of them all of the time, but it's got to be a crazy life if you have to do that, you got to be 
pretty OCD to do that. Even though a lot of them are my natural ways, my natural impulse 
and I get depressed if I don’t walk or get dancing or something like that…So you know 
strategies do help”. 
Paying close attention to food and exercise was common among the people I met, and one of the 
support groups, Group B, organised sessions specifically aimed at promoting their physical well-
being. In particular, they had negotiated with their local councils to receive yoga sessions and relaxing 
massages from a teacher based in the adult education department.  The group facilitator explained that 
yoga was particularly effective at enabling people to slow down and relax, something that many in the 
group found difficult. She pointed out that how yoga used the body to bring a sense of peace and 
quiet
63
. Foucault showed how the notion of physical regimen in ancient Greece, including diet and 
exercise, was thought to be the best way to discover and understand one’s self. To take care of one’s 
self in such a way, would not only bring therapeutic benefits but could ensure that one could make the 
right decision in one’s life:  ‘A concern that permeated everyday life, making the major or common 
activities of existence a matter both of health and of ethics’(1985: 118).  
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 For more details on the therapeutic use of yoga for ADHD see: (Balasubramaniam et al., 2012; Kraft, 2010) 
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Foucault points out more specifically how, for Ancient Greeks, following a specific diet ‘was a 
strategic art in the sense that it ought to permit one to respond to circumstances in a reasonable, hence 
useful, manner’( ibid.:106). Using this concept, we can start to understand what Clara meant when she 
described her intuitive dietary and physical regimen.  The techniques and tricks were immediate 
actions she took to remedy her attention problems, described as her natural impulse, which she 
explained, she had followed independently of her more recent concerns with ADHD. Over time, Clara 
learned how some of those techniques were effective in reducing the difficulties she associated with 
being inattentive and hyperactive. It was only recently, when she heard of ADHD and thought it 
might be relevant to her, that she started to think of her natural ways in terms of strategies. As I asked 
Clara how she imagined her life in ten years’ time, she responded:  
Clara:  “Most people learn as they go along through life, about what helps them, what is not 
so helpful, you know.  We learn from our mistakes, and I know what things are helpful to me 
as I go along, I hope I will only get better at the things I need to do.  I don’t even know all of 
the little tricks and tactics that keep me sort of alright.  I think [silence] it is so easy to kind of 
slip and get in a mess.  The natural me is kind of chaotic, and that chaos is always round the 
corner and maybe that's not how it is for everybody.  That's not something that I would 
change, so imagining 10 years down the line probably I might be more aware of what things 
work for me and have strengthened that muscle more so I am kind of doing things that are 
helpful.  Or just accept the mess that comes with not doing the things I need to do, but being 
comfortable with who I am and what is going on for me.” 
As time has passed, Clara was learning about herself, her body and her mind. She had hopes that she 
would still be learning new techniques, training herself and ‘strengthening the muscle’ in order to 
improve the way she functioned in the world. During this part of our conversation, it occurred to me 
that she had not envisaged or imagined her future in terms of being diagnosed and receiving 
treatment.  I asked: 
 Claude: “Do you think getting a diagnosis of ADHD would change things?”  
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Clara: “I am a bit ambivalent about having this diagnosis anyway; it’s bit like a kind of a 
stamp on your birth certificate or whatever. For me it's just a way of understanding myself; I 
do these things and other people also do these things. It’s nice to know you are not the only 
one; somewhere over there, there are some of my kind, which is helpful when you behave a 
bit differently from the norm and you might get negativity and problems because of that. 
That’s what the diagnosis means to me.” 
Clara’s ambivalence about the diagnosis was widely shared between members of support groups and 
yet she suggests that it is possible for the labelling and categorising to be part of the process of 
understanding one’s self. The diagnostic process and its practices such as attending support groups 
and being labelled, are for Clara transformative practices. Foucault’s most famous definition clearly 
describes the relation between, practice, knowledge and the making of a self as:  
‘technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality’ (1988: 17). 
Clara described how finding out about the diagnosis of ADHD had brought her better knowledge 
about herself, an understanding and some clarity as to what might be going wrong.  As I have shown 
through Clara and Paul’s stories, they achieved this by taking care of themselves by putting in place 
strategies that could alleviate the forgetfulness or the excess of energy. In the sense that a diagnosis is 
a process of identification and a differentiation between what is wrong and what is not (Jutel, 2011), 
the strategies put in place by Paul and Clara contribute to the production of that knowledge. The years 
of experience in trying to alleviate difficulties provided the people I met with ample time to build 
strategies which often left them with more of an understanding about the phenomenology of ADHD 
than many General Practitioners possessed
64
. 
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 Many members of support groups complained to me of that very point, that they knew more about ADHD 
than their doctor, from their own bodily experience.  See  Matheson et al., 2013 and McCarthy et al., 2013 for 
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Clara also pointed out that in the process of understanding herself better, she became aware that she 
was not alone in experiencing these difficulties. She suggested that this knowledge of others is also a 
relief, and hinted that it could be a source of support if contending with stigma.  Being with people 
who have similar ways of experiencing the world is as much a reason for Clara to attend support 
groups as sharing and learning techniques and strategies from others. I will return to Clara, but first, in 
the next section, I want to focus on this element and introduce Garry’s story to explore how the 
strategy he developed depended on being with and paying attention to others.   
 
Keeping myself in check 
 
I met Garry in Support Group B which ran sessions that were long enough to offer social activities. 
Once a week the room that housed the group was open from 10 am and often did not close until 3 pm. 
I described in Chapter Three the sharing sessions that took place which were considered to be the 
main part of the group’s activity. As the group was open for at least five hours, there was time for 
informal chats, long lunch breaks and less structured activities such as drawing or playing board 
games. 
Garry was a keen chess player and would inevitably set up his chess board to have a game or two with 
other people in the group. In an unexpected way, these chess games were social events as they 
attracted other people who would sit, watch and chat, or sometimes just come in and tease a person 
who was in obvious difficulty – never Garry. As I found out, the social aspect of the game meant that 
it was less of a competitive activity than a chance to banter and chat, a feature which made 
concentration on the moves of the pieces rather difficult. But Garry was adept at talking and playing 
simultaneously and, in one of the games I played with him, he explained that he was relying on set 
moves that he knew well because he played in a regional chess club. His chess fluency was evident in 
the games I played with him, which developed a pattern of my being on the back foot and in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
some accounts of the unbalanced and often unsatisfactory encounter between GPs and patients in relation to 
ADHD.  
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defensive position, to the great pleasure of those watching. Caroline, one of the facilitators, had 
mentioned how Garry started a chess club for the group, and would teach whoever was interested and 
so I asked him how that was going. He explained that some people were attending, that it was slow to 
start with, but if there was one thing that chess had taught him, it was not to give up. As we continued 
to chat, losing my queen and a castle in a matter of minutes, I came to see that chess played an 
important role in his life. He had learned to play at school and had continued playing throughout his 
education, thinking it had been helpful when he was taking his GCSEs and later during other exams. 
Garry was 39, and had been diagnosed with ADHD as an adult two years previously in 2011 yet he 
had not been prescribed the usual pharmaceutical treatment. Instead he was given anti-depressants 
which he felt were helping with his low mood. I asked him how he felt about “not being treated for 
ADHD” 65, and he explained that, most of the time he could control some of his symptoms, and that 
he had been working at it for a long time and that chess had been really helpful.  
Through the years, chess had built his confidence - “even when you lost a game, there’s always 
another one coming”, he said. It had also taught him persistence, not to give up and keep going till the 
end - “til I drop dead”. He had been playing in a local chess league club in division five for a number 
of years and had lost his last eight games, but felt confident that he would soon win again. Through 
playing chess, he was learning to counteract the difficulties that are part of ADHD such as inattention, 
distraction and restlessness: the strategies on the board became a strategy for everyday life.   
Desjarlais (2011) in a recent book on his passion for chess made a similar point in describing the 
effect of the game on players: 
                                                          
65
 Although Garry did not say specifically that he found the anti-depressant helpful, I realised that he was 
reacting to my top down view of what his treatment was, and from other informal conversations I sensed that he 
was happy with his treatment. He made me realise that I was putting myself in the shoes of a doctor when I did 
not mean to do that. On reflection, my assumption that the anti-depressants were not treating ADHD can be seen 
as the result of my habituation to clinical practice through the time I spent in the clinic. At that point in time I 
had spent six months in the clinic and had completed the diagnostic training provided to psychiatrists. My 
fieldnotes describe how, when outside the clinic, I would apply a clinical framework to the descriptions 
provided to me by support group members as a  matter of course, and how I needed to ensure this would not 
obfuscate other understandings.  
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‘Chess can provide a modest sense of mastery in the world, even if it’s only for moments in 
time…Chess players can find that they are acting in the world, initiating lines of thought and 
action, rather than simply responding to whatever life throws at them (2011:42).’ 
Desjarlais is keen to describe chess in terms of ‘interrelatedness’ and ‘fields of force’ on the board. He 
considers it interactive and multi-dimensional; it spills out on to the world rather than being contained 
as just a mental activity.  
‘By altering focus, homing in on the task at hand, and gaining a fresh perspective – 
daydreaming, thinking outside the pre-set frames, stepping into a realm of play –  a lifeworld 
can be altered. Through the sleights of consciousness, people rework the experiential grounds 
of their lives so that their world becomes different, at least for a spell’ (ibid.: 43). 
Echoing this view, Garry explained during one of our imbalanced chess encounters how focusing and 
planning really did not come to him naturally. It was always the part that went wrong in his life. He 
had lost work because of it and had been unemployed for two years when I met him; he was in serious 
debt as he spent impulsively and had been called lazy at school and home. As he explained, playing 
chess was helpful in dealing with these problems: it taught him to be calm and present in the moment, 
it pushed him to focus on one task at a time and not be distracted by other things. He demonstrated by 
swiftly putting me in check whilst other members were joking and chatting around us. 
Desjarlais suggested that any change that chess could bring in the lifeworld of its players was only 
temporary, hence the need to keep playing.  Garry kept playing chess, knowing there was always 
another game round the corner, and thus he felt that chess had a lasting effect on him. Learning to 
control the board also helped him to control himself or, as he put it, carrying on the chess metaphors, 
helped in keeping himself in check. He described this as the best strategy he had found to help him to 
become self-aware, to develop the ability to not get lost in the world and he hoped that this strategy 
could be helpful to other people with ADHD. The process of mastering oneself through playing chess 
is described by Desjarlais as a form of ‘cognitive magic… a sort of ritualization [that brings] 
containment, ordering, making things right’ (ibid.:44).  
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There are obvious rituals associated with playing chess, setting up the board, using chance to choose 
which colour to play, and other small habits that each player develops. Beyond these small rituals, 
Garry made chess a habit in his life, something that he engaged with purposefully on a regular basis in 
the club and in the support group, because it was helpful to him, and he hoped, to others too. In his 
own words, Garry felt that chess ‘wised him up’, made him a better person who could achieve better 
things.  Desjarlais in his conversations with chess players came across the same kind of claim for the 
acquisition of wisdom through chess playing.   
‘Chess can serve a corrective function. It can help us counter a too-purposive and linear view of life 
and make our outlook more holistic and more ethically sound. It can help us to wise up.’(ibid.: 39). 
In the context of the conversations I have had with Garry, the expression ‘to wise up’ has acquired a 
sense of discovery, of becoming aware, of waking up to something. Garry had discussed how chess 
provided him with the discipline to keep focusing on one task at a time and to avoid becoming 
distracted by other things. Desjarlais suggested that playing chess provided a structure geared towards 
expending and broadening the player’s perception and interaction with the world; in the case of Garry, 
chess provided a structure with a different kind of impact. It helped Garry to be more discerning in his 
interactions with the world and not become overwhelmed by an elusive blur of passing events; chess 
woke him to the present moment and helped to rein in and filter down the world.  In other words, 
Garry was not seeking to escape his difficulties by playing games. Instead chess helped him to 
increase his focus on his everyday life; it helped him to make decisions, ethical decisions, that would 
improve his life, or at least avoid those choices that might be detrimental to his well-being (Das, 
2014). 
As I understood it, rather than closing and reducing his world, chess helped Garry towards being more 
selective in his interactions with the world, something that was apparent in his choice to play chess in 
social contexts. As is well known, it takes two to play a game of chess, but Garry was also choosing to 
play chess as a social event which involved many more peripheral players.  Observing him in the 
support group, I never had the impression that he was seeking an audience; instead he seemed to 
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encourage people to engage with the game as an event, and to make comments on the positions of the 
pieces which usually led to some banter about which of the players was winning. I saw Garry lose 
once in the group, to the great delight not only of his opponent but also the four or five other people 
who were involved. Garry, in his own calm way, was also participating in the celebration and 
encouraging those who had previously been fearful of challenging him at chess to do so at another 
session.   
The connections between chess and well-being existed long before Garry had heard of or been 
diagnosed with ADHD. As with Clara, he had intuitively felt the benefit of playing chess regularly; it 
calmed him and it also kept him alert to the world. There was a sense of hope in Garry’s commitment: 
hope for himself that after losing eight games he would win again, and hope that by using similar 
perseverance his life would also improve. Hope for others too as he came every week to teach and 
play chess with the members of the support group and hope that they could win, that they could 
benefit from chess and make changes to their lives.  Importantly, as described by Garry, it was 
playing regularly and setting a routine of play that produced a change in him that brought more focus 
and calmness, rather than the magic of one special game. In the next section I want to explore how the 
various strategies I have described –  which can be thought of as hopeful moves, ways to project 
oneself into a better future, and of being more present in everyday life –  may also be coupled with an 
opposite and darker side.  
 
Burdened with potential 
 
In an interview, Michael Taussig (2002) described the sense of hope as a mix of pessimism and 
optimism and explained:  ‘it’s like going to the theatre where you suspend disbelief and you become 
full of hope, but there is another part of you which says it can’t last forever. So that seems to me what 
human beings are about – that level of complexity, the ability to hold opposite ideas at once – and I 
think that is where hope and the lack of hope are organised in a sort of dynamic mix.’(ibid.:47).  
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I want to explore Taussig’s proposition that hope is not experienced without its opposite, so that it is 
intertwined with a sense of discouragement or despair. Returning to my conversation with Clara, the 
theme of hope figured extensively in her story, and as I found in other parts of my fieldwork and 
further afield, Clara talked of hope in terms of potentiality. There are many publications that urge 
adults with ADHD to reach, unblock or harness their potential and generally to focus not on the limits 
that ADHD imposes but on its positive aspects. In simple terms, the argument put forward is that 
ADHD forms part of a natural diversity that contains hidden strengths, and that some adaptations by 
the individual and/or environment can help people achieve their potential.  Long and Moore recently 
noted how ‘the “language of achievement”, in fact, has become one of the defining features of the 
contemporary moment’(2013: 2), thus highlighting how in the light of the austere economic 
environment, achievement provides a hopeful, yet rarely obtained, solution. Of particular interest is 
their notion that achieving takes place within social contexts and interactions, hence the difficulty in 
defining achievement precisely. In the same volume, Solomon explored the range of narrative genres 
related to achievement and autism and highlighted how achieving in this context is the result of 
‘collective, relational, interactional and imaginary work’( 2013:134).The strategies that Clara and 
others described to me can be seen in that light as adaptations and as optimistic actions and relations 
which bring the hope of achieving a better life.  
In gaining understanding of what had been helpful for her, and re-conceiving this in terms of 
strategies to keep chaos at bay, Clara hoped that she could find still more tricks to keep on top of 
things. But as she carried on our conversation, it became clear that being ‘sort of alright’ was not quite 
enough and she hoped to achieve more and to reach her potential.  
Clara: “Half of it is that I found it really hard to think through what I am trying to say, and 
half of it, I really feel that I have got a lot to say. And I know that whenever I am in a learning 
environment I get it before anyone else and I am bored. So for me not being able to show that 
and get my mark, it’s so frustrating, so frustrating. When you know you are capable, and you 
are not achieving what you feel you are able to do, and if for some reason I was not able to 
finish my dissertation – I know I can do this stuff, I can see that I am a lot faster than other 
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people, so I should be able to achieve a lot – so if for some reason I was not able to, then that 
would be a sign that this is a kind of debilitating thing, you know.  But I know I am an 
intelligent person, I know that I should be able to do these things , and if there is something 
that stops me because I don’t seem to be able to concentrate to complete a task , well that's..., 
it feels like an extreme thing you know.  I just want the legs so that I can run.” 
At that point of our conversation her frustration was almost palpable as she was moving forward in 
her chair, slapping the table-top that was between us and asking herself what it was that stopped her 
reaching her potential.  
We can try to understand the combination of aspirations and limitations in relation to potentiality in 
Clara’s experience by recalling Taussig’s concept of hope as dynamic and entangled with its opposite, 
pessimism.  On the one hand the possibilities for the future provide a direction to aim for and they 
bring hope for improvement, for learning new tactics to remediate difficulties. On the other hand such 
optimism forces a confrontation with the very obstacles that are getting in the way of reaching that 
potential. Potentiality represents both the limitation of a given, (for Clara, her consistent inability to 
get organised and keep focused), and the realisation of what is possible for her (that she will get the 
mark she deserves).   
A recent publication (Taussig et al., 2013) explored the concept of potentiality and its relevance in the 
realm of biomedicine. This work suggested that three meanings were intertwined.   
‘The first denotes a hidden force determined to manifest itself – something that with or without 
intervention has its future built into it. The second refers to genuine plasticity – the capacity to 
transmute into something completely different. The third suggests a latent possibility imagined as 
open to choice, a quality perceived as available to human modification and direction through 
which people can work to propel an object or subject to become something other than it is’ (ibid.: 
2013). 
From its Latin origin the word ‘potential’ combines the notion of possibility with that of power and 
force. The word therefore implicitly contains the notions of change and transformation that are 
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imagined as an intrinsic ability to become something or somebody better. Because potential is 
hopeful, it is optimistic and positive, it is ‘the flip side of risk’ (ibid.: S4) which would suggest a 
negative future, one to avoid. Potentiality involves projecting forward an aspiration, something to aim 
at, a goal to reach; it is already present but needs to be activated so as to be realised. Clara described 
this dynamic when she explained how she was doing all she could to control her chaos and increase 
her attention in order to achieve what she knew she was capable of. She called upon strategies in order 
to enable her potential to become reality.  
As part of our conversation, I asked her if she had prepared for her psychiatric appointment, 
something that is often discussed in support groups, where tips were exchanged such as accessing 
evidence of past symptoms in school reports. As I described in Chapter Three, locating old documents 
required efforts often involving conversations with parents and so it was with Clara who explained:  
Clara: “I am going to sort out the attic [of my parents], so there is probably a load of school 
reports in there.  I mean, I remember, ‘lots of potential’, that's what they always said.  My 
whole life has been mired by this bloody word, potential, you know, you just feel like, there is 
so much more you can achieve and something is stopping me achieving it, you know what I 
mean?”  
With the hope of finding her school reports, Clara was expecting the documents to describe all of her 
potential for achievement which had remained unfulfilled. Clearly, their content had stayed with her, 
casting a shadow over her life. What started as an optimistic vision by educators, one that was meant 
to create possibilities and set high expectations, turned into a burden for Clara. In thinking about the 
future and how she imagined what it might be like to live with ADHD in the next few years, she 
continued:  
Clara: “The big thing, I guess, this thing that has hung over me since I was a kid, is this idea 
of potential, and for me it is a very big thing, and it’s probably part of the anxiety of actually 
managing to get anything written and finish my dissertation. Part of that is a lot of anxiety 
because I struggled so much at school, there is a lot built up kind of errrrm, an expectation 
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that I will be up all night, suffering, trying to finish a report, there is a lot of residual memory, 
so that gets in the way.” 
Instead of inspiring and facilitating success, the idea of her potential and the repeated expectations of 
family and others became restricting, limiting and anxiety provoking. This necessity to perform and 
succeed, what (Kaufman, 2013) calls ‘the tyranny of potential’,  shows how potentialities are formed 
not only intrasubjectively  but also through social relations. What is recognised as potential is part of a 
process of fitting within social expectations and must be reinforced through relations with others. The 
potential an individual carries is formed within a wider cultural context, at home with family, at 
school or work, and it sets the parameters for success and failure, and to some extent can elevate this 
concept into a duty to others.
66
  
Throughout this conversation and at other times when I met Clara, she talked regularly of all the 
things she does to be healthy, of not choosing the easy medication for headaches or such things, and 
attempting more natural ways to treat herself. Yet she also seemed to have reached a stage where she 
wanted to try something different at the same time as recognising the social burden on her:  
“I learnt to be more socially acceptable over time, yeah, other people learn to do this in their 
teens, but I didn't and I still do things that really embarrass myself and you get to a place you 
kind of accept yourself. I guess that's where treatment comes in, and I am not a magical pill 
taker, but sometimes you can feel that it’s not working or something. I do worry that 
everything takes me so long, and is such a killer, and if I am doing everything else, I am just 
like: isn’t there something else I can do? I would like to know that there is one more thing I 
can do which would just, you know. So yes I'd want treatment.”  
In acknowledging the limits of her tactics and strategies, Clara is also keeping alive the hope that 
there is still something else that could make the difference between being all right and achieving 
more. This is the potentiality that resides within biomedical treatment which promises something 
                                                          
66
 In that context one’s age is likely to make a difference. Clara was in her mid-thirties, having worked and now 
training for a professional qualification; had she been in her sixties, it may be that her expectations and thoughts 
on potential would be different.  
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more than mere tricks
67
. Even though neurodevelopmental psychiatry does not claim to bring a cure 
through treatment, the treatments do propose to alleviate symptoms and to improve the quality of life 
of patients. To that extent, the biomedical potentiality for ADHD is about care rather than cure. It 
seems to me, that if we think of strategies as ways to care for oneself, then medical treatment for Clara 
in the form of medication or psychological interventions offers another strategy to help her live with 
disabling symptoms. Despite her ambivalence towards being labelled and about the effect of stimulant 
medication, she was hoping for an assessment which might provide her with treatment. It seems to me 
that, even with caution, Clara thought of treatment, including medication, as a strategy and therefore 
as something she would do actively, rather than something she would take passively.  
That taking medicines can be conceived as a social act saturated with meanings and metaphoric 
powers has been highlighted in the anthropology of health (Whyte, Geest, and Hardon, 2002). In this 
way we can think of taking medication as an active strategy
68
, something that requires planning and 
repetition in order for the effect to last. But is taking medicine the same as wearing a modified jacket 
as Paul did, or as the physical and dietary regime put in place by Clara? We may denote a hierarchy in 
Clara’s consideration of medical treatment as a last resort, after all else fails. But I would suggest that 
as medication for ADHD can only be accessed legally
69
 through a specialist diagnosis, it also 
legitimates the problems of inattention and hyperactivity in ways that other strategies cannot. 
Furthermore, medication in its materiality, simplifies the process of remediating symptoms and 
extracts it from the relational work involved in other strategies; put succinctly ‘healing is 
objectified’(Geest and Whyte, 1989). 
                                                          
67
There are other hopes and promises emerging in biomedicine from new technologies that are also 
accompanied with a darker side. DelVecchio Good  (2007) described this in the following way: ‘The 
biotechnical embrace creates a popular culture enamored with the biology of hope, attracting venture capital that 
continues even in the face of contemporary constraints to generate new treatment modalities’ (ibid.: 407). 
68
  I will return to the idea of treatment as an active strategy in Chapter Eight where I explore one way that 
support group members developed and produced knowledge in relation to the main form of treatment for adult 
ADHD and how they adapted their treatment to their lives.  
69
 I do not discuss the illegal purchase or use of stimulant medication in this thesis as my fieldwork did not put 
me into contexts where such activity was disclosed and discussed by participants. The use and abuse of 
prescribed medication is a topic well researched and written about, in particular in relation to universities in the 
USA (Bright, 2008; DeSantis and Hane, 2010; DeSantis, Webb and Noar, 2008).   
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Whilst Clara thought that a diagnosis would provide a way of understanding herself, our conversation 
did not extend to exploring the kind of knowledge that Clara might gain through using this 
strategy/treatment.  What I felt strongly in our conversation was her sense of frustration and of 
tiredness. On the one hand, Clara described her energy and determination and on the other, the 
exhausting process of calling upon tactics and strategies. In describing some of the strategies she had 
in place to remediate her disorganisation and chaos, she was also pointing out that they did not always 
work, which was a worry to her in regard to the exams she was working towards.  Her desperation 
about these limits was also expressed when discussing the fragility of her situation and her fear that 
she could slip back into chaos, a situation which might have dire consequences for her future.  Her 
efforts in seeking ways to remedy her difficulties and her hope to succeed at her tasks may yet come 
to nothing, leaving her having to keep struggling on. The dynamic mix of hope and despair that 
Taussig described (2002) is precisely that balancing act of being aware of reality, of the limitations 
that one may experience due to illness or difficulties whilst striving to improve one’s life and not 
giving up (Mattingly, 2010).   
As Clara described, it took a lot of effort to maintain a balance where hope was still present; it took 
great commitment to practice the physical and organisational regimen she had put in place, every day, 
day after day and to try not to slip. Yet, that same practice simultaneously reminded her of her 
vulnerability and of the fragility of her situation.   
Clara attended the group intermittently, and I last saw her towards the end of my fieldwork.  I did not 
find out if she had located her school reports in her parents’ attic but she told me that she was still on 
a waiting list for an assessment.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the way that the people I met in the support groups and the clinic discussed 
living with disabling symptoms without necessarily knowing what might be wrong. Throughout my 
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fieldwork and further afield the term ‘strategy’ was used to described the purposeful actions that 
people took in order to alleviate their problems. Chapter Three described elements of ADHD which 
were enacted in support groups through mnemonics and technological aids. The encounters I shared in 
this chapter focused on corporeal strategies that involve training and regulating the body in order to 
counteract the impact of hyperactivity and inattention.  I have shown that the practices described by 
Garry, Clara and Paul for taking care of themselves were congruent with Foucault’s concept of 
‘Techniques of the Self’ (1988). The strategies that group members put in place were transformative 
not only regarding their behaviours but also regarding their selves, as the process brought them new 
self-knowledge and understanding. Following Foucault, I am suggesting that the acts of self-caring 
which are put in place through everyday practices and habits are ethical actions directed towards 
achieving a better life. I concluded the chapter by showing how, for Clara, the hope that was enacted 
in strategies was also accompanied by despair and exhaustion; the fact that one comes accompanied 
by the other clearly highlights a sense of fragility and vulnerability. I have shown how strategies are 
always provisional, needing to be repeated and situated in specific contexts. When situations change, 
strategies have to be adapted, re-invented.  Thus putting in place strategies and keeping them effective 
in remediating symptoms is always a balancing act between hope and despair that requires constant 
care and attention. The next chapter moves further back into the diagnostic process; it explores how 
people described their first encounter with ADHD and its symptoms and how they identified with it. 
Their descriptions focus on moments of self-knowledge that brought insight and offered explanations 
as to what might be going wrong for them.  
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Chapter Five Moments of Recognition: identifying ADHD inside 
and outside of the clinic 
 
Newcomers 
 
Support Group C met in a suburb of London in a newly built centre that accommodated a number of 
projects related to autism and ADHD in children. A charity, it was established in the mid-1990s to 
provide a number of services for parents, their children and more recently for adult sufferers, with 
some paid staff and volunteers running groups and activities.  The group for adults with ADHD was 
run by two women, Anna, parent of an adult with ADHD and Yvonne, diagnosed with ADHD; both 
had been running this group for many years and were very experienced in supporting individuals 
emotionally as well as through advocacy work. On that particular night I arrived early and was 
helping to set up the room for the meeting; chairs were arranged in a circle. In one corner of the room 
a table was laid out with a kettle for making coffee and tea. There was a row of shelves on the 
opposite wall full of books. As people arrived and sat down, Anna started by giving some dates of 
forthcoming events and asked me to introduce myself for those who did not know me. I did this as 
succinctly as possible so as not to take up too much of the session as sometimes my presence 
generated questions. The group was well attended, 21 people were sitting in a circle, with slightly 
more women than men on that evening including one new person.   
This group had grown in membership in the last year or two, and in some sessions it became difficult 
to uphold the principle they described as ‘giving a sharing space’ to all attendees. The sharing space, 
as I saw it, was a time given to individuals to tell of their circumstances from one session to another 
and to elicit conversation and comments from other members. Eventually the opportunity for 
everyone to share became too time consuming, so the facilitators came up with a suggestion that was 
adopted by those present on the night; a priority list would be drawn at the start of each session. 
Members would be invited to rank how urgent their contributions were – high, medium or low – with 
the stipulation that newcomers would always have a protected sharing space. In the ten meetings I 
attended, there were one to two newcomers per session, sometimes more, and the process of 
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prioritising was done very quickly, seemingly without problems. It was of course a triage of sorts, a 
self-triage as it were, which could be interpreted in terms of power relations and inequalities within 
the group (Nguyen, 2010). But that is not how this came across to me, and the pragmatic solution of 
ordering contributions which I observed, with newcomers coming first in the ranking, tells another 
story.    
A newcomer’s story made the sharing in the group most obviously visible; some group members 
became at that moment both role models to others and vulnerable members seeking help.  Such stories 
played a foundational role in that they established a common relationship between the newcomer and 
the group, facilitating entry to the group. In common with the ‘coming out’ stories described by 
Weston (2013), adults were revealing something about themselves that had always been there, despite 
its not being recognised and diagnosed. Whilst their disclosure was often expressed with the hope of 
being understood and accepted by like-minded people, it was unclear to me if gaining acceptance 
from their biological families was as crucial an issue as it was for Weston’s participants70. In this 
group the time given to newcomers to tell their stories was also a space for regular members to reflect 
on what they had learned about ADHD, and what effective strategies they might adopt to live with 
their difficulties. The ‘newcomer’s time’ kept the struggle of living with ADHD in the consciousness 
of group members as something that was not to be forgotten and still to be worked on. There were few 
exceptions; on one occasion a couple asked to observe and not contribute, explaining that they needed 
to understand more about ADHD.  Despite the stories being very similar to one another, I always 
perceived a sense of anticipation, even of rejuvenation, at the moment when a new member started 
their narrative.  
After attending the four support groups and the clinic for a few months, I found myself noticing 
similarities in the discussions between members of the support groups, as well as with the way the 
diagnosis process was discussed by clinicians. If the obvious differences of age, class, educational 
                                                          
70
 This may be due to the age group that I mostly interacted with, who often had children of their own and 
whose parents were usually over 70 years old. Group A openly referred to ‘coming out’ stories, describing that, 
just like gays, they did not choose to have ADHD. More often than not the ‘coming out’ stories were related to 
acceptance at work rather than at home. 
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background and geography between the groups were given less emphasis, certain common themes 
became apparent. The contributions that seemed to resemble each other the most in support groups, 
often shared by newcomers, were the descriptions that people gave of their first encounter with 
ADHD and its relevance to them. In the clinic, I heard clinicians describe their process of diagnosing 
beyond the textbook approach, in terms of ‘recognition’ through signs and behaviours in their first, 
and often only, encounter with a patient. It seemed that common to both the clinic and support groups 
was a process of knowing ADHD that was tentative, cumulative and at times uncertain.  
On reflection, my initial awareness of common patterns in the describing of ADHD was an important 
moment in my fieldwork, but as will become apparent, it was tempered over time by the persistence 
of other stories that did not share the same narrative structure.  My point is that, rather than describing 
and analysing the way my participants told about their experience of ADHD in terms of a common 
narrative structure (Favret-Saada, 2009), I want to keep the diversity of personal accounts in the frame 
and examine how they are linked. This is particularly important if I am to include narratives which at 
first glance seem incommensurable; the stories of support group members of different genders, classes 
and from different locations as well as the accounts given by psychiatrists. What connections could 
there be between the tales of ADHD told from such different perspectives? Could patients’ and group 
members’ testimonies and stories of their experience of inattention and/or hyperactivity be 
comparable to the clinicians’ discussions of criteria and the diagnostic process?  
In this respect, I found Strathern’s exploration of the difficulties  of conducting ethnography in Britain 
particularly helpful (2004). In highlighting the impossible task of comparing a village in Essex with 
an urban suburb in Manchester due to the differences in scales and demography, Strathern points out 
that there are nonetheless connections between their inhabitants. They share ideas and concepts, even 
if ‘those similar ideas disguise themselves as ideas about dissimilarity: they are ideas about how 
different everyone is from one another, how different places are’ (ibid.: 25 original emphasis).Beyond 
the dichotomy between patient’s and doctors’ perspectives on ADHD, or the differences between 
support groups in different parts of the country, beyond the gaps, there are connections which link 
these actors and places. Crucially, the connection is partial in that the ideas, whilst similar, ‘are used 
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for different effect’ (ibid.). In examining the way my participants tell their stories in relation to 
ADHD, I hope to retain not only the multiplicity and diversity of their stories and how they might be 
connected but also to explore what they do as narratives.   
In the reversed chronology of this thesis, this chapter explores how support group members and 
clinicians described the process of first knowing ADHD in terms of ‘recognition’. As people attending 
groups, interviews and clinical observations told me their stories of how they recognised themselves 
in others, in self-help books, or in diagnostic criteria, I came to think of them as moments of 
recognition.  Sometimes these moments were experienced in a flash, often recalled as life-changing 
and turning points, yet for others the epiphany never came and instead it was friends and relatives 
who recognised the characteristics of ADHD.  Inspired by  Ricoeur’s  study of recognition (2005), I 
will examine the morphology of the word ‘recognition’  and unpack the layers of meaning that may be 
attached to the term.  
As noted by Ricoeur (2005), the word suggests notions of truth and identity, whereby recognising 
something can mean at one and the same time, identifying it and accepting its validity. Secondly, the 
association between recognising and identifying, as in the process of distinguishing between different 
objects, becomes useful to think with in relation to the clinical practice for diagnosing ADHD – a 
topic I explore in the second part of this chapter which documents medical-history taking. Finally the 
concept of recognition is problematised as my observations in the clinic suggested that prototypes 
played an important part in the diagnostic process of clinicians, something more akin to 
Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance. By asking how clinicians recognise ADHD when it has 
so many presentations, I explore the tensions arising between the application of precise criteria with 
algorithmic thresholds and the process of clustering symptoms that are different from one another and 
yet related. I conclude that the process of recognition inside and outside the clinic is similar and both 
may be conceived under the common term of ‘diagnosis process’.   
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That’s me! Recognising oneself as if in a mirror 
 
Maria had made contact with me after details of my research were posted on the website of Group A 
and we agreed to meet for coffee. Maria was in her early fifties and described herself as a well-
educated struggling theatre actor with a grown-up son.  As we chatted she explained that she had been 
aware of ADHD for many years, as one of her son’s friends had been diagnosed with the disorder in 
childhood and was prescribed Ritalin. At the time she thought how reluctant she would be to give this 
kind of medication to her son and had never thought this diagnosis would apply to her. I asked Maria 
how ADHD became relevant to her, and she recalled how a couple of decades later, things had 
changed. She said: 
“Oh well  this is funny [laughter] I am not sure how long ago that was, let’s say [silence] 
more than five but less than ten years ago, and my sister was being terribly scatty, and 
menauposal probably, and she told me some of her problems, and I thought – well I am like 
that all the time. And she said, - you know, I think I have Attention Deficit Disorder -  and I 
thought really, she thinks she's got it? So I found myself in a bookshop one time, and I saw 
this book on Attention Deficit Disorder generally , and I had a look and wondered if she had 
it, thinking about her, not me. And then there was a list of characteristics, and I thought – I 
tick every single thing – you know, not being good at settling down, having lots of different 
jobs, always forgetting things, you know I can recognise myself in that. I constantly forget 
things… very hard to keep hold of umbrellas, scarves, gloves and things like that. I can email 
you that list – and there was about nine or ten different things, general things, and I thought – 
I've got it! I thought that's interesting! And I felt quite exited actually, because I thought, - Oh 
maybe there is an explanation for why I have had such a cock up of a life.” 
Throughout this part of my interview with her, Maria was smiling and laughing at some points, 
clearly finding it funny if not ironic that, in the end, she was the one diagnosed with ADHD, not her 
sister.  
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In a similar way in support Group C, Jack recalled the moment he had found out about ADHD and its 
relevance in his life. Within the sharing circle, it was his turn to speak and as this was his first visit he 
started ‘at the beginning of his story’ when he was listening to the radio whilst driving home one day. 
Rory Bremner, the famous comedian, had produced a programme in 2011 entitled ADHD and me, 
recounting how he had lived with forgetfulness and disorganisation and that, following one of his 
relatives being diagnosed with ADHD, he had wanted to know more
71
.  The programme was a 
combination of interviews with children and adults diagnosed with ADHD, with specialist 
psychiatrists and Rory Bremner’s own reflections on his childhood. Jack told the group that he had 
not heard of ADHD before this programme, but that when he heard some of the interviewees describe 
their lives and the difficulties they faced, he exclaimed ,“arggh yeah that's me, that's me, that's 
absolutely me! And I got a lot of identification from it”. As he was telling his story, the rest of the 
group, were listening, nodding and making little remarks – “I heard of that programme” or “that’s 
right, the penny dropped”.  
As was often the case, the conversation moved towards someone else’s story, but was rapidly 
redirected as Anna explained gently but firmly that new members needed the space and time to tell 
their stories. Jack continued, describing how after the programme, he read books on the subject and 
then found out about this support group on the internet. Jack’s experience of ‘identifications’, to use 
his term, was strikingly describing a direct connection with the people in the programme, not just their 
stories but that they were actually the same. Members in other support groups too clearly described 
this same sensation of seeing themselves as if their own image was being reflected back to them by a 
mirror. 
When I asked Nick to describe his own face-to-face encounter with ADHD, he talked of having been 
aware of ADHD because of his work but, as with Maria, had not made the connection straight away 
with his own situation. It was only after a dramatic and tragic event that led him to lose his job, 
threatening his professional career and leaving him in an emotional crisis, that he started thinking 
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 ADHD and me was first broadcast on BBC radio 4 on 21/5/2011 and can still be heard on 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b011c0nn. Accessed on 10/03/2014. I return to this programme in Chapter 
Seven. 
P a g e  | 123 
 
about the difficulties he experienced with his own disorganisation. After watching a TV programme 
on medication that included stimulant treatments for inattention, he started to put two and two 
together. He told me:  
“And the first thing I did, was, in my living room, in my clutter in London, was to go on a 
website, looking for adult ADHD, and one of the websites had a description of the stuff. And 
it was one of those moments, one of those moments like; I don't know if you have ever 
experienced this moment, this moment is so profound.  I was like reading, reading a text, 
[silence] on a website of a description of something and I felt I was looking in a mirror, like 
pure recognition, looking at myself in a mirror. It's just like one of those mind-boggling 
moments. Immediately I thought I might have it, I probably got it, but how do I… it's one of 
those things. Even if you think you've got it, that's the beginning of the journey; that is 
literally the beginning of the journey when you think you have it.”  
By describing this moment of finding out about adult ADHD in terms of an image, his image being 
reflected back at him, Nick is also describing his difficulty in grasping what this means as if taken by 
surprise. He is asking himself if he is seeing right, is this him? The descriptions he found on the 
website, just like the ones Maria saw in a book were most likely based on lists of impairments and 
symptoms that form part of the diagnostic criteria found in the DSM. Whilst individuals 
retrospectively discussed their excitement at finding out about ADHD and thinking that it might be 
relevant in their lives, the revelation was often tinged with ambivalence and some anxieties. As Nick 
put it, finding out about ADHD is like the beginning of a journey. The average waiting time for being 
diagnosed with adult ADHD in the UK is eighteen months and the wait is usually followed by 
difficulties in receiving treatment (Matheson et al., 2013).  The journey towards an unknown outcome 
can of course be the cause of apprehension, anxieties that are turned towards the future.  But the 
ambivalence in recognising oneself can also be about the present as Clara described:  
“I remember I was in this field, and I saw this guy that was flying a stunt kite, and I wanted to 
ask him about it, and it turned out that I knew him from somewhere. I sat down and it was 
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quite an interesting conversation because, I noticed that he was talking to me but he did not 
seem interested because he wasn't really looking at me. He was looking around all the time, 
like not paying attention, but he kept errrm,  when he responded it was relevant so he actually 
was paying attention but did not look like he was.  I had not seen this before. And something 
was kind of dawning on me [laughter] sort of, maybe I started to realise that I kind of do that, 
you know, and I never really saw that before.  And [silence] in during the course of the 
conversation, he said – “has anyone ever told you about ADHD?” – and I'm like – no – 
“because I've got this diagnosis and I was like” – oh ok . And he said – “you seem really 
similar to me” –  , and I was thinking yeah, you seem really similar to me [laughter], like 
really a lot, like he seemed more similar to me than my own twin. I have a twin, and he has 
the same name as my twin and similar age, and I was kind of joking in my head, like maybe 
he got swapped or something. And I remember I bumped in to him in the supermarket about a 
week later, and the way we reacted was like a mirror. It was the strangest thing, we saw each 
other, and recognised each other, we both kind of… sort of chaotic and really over… I don't 
know the way we reacted was like, oh oh oh , we kind of…  the way we laughed.  I can’t 
really explain, but I just really recognised myself in him, even though I didn’t know I behaved 
like that, to see him do that I thought,  that's what I do.  Oh my god it's really strange, I never 
realised I was so weird in that respect , until I saw it in someone else, and thought –  how 
weird it is , I think that's me . Same thing happened in the group we met last week” 
C: “Really?”  
“Yeah! So this guy said this thing to me , I thought right this is weird, and then I was in the 
library, I go at my lunch break, and there is a book on the side there, that was called - I am not 
lazy, crazy or stupid -  and I thought Wow! It was brightly coloured, so I picked it up and the 
first page that I read was just like – CLANG – [said loudly with a hard slap on the table], you 
know like through your whole body, it just resonates, everything it said it just described me, 
in a way I've never… I would never have read a book like that. I could have laughed when I 
was reading it, but I felt really emotional as well, I mean it’s so depressing. OH MY GOD, 
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they’re describing someone who's just quite chaotic potentially, life is a bit messy you know. 
But it was funny, the way they put it, but kind of distressing as well, upsetting, not 
distressing, oh my god, you think, life does not have to be like that. So that was for me I 
guess, meeting this guy, reading this book, and then there was other books on the shelf, and 
one had a test at the back so I did it very quickly and I scored, like, stupidly high.” 
The resemblance that Clara found in this stranger could not have been more personal: she felt even 
more affinity than with her own twin, sharing the same name and seemingly behaving just like 
herself. The experience had a great impact on her, and as she described, she was not entirely sure that 
she should trust her senses; had her twin been swapped for this stranger?  As she found out more 
about what she and the stranger had in common, the sense of recognition became almost physical. It 
sent out waves and ripples as if it was the aftermath of an impact – CLANG – followed by a turmoil 
of emotions.  The initial surprise, while it initially seemed funny but also uncanny
72
, turned into a 
stronger sense of disquiet and upset. Clara recognised and identified herself in the descriptions and 
saw her own chaotic and messy life, but she quickly turned to a different mode of understanding, 
suggesting the beginning of something else to come; she realised life did not have to be like that. 
 
Beyond recognition 
 
Before I introduce moments of recognition in the clinic, I want to explore the different layers that the 
word ‘recognition’ carries which have been implicit so far. Recognition is used in many ways and it is 
likely that the various connotations overlap and influence one another. Here I return to Ricoeur’s 
(2005) investigation of those layers, which are surprisingly numerous
73
, embracing over twenty 
different nuances. Ricoeur summarises them in three main categories:  
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 Described by Freud ( 1971) as something strange tinged with fear.   
73
 Ricoeur used two French dictionaries to expose the different layers of meanings given to the word, yet they 
translate well in English in that they have similar usage in everyday parlance, except for one element: the 
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1. To grasp (an object) with the mind, through thought, in joining together images, perceptions 
having to do with it; to distinguish or identify the judgement or action, know it by memory. 
2. To accept, take to be true (or take as such). 
3. To bear witness through gratitude that one is indebted to someone for something (an act). 
(2005: 12). 
The first definition highlights the process of identification, which may involve making connections 
between different things and noticing the resemblance or difference through comparison. As Ricoeur 
notes, this is not so different from the notions of cognition and the process of knowing.  The second 
layer emphasises recognition as accepting claims or the validity of documents. The third use of the 
word involves relations with others, with implications that recognising status may be at play between 
the parties. The path of inquiry that Ricoeur built from these dictionary definitions could be simplified 
as moving from cognition, to self-recognition and finally to mutual recognition. Ricoeur’s trajectory 
of recognition, that shifts from the world outside to the shared world via the inner world, is founded 
on another move, a grammatical one; from the active use of the verb ‘to recognise’ to the passive use 
of the verb, ‘to be recognised’.  The active voice of recognition makes a claim and statement, 
recognising things, oneself and others. Whereas at the other end of the trajectory, the passive voice of 
recognition makes a demand, has an expectation of being recognised  ‘which can be satisfied only by 
mutual recognition, where this mutual recognition either remains an unfulfilled dream or requires 
procedures and institutions that elevate recognition to the political plane’(2005: 19).74  
Ricoeur’s analysis is helpful in that it proposes a dynamic vision for the word ‘recognition’, made up 
of layers of signification that are in relation and filiation to each other, and suggests the possibility 
that shades of one connotation are found within another. Thus traces from ‘recognising’ into ‘being 
recognised’ and back again will resonate throughout this thesis’ exploration of ADHD as a contested 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
connotation of gratitude is to be found much more strongly in the French use of ‘reconnaissance’ than in the 
English recognition.   
74
 For other explanation of the use of ‘recognition’, see (Honneth, 1996; Povinelli, 2002; Rapp and Ginsburg, 
2011; Taylor, 1994; Ticktin, 2010).  
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illness (Dumit, 2006). For my purpose, Ricoeur’s exposition of the word ‘recognition’ with all its 
derivations, is a reminder of the enmeshed meanings of the word rather than a map that might take the 
reader on an already preordained journey (Latour, 2005) from one state of recognising to another of 
being recognised. Recognising, and being recognised, were terms that were used in my fieldwork in 
different situations and by different people. Sometimes using the word expressed notions of truth, yet 
its meaning emerged in different ways when it was used in the clinic than when it was uttered in the 
support groups and other contexts.  In the situations quoted above, Clara and others described 
recognising themselves as an epiphanal moment, a revelation of truth about themselves, a certainty 
and veracity about their identity, which retrospectively seemed a turning point in their lives, sending 
them on a different path and seeking change.  
People made their own inquiries through books, internet websites and support groups; some, like 
Nick, made contact with their GPs or other medical professionals. For most the moment of 
recognition seemed to provide a platform from which to rethink their identity and ask as Clara did – 
‘do I really look this chaotic?’  In the stories I heard, the moment of recognition opened the possibility 
for seeing oneself in a different way. If, after the initial moment, the recognition was repeated through 
attending support groups or reading books, that glimpsed vision was validated and it acquired a 
pivotal role as a turning point in the stories that were told and retold in the groups’ conversations. 
Described as  ‘the subjective road marks along the lifecourse’ (Hareven and Masaoka, 1988), turning 
points are not isolated events; instead they need to be considered as part of a process that requires 
certain strategies and choices (Crosnoe and Elder, 2002; Day, 2007; Hareven, 1999; Wheaton and 
Gotlib, 1997).  In other words, agency plays a crucial role and the same event met by different 
strategies will lead to different trajectories which may be affected by the timing of this event either in 
youth or later on in life. The adults I met in the support groups were mostly over 40, and recognising 
themselves in the descriptions of ADHD symptoms was often difficult. Recognising themselves did 
not necessarily mean that they recognised the validity of ADHD or even only part of it. In my 
continuing conversation with Maria, she explained that her uneasiness about the use of Ritalin in 
children had not subsided and that when she was diagnosed she refused to take stimulants as 
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treatment. Instead she sought alternatives which she considered more natural, such as Omega 3 oils, 
chamomile tea and evening primrose oil.  For other people it took years and a number of incidents or 
crises to get to the point where they would take the next step to seek help and support. Sometimes this 
was done with reluctance and required persuasion from another person, often a partner, who was 
affected by their difficulties, as Paul described in Chapter Four. And as Hareven and Masaoka (1988) 
warn, turning points are only identified retrospectively and may be considered normative transitional 
moments by some. In fact, the moment of recognition may not always be experienced as a turning 
point or it may lose its role as a focal moment in a narrative as time goes by. 
I met Ray in Group A and in a long interview he explained to me how he had experienced a number 
of events that were potentially life changing.  He explained that he was university educated, had been 
attending the support group for about a year by the time I started coming along and, according to him, 
was financially
 
successful due to his entrepreneurial skills. He was a vocal person in the group, 
discussing pharmacological information with confidence, and recounting his experience to others and 
offering advice. He was also quick witted, often making jokes as well as being visibly very active, 
using his smart phone constantly and moving on his chair incessantly. He had been diagnosed with 
ADHD four years before we met after a serious physical health problem had led him to receive some 
psychological support. In that support process ADHD was also diagnosed; this led him to think of 
himself differently and eventually to seek further support and treatment. But Ray did not position the 
moment he had found out about ADHD as a turning point, or to be more precise, as a lasting turning 
point. Our conversations at the group and during this interview were lengthy as his sentences were 
often full of detours or remained unfinished. As I met with him regularly, I came to think of his 
digressions as giving ADHD a voice, what ADHD might sound like. He was aware of not finishing 
his sentences and jumping from one subject to another and thought of them as ‘who he was’. I 
commonly observed such speaking modes in all the groups, as well as in the clinic. In both contexts 
these verbal modes were seen as a diagnostic criterion (Casas et al., 2013; UKAAN, 2013). 
Sometimes people were embarrassed or even ashamed, as if caught doing something wrong, yet at 
other times it was the subject of laughter and fun. In support groups in particular, I found that 
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conversations were difficult to follow, something that some members felt was a great disadvantage 
when at work or in ‘non-ADHD friendly’ environments. In these cases we might think that having 
such a ‘voice of ADHD’ is an impairment and the very opposite of empowering  (Das 2007), but as I 
will explore further on in this thesis, it may be that to digress, interrupt, jump from topic to topic, 
actually represents the complexities through which this form of life is expressed.  
I asked Ray to describe how he came to be diagnosed with ADHD and what that meant to him. After 
providing a lengthy response he arrived at the following point, saying:  
“To answer your question, a diagnosis is only useful if it actually provides me, it makes my 
life somehow –  by life I mean obviously work is secondary –  so,  not so much in my work 
success, but in my,  my ability to achieve a balance, to interact with my wife and children in a 
more meaningful way. Now there are elements in ADHD that can make this difficult, 
isolating yourself and problems in keeping friends. So I am interested in having a diagnosis in 
terms of what it can do to improve my experience of existence and those around me. As soon 
as the diagnosis uses its utility, as ability to self-reflect and learn, it's not a useful identity for 
me. I inhabited the identity of an adopted person for a long time and my roots were – it was 
almost an existential crisis, and I did inhabit not so much the persona but the identity of an 
adopted person, for a couple of years, once I had actually addressed the issues and became 
comfortable with who I was and where I came from.  That identity of an adopted person is 
there, it’s part of me, but I don't spend much time thinking about it now, it’s not important. I 
would think that if I can develop the skills and behaviours which are beneficial to –  not the 
pills actually,  I have a drawer full of pills but I don't find them helpful at all, they make my 
heart jump out of my chest and sense of anxiety, you can almost feel your heart up here. 
That's unhelpful, my blood pressure goes up  – oops I’ve done it again, gone off topic – so to 
go back to your point, as I don’t have to worry about keeping a job I would rather learn the 
skills to live with ADHD.” 
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Ray expected that as time passed and he learned to live better with his difficulties, the moment he 
found out about ADHD would become part of the background of his life. He had gone through 
different stages with regard to finding out about being adopted, including tracing both his birth mother 
and biological father through DNA testing, and he had come to feel that the existential questions were 
no longer so urgent or present. Similarly he expected that the diagnosis of ADHD would have a 
function that was limited in time for him, as he was already becoming aware that the medication had 
harmful effect on him.  In contrast to the other support group members I have discussed so far, Ray 
used the word ‘diagnosis’ to describe the moment clinicians described the difficulties he was 
experiencing as symptoms of ADHD. Similarly, Ron described during his assessment in the clinic 
how he had found out about ADHD from other people who had recognised symptoms in themselves.  
 
Questions, scores and algorithms 
 
Ron, in his mid-thirties, attended the clinic with his partner, and was visibly nervous or anxious as he 
twisted and rolled a small piece of paper in his fingers throughout the assessments. Once the 
administrative tasks were done, including giving consent to my presence in the assessment, a 
specialist nurse and I accompanied Ron and his partner to a consultation room where the first part of 
the assessment, lasting approximately 90 minutes, would take place. Based on a scripted 
questionnaire, the interview consisted of questions exploring the diagnostic criteria found in the DSM 
(2013):  criteria Aa and Ab (inattention and hyperactive/ impulsive symptoms), B (age of onset), C 
(pervasiveness), D (impairment) and E (symptoms not accounted for by another disorder). There were 
eighteen questions for each criteria A, nine for the adult context followed by the same nine questions 
this time in childhood context;  two questions for both criteria B and C and four questions for criteria 
D in adulthood and repeated in the childhood context: a total of 52 questions.  The questions were 
meant to elicit instances of behaviours for each criterion: for example, ‘do you often fail to pay close 
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attention to detail or make careless mistakes?’75 Ron explained that he was always in trouble because 
of this as he did not thoroughly read information given to him – “like when I write a cheque, I put the 
wrong name or the wrong amount and I never know how much is in my account.”  The same question 
was then asked, requiring examples from Ron’s childhood which he found more difficult, but with the 
help of his partner, he recalled having difficulty with homework; his mother had to sit with him 
through it all until late in his schooling. Both had talked to Ron’s mother before coming to the 
appointment so that he could repeat certain stories and talk of his school reports. The specialist nurse 
conducting the assessment kept taking notes of the examples, writing on a form, ticking yes or no to 
register the presence or absence of particular symptoms. Other questions were: ‘Do you often seem 
not to be listening when spoken to directly?’  or ‘do you find it difficult to organise tasks or 
activities?’ and so on. Forty minutes later, the nurse explained that the first part of the assessment was 
finished and that Ron could have a break whilst he spoke to the psychiatrist.  
During this break, the nurse summarised his findings so that they could be handed over to the 
psychiatrist who conducted the second part of the assessment. Mainly the summary consisted of 
applying an algorithm
76
 which produced a number that was compared to a threshold determined by 
the DSM. According to these criteria, Ron must have six symptoms out of a list of nine in relation to 
Inattention and again six symptoms out of nine in relation to Hyperactivity/Impulsivity; in addition 
the age of onset and the degree and domain of impairment were also marked. Finally all of the scores 
gathered from ten pre-assessment questionnaires
77
 that had been handed in by Ron’s partner were then 
added to the same report to produce a final score.  Clinicians explained that the algorithm helped to 
pin point where the patient was situated in the continuum from normal to abnormal; was forgetfulness 
or being over active experienced beyond a norm? As with numerous other ailments, it is the 
accumulation of symptoms and their severity that may tip the individual over the threshold for a 
particular diagnosis. The scaling and quantifying process was presented by clinicians as an objective 
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 Questions used here  are from a diagnostic tool called  CAADIDD: Conners Adult ADHD Diagnostic 
Interview for DSM-IV  (Conners et al., 2001) 
76
 ‘A process to be followed in calculations or problem-solving operations’ Oxford Dictionaries online 
http://tinyurl.com/o59q2rk Accessed on 10/03/2014. 
77
 Close to a 100 questions. 
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measure that, when triangulated by a mental state examination and by third party information, 
provided enough evidence to justify giving a diagnosis.  It was a decision-making tool aimed at 
bringing precision and at counterbalancing the effect of intuition in the assessor.  To my mind, it 
raised a lot of questions as it seemed like an attempt to reduce many symptoms described in life 
events into one score that could be compared to a threshold of normality. Further, the application of 
the algorithm, doing the calculations, with pen and paper, brought some complications as I found out 
when I followed the process myself.  
On three separate occasions, I paralleled nurses in noting examples during assessments and then 
marking afterwards, and I then compared my scored with theirs. On each occasion my scores differed 
from those produced by the nurses, not in the marking but in the calculating element, sometimes but 
not always due to my mistakes.  Overall I found the whole process awkward and fiddly, as scores for 
Hyperactivity and Inattention were found on alternate lines of the form and the scores above the 
threshold were found on the extreme right of it. In order to facilitate the calculations, a nurse had 
devised a masking page that was applied to reveal the scores to be added and hid everything else; it 
must have worked efficiently until the form’s appearance and its font and size changed so that the 
masking page did not quite fit, yet it was still in use in a rather awkward way. From informal 
conversations as well as attending research meetings, I was aware that senior consultants in the clinic 
were mindful of the shortcomings of such systems and they had initiated an inter-rater reliability study 
within the clinic in order to test and improve the process.
78
 
Ron and his partner were called back so that the assessment process could resume. Commonly, once 
the psychiatrist had explained what the interview would entail, the first question was ‘what brought 
you here?’ Thus an opportunity was given for the patient to describe their journey towards this point 
in time. Some started with their childhood, but more often than not they related those difficulties 
encountered in adulthood which had peaked to crisis point. Ron described how he’d had a really bad 
argument last summer with a friend, an event which made him want to seek help.  It was, he 
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 Assessors scored-blind each other’s assessments from audio recordings, a process that was envisaged as 
forming the basis of a training package.  
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continued, as if he had “a disembodied experience, seeing myself losing it, flipping, and not being 
able to stop it.” That incident led him to be referred to his local mental health team, who after initially 
diagnosing him with bipolar disorder, decided to refer him to the ADHD clinic. The assessment 
continued and with the help of his partner he recounted many stories that described his attention span 
problems, such as the time when he started stripping all of the wood in their home but never finished 
the process. During a short break in the assessment I asked him when he had first heard of ADHD and 
he explained that he had been in ‘special schools’ as a child where other children were on Ritalin so 
he knew what it was, but had not associated it with himself. At that point, his partner explained how 
her parents were both mental health professionals, and they had noticed some of the signs and 
behaviours at home and had recently mentioned it to him. Other patients also recounted how their 
problems had been noticed by others, either relatives or friends close to them who had knowledge of 
ADHD, or professionals dealing with crisis in their lives, such as criminal justice staff or social 
workers, who queried the nature of their problems.  
Overall, I observed more assessments where patients did not know much about ADHD and they 
recounted how they had been directed to the clinic by others
79
. When a patient described a moment of 
recognition and became convinced that ADHD applied to them, it sometimes made for difficult 
clinical encounters. Dr Goodman explained how he had seen patients who were convinced that 
ADHD explained their difficulties, and with whom he disagreed. He had felt in these situations that 
other explanations were better suited. Some were medical explanations since ADHD symptoms 
overlap with other classifications (Bipolar, Personality Disorder), but also social explanations  as the 
context of symptoms will impact on the way inattention or impulsivity is construed.  He then asked a 
rhetorical question: “Do you undo their convictions? It may undo their inner world and explanatory 
models, and surely this would be counter-therapeutic.”  As in other conversations with Dr Goodman, I 
was struck by the pragmatic approach to his work, that strong sense that medicine aimed to relieve 
pain and that it was expected and required to act when faced with suffering. But beyond the 
humanistic reflection that this conversation triggered, Dr Goodman also pointed out that self-
                                                          
79
 Of course this may be due to the clinical context and it is possible that the relation between psychiatrist and 
patient, as enacted in a hospital environment, is not conducive to self-disclosure of this kind. 
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recognition, from the point of view of the clinician may actually be self-misrecognition, that the 
resemblance between certain traits can be mistaken or confused for something else.  
 
To recollect the old, to produce the new: that is the task of Anamnesis80 
 
Ricoeur’s discussion on misrecognition81 is helpful in pointing out first of all that the work of 
recognition may be at its most powerful when it conquers the doubt of mis-identification. His main 
point is that, in contrast to objects that are recognised generically, people are recognised through their 
individual traits, and that consequently time, or the passage of time, plays a crucial part in this 
process. Dr Goodman and other clinicians could not agree more with this as they attached a lot of 
importance to the past life-events of their patients including the age of onset of their difficulties. In an 
attempt to avoid mis-recognising, and therefore mis-diagnosing, clinicians try to ascertain if the 
behaviours presented have occurred before, and if so with what frequency and severity. They do this 
by collating a medical-history of the patient and the two parts of the assessment which I have 
described are complementary ways to do this. A medical-history records a series of events in their 
sequential occurrence in order to identify difficulties and impairment that could be associated with the 
ADHD diagnostic criteria. It is typically done by initially using open and broad questions ‘what 
brought you here?’  that gradually hone onto specific events of ill health. Although out of regular use, 
this process of provoking recollection is called anamnesis and is defined as follows:  
 ‘Anamnesis is the recalling to mind of things past and is used in two specific medical senses:  firstly 
to mean a patient’s recollection of his symptoms and illnesses as recounted in the history he gives; 
Secondly, to mean immunological memory, exemplified by the rapid reappearance of an “antibody” 
in response to an “antigen” to which an immune response as occurred on a previous occasion (see 
immunology).’ Oxford Companion of Medicine (Lock et al., 2001). 
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 Taken from a publishing company called  “re-press”: http://re-press.org/category/series/anamnesis/ Accessed 
on 10/03/2014. 
81
 The French ‘meconnaissable’ that Ricoeur uses is translated as ‘unrecognisable’; I prefer to emphasise in the 
French word the sense of what could be mis-identified rather than what could not be recognised.  
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From its ancient Greek origin, anamnesis has the meaning of remembrance and calling to mind; it is 
the praxis of recollection. Anamnesis describes the work directed towards remembering, of bringing 
back to the present something that was forgotten, making present a memory that was latent, undefined 
and vague and in this way it is closely related to the process of recognition. The recognition moments 
that were described earlier were not quite déjà vu, but memories that required active recollection.  
Anamnesis and recognition are engaged in a dynamic process of un-concealing, recalling and 
identifying that feed on each other. The immunological image is helpful here, if we consider the 
booster jab that re-activates the effectiveness of an antibody present from previous immunisation, we 
can similarly imagine how the recalling of memories brings the reality of past events back to life.  The 
moment of recognition involves this double orientation of anamnesis, seeking in the past for 
something that was forgotten, and making it present for future use.  
In another of our conversations, Dr Goodman and I were speculating on the reasons why ADHD was 
not yet on the radar of general adult psychiatrists in the UK. Generally adult psychiatrists did not have 
much awareness or training on ADHD. He volunteered the following opinions: 
“It may be that you are kind of shying away from things that you are not familiar with, but 
also generally, you cannot recognise something unless you are familiar with it, if you don't 
know what you're looking for, then you can't recognise it.” 
This excerpt is from a recorded interview, but because of the numerous conversations I had with Dr 
Goodman, it felt more like a continuation of themes that we often discussed.  Dr Goodman always left 
me with a lot to think about and many research articles to explore, so on this occasion I had not 
noticed that, whether intentionally or not, and I was never to find out, he seemed to make a direct 
reference to the Socratic dialogue with Meno on virtues, knowledge and recollection. This is the 
section which is relevant:  
‘Meno: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you don’t have the slightest idea what it is? How can 
you go around looking for something when you don’t know what you are looking for? Even if it’s 
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right in front of your nose, how will you know that’s the thing you didn’t know?’ (Holbo and Waring, 
2010 original emphasis). 
Michel Serres (1995, 2014) offers a reading of this text that brings nuances to the representation of 
anamnesis particularly relevant to my exploration of diagnostic practices in the clinic. In his 
exploration of the origins of geometry in ancient Greece, Serres describes through the example of 
Meno a shift in scientific concepts from procedural to deductive, from concrete to abstract.  
According to Serres, Socrates’s argument is that learning is really the recollection of things already 
there, anamnesis, but in order to parry memory’s fallibility, abstract reasoning is required, that is the 
art of deduction.  Socrates goes on to test this by asking the slave Meno to solve a geometrical 
problem, which he can only attempt by remembering his time tables rather than thinking deductively. 
Thus Serres argues that this dialogue shows a play of power by the philosopher over the slave Meno 
in order to establish the modern science of demonstration. The struggle between two concepts of 
geometry, an older version based on pragmatic tools and the other on abstract calculation presented by 
Serres is, I suggest, good to think with for my description of the clinical diagnostic process conducted 
in two parts. The first part of the assessment, described in the previous section, was conducted 
through scales and calculation, a kind of abstraction in an effort to bring objectivity. The second part 
of the assessment conducted through an unstructured interview, includes the medical-history taking 
and as well as recognising familiar symptoms and patterns. What Serres helps me to highlight is that 
the tension he described between two different learning modes in science, is also found in the clinical 
practice I came across in my fieldwork
82
.  
Yet I wonder what Dr Goodman was doing by bringing this paradox in our discussion.  It seems that 
he was using it as an example of clinicians not being able to recognise ADHD because they had not 
seen it before. The notion of familiarity was mentioned again later in that same conversation when 
discussing the possible increase of ADHD diagnosis: the more familiar we are with ADHD, the more 
likely we are to recognise it for what it is, or as he put it “ADHD is what is called ADHD”. This last 
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 Serres (2014) suggests that a reversal is currently taking place as memory through computers may regain the 
upper-hand over abstract and ideal thinking.  
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statement left me puzzled. Was he affirming a positivist view that ADHD is already there to be 
identified?  Or was he suggesting that ADHD depends on the act of naming it?  Other clinicians 
talked of familiarity by describing how through time they would build a repertoire, catalogue, or 
‘typology’ as Warren described it, to which they could refer when conducting an assessment.  Warren 
was a specialist psychiatric nurse, with more experience of diagnosing adult ADHD than most of the 
psychiatrists who were working in that clinic. He had been working in the clinic the longest of the 
team and was involved early on with the founder of the clinic in participating in research and 
publishing. Having over ten years’ experience, other team members including doctors would often 
refer to him in difficult cases, and in a poised manner, he would consider the case in question.  He 
could nevertheless get quite despondent about the continuous changes he had seen in this clinic and 
generally in the NHS, as he would describe the re-organisations and other management strategies 
which he felt negatively affected his clinical practice. When in between assessments or meetings, we 
would find ourselves in the office, typing notes or emails. Often for long periods, silence was only 
broken by the noise of the keyboards, printer or the phone ringing. And then conversations would 
start, sometimes triggered by an annoying email someone received or something heard on the radio 
that morning, just like in most offices of this kind in the UK. After a number of months in this office, 
the rhythm of work/chats that was initially unreadable became second nature to me and I was able to 
initiate conversations that did not seem to interrupt people’s work.  Often too, the office was empty 
except for me, doing my administrative work, responding to emails, booking training or observation 
sessions.  
On one such occasion, Dr Fring from a neighbouring clinic came in with his colleague, Dr Shrader, in 
search of computers, their office being very busy and unable to accommodate them. They had 
obviously been engaged in conversation and continued as they sat down, commenting on the current 
round of re-organisation and efficiency measures. The tone was rather light with good-humour banter 
and, as I had met them before, I joined the conversations responding to their questions on my interest 
in the diagnostic process. Dr Shrader started to explain that the more assessments she was doing the 
shorter the time she needed to diagnose. She said that often there were signs, visual signs that were 
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easier and quicker to observe than relying on verbal communication and that less than twenty minutes 
could sometimes be sufficient. Those signs were subtle, of hand or head movements, of gait and other 
such body language, and recognisable with experience. At that point, Dr Fring suggested that Dr 
Shrader should really try harder and attempt a ‘two minutes diagnosis’, which would save the NHS 
lots of money.  Beyond the obvious irony of the comment, the idea of ‘speed recognition’ and reliance 
on non-verbal signs was something that I had heard previously. When I interviewed Warren towards 
the end of my fieldwork, I asked him questions on the way he perceived the evidence that was 
required for diagnosing. Were there some pieces of evidence that were more important than others, 
some that would trump others in a hierarchical order? His response was:  
Warren: “I guess it is very much about putting together the jigsaw puzzles perhaps, rather 
than to seek some gold standard if you like and then working your way down.” 
Claude: “More a matter of accumulation?” 
Warren: “yes or I guess that's how I think of it [silence] and I guess a lot of the time [silence] 
I am hesitant to use the phrase but you almost go on a sort of gut feeling as well, it's difficult 
to pin down what it is. But it's something about what the person's telling you, how they are 
telling you, getting a fuller picture, their expressions, or you know, little gestures when you 
ask questions, that can often tell you more than the answer does.  And that works when you 
have informants, when you ask a question, it's like –  oh yeah it’s him in a nutshell – and it’s 
hard to actually always pin that down, and it’s hard even to get the person to exactly pin that 
down and provide good examples. But there is something very powerful in the initial reaction 
a lot of the time. Especially when you have got two or three people in the same room and they 
have little smiles at each other or giggles when you ask questions, that's quite a powerful 
thing to observe.”   
Claude:  “I found myself few times being suspicious about why some people were here [at the 
clinic], feeling sceptical and not seeing impairments or disabling symptoms. And every time it 
happened, the clinician [doing the assessment] had no doubt that the patient had ADHD. And 
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I would tell them I was not convinced and they would describe things that they had picked up 
that maybe I hadn't. So the more you do those assessments, errrm  do you get better at finding 
what you are trained to look for in a way?” 
W: ‘Yeah I think you get more accustomed to, you know, you're almost thinking – yeah I 
have seen this type of patient before – or it’s  that twenty something man whose mum does 
everything for him, or it’s that self-employed  businessman, and you've seen that before, 
whose wife does all the paperwork.  And you quite quickly, possibly too quickly put people 
into those sorts of pigeonholes if you like.’  
Warren described how through his years of experience in diagnosing, he had built a typology of the 
way ADHD might be displayed in adults and he found those signs reliable in a ‘gut-feeling’ kind of 
way. Warren spent a lot of his time doing the first part of the assessment and even more in applying 
the algorithm and scores into his reports. Nevertheless, his ability to recognise some signs which 
might not fit a particular criterion remained at the heart of his diagnostic practice. In her ethnography 
of psychiatric practice, Luhrmann described the processes of building clinical experience as a move 
‘from memorising criteria to recognising prototypes’ (2000:41). Warren described this clearly too, yet 
in what I observed it seemed  to me that his typology was an additional mode of diagnosing which 
was kept in tension with the algorithm, even if sometimes reluctantly.
83
 By paying attention to the 
whole picture presented by the patient, such as self-employed business man, as well as the smiles and 
glances shared, Warren can cluster together elements that were not clearly defined yet which 
contributed to the diagnosis of ADHD. The similarity between what he observed and the definition of 
ADHD in the DSM, did not rely on all criteria being met, nor did it rely on all patients sharing the 
same characteristics. In other words, when Warren relies on his “gut feeling”, he is suggesting that the 
vagueness provided by capturing the whole picture of a person, is more helpful to identify ADHD 
                                                          
83
 Prototypical theories of classification when applied to psychiatry each claim a different genealogy such as 
Karl Jaspers and  Max Weber’s ideal type ( (Schwartz and Wiggins, 1987), or Wittgenstein’s family 
resemblance (Mackinejad and Sharifi, 2006). Such theories highlight that characteristics and personality are not 
clearly defined and bounded but situated on a continuum (Schwartz and Wiggins, 1987; Westen and Bradley, 
2005). Such means to categorise have been part of on-going debates in psychiatry since the DSM-III  claimed to 
bring precision to psychiatric diagnostic practices by providing rules for the decision making process; for 
example the algorithm I described in the first part of the assessment . (Mirowsky and Ross, 1989, 2002; 
Wakefield, 2012; Westen et al., 2010; Zerubavel, 1996).  
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than to reduce it to a precise check list. Wittgenstein described the kind of connection as: ‘a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail’ (Wittgenstein, 1972 § 66).  
 
In his investigation on language as an activity Wittgenstein famously proposed the concept of family 
resemblance to describe the diversity of multiple yet related forms that language might assume. Here I 
am interested in Wittgenstein’s proposition that in order to understand a complex concept as a whole, 
one should seek to see the connections between parts, how they are related rather than seeking a 
common element between all parts. In other words, and to paraphrase Wittgenstein (ibid.: § 65),  I am 
saying that the signs, smiles and symptoms observed by Warren have no one thing in common which 
makes him diagnose ADHD, but that these observations are related to one another in many different 
ways. And it is through the absence or presence of these relationships that Warren identifies ADHD. 
Warren described his practice of diagnosing as akin to putting together a puzzle, working out how the 
parts relate to the whole when none of the pieces have one shape in common.  Wittgenstein’s 
exploration of family resemblance led to him to ask questions regarding recognition and he pointed 
out that recognition was in many cases not achieved through the recollection of a picture already 
stored in the memory: ‘as if recognising always consisted in comparing two impressions with one 
another… But it is not so much as if I was comparing the object with a picture set beside, but as if the 
object coincided with the picture. So I see only one thing, not two.’(ibid:. § 604, 605). I found this 
description helpful when considering how recognition takes place and it made me wonder what Clara 
and others recognised. The kind of recognition they described was in regard to themselves and to 
strangers, for whom they did not hold any pictures in their mind. Did they recognise features they 
could apply to them?  According to Clara, she was not aware that she behaved in a chaotic and 
inattentive way, until she saw those features in a stranger: she did not carry a picture in her mind that 
she compared with the person in front of her, instead she recognised herself instantly in the overall 
demeanour of the stranger.  In juxtaposing Clara’s account of recognition with Warren’s, I am 
suggesting that the processes of identifying ADHD when first encountered inside and outside the 
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clinic are similar, because whilst their practices are not the same, both set of sites aim to apprehend a 
full picture, rather than capture a precise definition and essence for ADHD.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined how the people I met in my fieldwork spoke about their first encounter 
with ADHD in their lives and at work. Support group members described moments of recognition 
which activated instantaneous identification with strangers they met, or they spoke of the descriptions 
they found in books and radio programmes which brought the concept of ADHD into their lives. For 
others it took much longer to get to that point and was a process triggered by others, sometimes 
medics. Examining the details of the two-part assessment process in the clinic showed how the 
seemingly incompatible approach of the two parts –  categorising through specific thresholds and 
building a whole picture –  were complementary and held together in the daily practice of the clinic. 
In the clinic, the two parts of the assessment brought together deductive and experiential modes of 
learning with the aim of avoiding mis-recognition. The practices I witnessed in the clinic and support 
groups suggest that, overall, the essence of ADHD was conceived not through a singular element, but 
through multiple and overlapping similarities. My suggestion that the processes of recognising and 
identifying ADHD were part of the same family of practice, that is a practice of diagnosing, must be 
seen in view of debates on self-diagnosis. The process of diagnosing oneself, arguably ubiquitous 
across a wide range of illnesses, is often portrayed in medicine as a challenge to medical authority, 
sometimes described as being driven by pharmaceutical companies and, when it is acceptable, is 
usually found in circumstances where other alternatives are not available (Goyder et al., 2009; Jutel, 
2010). Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance allows for rethinking the structural dichotomy 
between clinical and lay practices. It also highlights the importance of relations, connections, 
influences and links in the making of a group, cluster or family. Whereas this chapter has shown how 
people recognising similarities led them to see and make relations and connections, sometimes 
through recollecting, the next chapter will explore how this process can take place the other way 
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round. I will describe how, within kinship and familial relationships, people recognise unexpected 
similarities; in other words resemblances between members of the same family. In drawing on 
examples of this recognition process, I will trace how kinship is related to recognition. 
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Chapter Six Family resemblance: how children make adults 
 
New kinship imaginaries 
 
In their examination of the diagnostic process of ADHD in adults, the previous chapters have 
highlighted the central role played by memory practices of clinicians and members of support groups. 
In Chapter Five I showed that the work of remembering entailed elements of recognition; recognising 
similarities and resemblances between people helped identify symptoms as belonging to the defined 
cluster named ADHD. Thus relations between similar parts were brought to the fore in the diagnostic 
process and, as such, it was the assembling of familiar elements that facilitated the identification of 
ADHD. What I want to take forward in this chapter is the idea that the memory practices involved in 
the diagnostic process are inseparable from the relationships people engage in. In this way Chapter 
Five and the memory/recognition practices it described acted as a connector with the 
kinship/recognition mode that will form the basis of the next two chapters. The connections between 
memory and kinship have been noted in their many forms, suggesting that remembering is always 
embroiled in a network of relations, with one’s self, others and institutions (Carsten, 2007; Radstone 
and Hodgkin, 2003). Following Strathern (2014) who showed that the concept of ‘relation’ implies 
the notion of ‘recognition’, as in ‘acknowledgement’, I want to explore how kinship is enacted in the 
diagnostic process as one element of recognition and, more specifically, to ask what kind of kinship is 
put into play.  
In their article Reverberations: Disability and the new Kinship imaginary, Rapp and Ginsburg (2011a) 
suggested that families of children with disabilities, in their case Learning Disabilities like autism and 
dyslexia, have to re-imagine their daily lives and interactions with the world, in order to organise the 
care and support required for their child to thrive. They demonstrated that in this process a new 
narrative of family life emerged which questioned the kinship relations that could no longer be taken 
for granted.  The unexpected recognition of ADHD in a child by his parent, that I will come to 
describe in the next section, epitomises Rapp and Ginsburg’s insight that ‘kinship imaginaries require 
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continual reinvention’ (ibid.: 10), whereby adults reformulate their identity and knowledge of 
themselves from information about their child. Furthermore, Rapp and Ginsburg go on to show that 
this new kinship imaginary extends beyond the family, as individuals find themselves meeting other 
adults in similar predicaments, seeking support and in that process becoming ‘accidental 
activists’(Panitch, 2008).  In a similar way, the people I met in the support groups were also engaged 
in seeking public recognition and making claims for resources. Yet in the support groups I attended, 
parenthood was not the only bonding element between members as many, often the majority, were not 
parents. Instead the kinship that was being re-imagined outside of the family and in the support groups 
was based on sharing a way of being in the world through the lens of ADHD.  
It is this notion of relating to others through ADHD, of the making of kin, within a family and with 
strangers as part of the broad diagnostic process, that I want to explore in the next two chapters. In 
Chapter Seven, I will explore how kinship relations extend outside home and are made between 
strangers on the basis of a shared neurology (neurodiverse) that distinguishes them from others 
(neurotypical). In this chapter, Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance (1972), which I 
introduced earlier in regard to modes of categorisation, will be explored to support my investigation 
of how similarities between family members within existing kinship relations can lead to unexpected 
outcomes. As with other disorders (Lock et al., 2006), the notion that ADHD may run in the family 
seemed to be accepted as a matter of course within my field sites. Widely available lay information 
regarding ADHD, in self-help books and website forums, emphasised this familial connection by 
referring directly to the scientific discourse of heritability. ADHD is often described in this scientific 
context as one of the most, if not the most, heritable psychiatric disorder, with a 70% to 80% 
heritability factor (Franke et al., 2012). What that means exactly to support group members is not 
always clear, as I found their interest in genetics or molecular biology to be limited. Nevertheless 
these scientific concepts run along a more general notion of family resemblance, whereby certain 
traits and characteristics are passed on within a family, as one manual explained: ‘because of the high 
familial risk of ADHD, [practitioners] are also aware of the high proportion of parents of children 
with ADHD who present with similar problems’ (UKAAN, 2013: 2). Support group members related 
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to this instinctively as they saw how their parents, siblings or cousins also got into difficulties due to 
their lack of attention or an inability to control impulsive behaviours.  
The main question I ask in the last section of this chapter is: what kinds of kinship relations are 
encouraged through these practices? In the context of the expansion of ADHD into adulthood, as a 
lifelong disorder, my query is how this change may affect kinship relations. Making reference to some 
recent anthropological debates I ask: is this kinship founded on the basis of sharing blood or sharing 
genes? Alternatively, could kinship consist in the sharing of medicines between generations, possibly 
the sharing of biological traits that are not genealogical?  If kinship exists in the realm of caring for 
those who are close to us, I want to ask how this is achieved in the context of cross-generational 
ADHD. What are the implications when support groups advocate for treatment of the whole family? 
Is kinship in this case a resource towards a claim for recognition and, by extension, the basis for an 
activism and politics of difference? The specific relations implicated in the making of ADHD as I 
describe it do not suggest a fundamental  move from the idea of kinship as it is known and 
experienced in the UK, but rather the description of a particular and unexpected way that knowledge 
about kinship is put to work and re-imagined.
84
 The reformulation and re-imagining of the biological 
explanations for ADHD, which often lead to the making of new relations, suggest that the social and 
biological notions of kinship require work in order to be held together. As I will come to show, there 
are contradictions and ambivalence arising from feeling connected with kin on the basis of an 
affliction. For example, the sense of genealogical responsibility that parents might feel towards their 
diagnosed child might be marred with guilt; or the sense of vertigo that a parent may experience when 
made aware of ADHD as potentially relevant to their lives through the diagnosis of their child, 
bringing relief, turmoil and confusion all at once. The paradox of kinship in the lives that people 
described to me is that it highlights problems and difficulties that have been and continue to be 
endured, whilst also providing creative opportunities for the making of new relationships.  
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 In this chapter, I focus on a particular kind of kinship relations, namely the parent-child bond, as it featured 
prominently in the support group members’ discussion on recognition and diagnosis. As it will become 
apparent, other members, who were not parents, also experienced a sense of identification with others, which 
leads me, in Chapter Seven, to extend notions of kinship to include the sharing of neurological differences. 
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This chapter also contributes to the anthropological proposition that kinship systems may not all be 
based on biological links and reproduction as proposed in the western popular mode (Bloch, 2001; 
Sahlins, 2013; Schneider, 1984). Rather than putting forward a radical proposition departing from the 
accepted British folkbiology, my fieldwork encounters indicate an additional direction in the expected 
descending links and influences passing from parent to child
85
.Thus I suggest that adults with ADHD 
are made by children on two accounts: first, according to diagnostic criteria, ADHD in the child must 
precede ADHD in the adult. Wordsworth’s famous line ‘the Child is Father of the Man’, is often used 
in medical and scientific publications, to describe this continuity of personhood during a lifetime: how 
adulthood is dependent on, and follows from, that person’s childhood. It is a popular image that took 
hold at the beginning of the 20
th
 century in public health debates, when states were concerned with 
building strong nations, and the correlation between child development and adult health was made 
(Harris, 2001).  But my interest here, and my second point, is that the specific moment in time we are 
in, when adults could not be diagnosed until recently, has put a cross-generational twist onto 
Wordsworth’s line. Thus the transmissions of characteristics can take place not within one individual 
but across age groups and, more specifically, upstream from children to adults. What is asked in the 
next section is: how can a child beget a parent? 
 
The child is father of the man 
 
Keith
86
 was in his mid-forties when he first came to the support group. The facilitator gave him, as 
was customary, the chance to speak and explain why he was attending. The group was quite large 
with over twenty participants, with the majority of people being regular members, including myself. 
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 I am suggesting a co-existing ascendant and descendant transmission, the former being implicit in the 
practices I have described yet counter-intuitive to western concepts of kinship and reproduction.  
86
 Due to reasons of anonymity I described in the introductory chapter, I have decided to combine a number of 
stories told by support group members, representative of the common experience that I came across in order to 
make new ones.  Thus in the case of Keith and Bridget in this chapter, their stories have not been experienced 
nor told by just one person, but by a number of people with similar experiences. I hope that the composite 
stories I present will help to illuminate the practices of kinship that are common to my participants. 
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We were sitting in a circle as usual and most had made a cup of tea or coffee before settling down. 
When it came to Keith’s turn to speak, he explained that it had taken him quite a while to decide to 
come along to the group and that he still wasn’t sure that he had ADHD. He was not diagnosed and he 
did not have an appointment to see a doctor yet. He was hoping to get more information from the 
group. Anna, one of the facilitators, asked him how he came to think that he might have ADHD. Keith 
then told the following story:  
“I’ve got a son called Billy and he is twelve years old. He had been given an appointment at 
the Child and Adolescent Mental Health centre, because he’d been in trouble at school. He 
was constantly getting detentions for disrupting the class, or not finishing his work, that kind 
of thing. He had always been like that, at home as well, always on the go, never staying still. 
Not stupid though, he still managed to get good grades.  Anyway, on that day we were 
running late, I am always late for things, you know, and so we went in and there was a 
psychiatrist there who asked us if we had done the forms. We had been sent forms to fill in 
with lots of questions, like maybe 50 questions, and we’d done most of them, so I gave them 
to her. She explained that there were quite a few school reports which suggested that Billy 
was restless in the classroom, and that was why we were there. She then started doing the 
assessment, which was like more questions, mostly for my son to answer, but also for me, 
about his sleeping pattern, about him forgetting things, or feeling anxious.  This was taking 
quite a long time, like an hour or so, and I could tell it was really hard for Billy to be there.  
The psychiatrist then asked Billy if he had heard of ADHD, and we both said yes, because the 
school had mentioned it already. She thought it was ADHD that caused him his problems, 
like stopping him sleeping properly and not being able to relax. And then she said to him but 
pointing at me:  ‘you see your dad sitting here, how he is twisting his fingers and moving his 
legs all the time, well I think he has ADHD too.’” 
At this point quite a few members of the group laughed, made exclamatory noises: “Whoouah, 
Really?  No way!”  and a sense of surprise and excitement was clearly palpable. As Keith was 
speaking I had noticed how he was very fidgety, his legs were shaking up and down, sometimes he sat 
P a g e  | 148 
 
on his hands to stop them moving too. He seemed to be experiencing this more that most members I 
had seen so far. Yet no one in the group commented on that; instead Anna asked: “Oh my god, what 
did you say?” Keith elaborated on his feelings: 
“Well I didn’t know what to say, I was like feeling really awkward and embarrassed. And 
then the psychiatrist carried on explaining what kind of treatment she was going to prescribe, 
what difference it should make and how often Billy should come to see her. But really I did 
not pay attention; I was like, in shock, it was like having vertigo.  On our way home I kept 
wondering about what had happened, what did she mean I had ADHD as well?  The thing is, I 
could not really remember what she had said about the meds so I had to ring her again and 
that’s how she explained that adults can also have ADHD, I didn’t know that, I thought it was 
only children that could have ADHD. She told me I could go and talk to my GP about it but I 
didn’t do that. I have not been to see my doctor yet.” 
Very quickly, members one by one started to ask questions and to give advice to Keith:  which GP did 
he have what he should do to get an appointment with a specialist doctor.  After the session, I had the 
chance to have another conversation with Keith, and he explained to me that the event with the 
psychiatrist had happened nearly a year ago: 
“I haven’t done anything about it, because with my wife we needed to get our head round the 
idea of Billy being on medication. We weren’t sure about the side-effects and how if this 
would make it harder at school for him. At the time the doctor told me she thought I had 
ADHD, my wife was pretty convinced that I had it and I should do something about it. To be 
honest, I felt a bit offended by the idea, not sure why, but it’s probably why I didn’t do 
anything about it for a long time. It’s only when I went to a follow up appointment with Billy 
that I asked more questions and thought I should find out more about it. So I went online got 
more information and started to see how Billy was so much like me, or was it the other way 
round? I know that I used to have bad times at school, lots of detention and thinking back they 
let me down really, so I don’t want that for him.” 
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The Future in the mirror 
 
Keith’s is an exemplary story which I heard in slightly different variations in all of the groups I 
attended, as well as in some of the clinical assessment I observed. The entrance and arrival of a 
psychiatric diagnosis within a family both reshapes individuals’ life trajectories, and provokes parents 
into a re-examination of their past and present difficulties. Family stories are told and retold 
describing the similarities between childhood experiences at school and at home between generations.  
For some, like Keith, it takes time to come to terms and decide to take a passing comment seriously, 
as if the resonance of that moment required amplification. For others it is just like the flashbulb 
moment of recognition I described earlier, seeing oneself in another as if in a mirror. Roger, from 
another group, explained how he could see himself in his son, always climbing trees, getting into 
trouble at school and falling about all the time.  In fact, he continued, he recalled how, as a child, he 
was always covered in bruises, knocking into things, and he broke his arm when he was ten and then 
his leg two years later.  His son had had similar injuries and scars, which Roger thought was a little 
strange. At first he did not think that this was anything but ‘boys being boys’, even though his son was 
more frequently injured than most of his peers; but when his son was diagnosed, he thought, ‘that 
explains a lot’.  As my conversation with Roger was diverted to different subjects with other group 
members, I took it to mean that the diagnosis of his child explained a lot about himself, and that 
viewed through that lens, it appeared that he had been hyperactive as a child.  The recognition that 
took place between himself and his son brought a new understanding, a new insight; it was not like 
seeing an exact mirror image but it brought the strangeness out of the familiar. 
 In his musing on time, art and things past, Berger (2005) describes how some painters have 
developed a technique in order to answer the searching question: when is a painting finished?  
According to Berger, they study their painting in a mirror, in a reversed reflection, a tactic which 
forces them to see through the familiar, to look with fresh eyes, and see anew. He concludes, ‘What 
they glimpse in the mirror is perhaps a little like the look of their painting at that future moment to 
which it is being addressed’ (ibid.: 27). The mirror reflection acts in this case as an intentional shift, a 
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disruption of what has been seen and worked on by the artist day after day, to then suggest what the 
end product will look like. Berger’s mastery of time narration and his insight in finding the future in a 
mirror’s reflection is also helpful to think with concerning the experience that people have of seeing 
themselves in their child as if in a mirror. Recognising behaviours and traits in one’s children is quite 
common for parents, and it usually confirms one’s sense of identity and of continuity. Weston also 
made use of mirrors as metaphors in exploring  gay stories of coming out  and suggested that ‘seeking 
one’s own reflection often symbolises an effort to affirm a coherent self in a situation that promises 
(or threatens) to transform identity’ (Weston, 2013: 139). But in the cases I have described, parents, 
rather than seeking, were enforced and compelled to reconsider, and question who they were in 
relation to their child. What they saw and caught a glimpse of, in that moment of recognition, is the 
sameness in difference, the same yet not the same, and it propelled them along an unexpected 
trajectory.  The familiar, what was seen every day, as a parent saw their child, was suddenly displaced 
to reveal other aspects of resemblance that had previously gone unnoticed
87
. 
 A different visual metaphor, the Rabbit-Duck picture famously used by Wittgenstein (1972), can also 
help to envisage what takes place in this moment.  One has to be familiar with the rabbit to see it in 
the picture, and the same goes for the duck, but only one can be seen at a time. Furthermore, the first 
time that we see this picture, only one of the two, rabbit or duck, can be seen and it takes a shift, a 
visual displacement, a change of focus, to see the other. Wittgenstein describes this in terms of a 
distinction between ‘continuous seeing of an aspect and the dawning of an aspect’ (ibid.: §194), 
hinting that the object being seen influences what is seen, and emerges in a kind of ‘materialisation’ 
(ibid: §199). No conclusion is given by Wittgenstein about what causes the shift, nor is my interest in 
explaining it. Instead I am interested by the fact there is a change of perception of the familiar that 
becomes something other and that this glimpse, caught in a moment, leaves an impression. Once we 
have seen and apprehended the picture of the duck in the rabbit, that possibility remains with us. 
Furthermore as noted by Cavell ‘the flip from one reading to another is due solely to you, the change 
                                                          
87
 Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage (1968) is influential in the mirror metaphors used above which suggest an 
objectification process associated in seeing oneself in a mirror; my interest here is in the way that a mirror image 
calls upon notions of reciprocity – that if I can look at another person and see myself in them, that is what I look 
like to somebody else. 
P a g e  | 151 
 
is in you’ (Cavell, 1979: 354) 88. In a similar way, for Roger and Keith, once they saw themselves in 
their sons, not only in terms of sharing the colour of their eyes or hair, but also in the bruises, scars 
and broken limbs, they knew that something had changed and they could not ignore it.  But there are 
other reasons why recognising themselves in their children made a lasting impression which required 
acting upon, reasons directly linked to their relationship as kin. Marilyn Strathern showed how 
kinship knowledge has certain intrinsic qualities that make it difficult to ignore due to its ‘cultural 
coupling with identity’ (Strathern, 1999:68). 
‘For English-speakers, a peculiarity of knowing in kinship terms is that information about 
origins is already grasped as knowledge. Parentage implies relatedness; facts about birth 
imply parentage and people who find things about their ancestry, and thus about their 
relations with others, acquire identity by that very discovery. The information constitutes 
what they know about themselves.’ (Strathern, 2005:69).  
The contemporary scientific discourse of ADHD, which now describes it as a lifespan condition, also 
emphasises that ADHD has a high familial risk of ‘clustering both within and across 
generations’(Franke et al., 2012: 961). Information of this kind that calls upon genetic ideas of kinship 
is widespread and not confined to ADHD. For the parents of children with ADHD I have met, it adds 
a new dimension to recognising and seeing themselves in their child. Can they ignore this 
information?  What would be at stake if they did?  In addition, the memories of childhood events that 
are triggered through this recognition also bring to the fore the persistent difficulties they have 
experienced. As Strathern described, they cannot ignore the information that their child is likely to 
have a neurodevelopmental disorder. To do so would potentially render the child as ‘other’, as not the 
same, not part of the family: it may deny the parent/child relation altogether. The experience of being 
stigmatised and ostracised for behaviours associated with ADHD is, unfortunately, widespread for 
children (Singh, 2012, 2013). Parents are well aware of this, having to deal with the impact and 
                                                          
88
 Cavell’s analysis of the duck-rabbit picture emphasised the wide range of concepts that could be extracted 
from such an image; he lists seven. Following the moment of recognition I introduced in Chapter Five, my 
interest in the duck-rabbit picture is on the dawning, the appearance  and new way of seeing something that had 
been there all along.  
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aftermath of the problem.  For parents to act on the information that ADHD clusters in families, and 
to seek and accept a diagnosis of ADHD and treatment, is also to recognise one’s kin as genuine 
relations. Acknowledging their sameness in being different, adults also open the way for the 
possibility of new kinds of kinship relations based on the sharing of similar difficulties, bringing adult 
and child closer together. Further on I will explore the reverberation on ‘kinship imaginaries’, to use 
Rapp and Ginsburg’s phrase (2011a); but I wonder if the recognition of one’s kin may not be 
particularly germane for the men I have met. Fathers have always had a lot more to prove in regard to 
their biological relations with children than mothers. Thus, to admit the possibility of the heredity of 
ADHD as pertinent for one’s life, is to recognise and affirm a legitimate filiation. Keith had felt quite 
offended that his wife thought that, like their child, he too had ADHD, and that he should do 
something about it. Yet, after months of not acting on the information given to him in passing by the 
psychiatrist, his wife’s comment may well have been a crucial factor in Keith’s decision to finally 
make contact with the support group.  Clearly that comment had also made an impression on him. 
Strathern discusses kinship knowledge and the impossibility of refusing information in the context of 
reproductive medicine in the western world.  She asks what impact new technologies have in 
producing new kinds of kinship relations from knowledge of the past. But the narratives I have 
encountered in the context of adult ADHD suggest a disruption to the natural flow of kinship 
knowledge that we have come to expect – namely a flow from parent to child whereby the sense of 
self and identity is passed on downward to the child. Instead the adults I met found themselves 
reformulating their identity from information about their descendants, not their ancestors, adding an 
upstream flow of knowledge from the child to the adult. For the adults I met, this is knowledge about 
their past, that is their own childhood, as well as about their present, knowledge they acquire through 
their child, their future. It is as if the child generates the adult: the child with ADHD begets the 
ADHD in the adult.  As I have described, this situation is the result of a particular historical context 
whereby adults could not be diagnosed with ADHD until quite recently. In this way it could be 
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considered peculiar to the scientific and cognitive context of Euro-American
89
 kinship knowledge. It 
is another permutation of the way that individuals within families either connect or do not connect 
with each other, which is due to new technology, albeit in this case not reproductive technology. But I 
wonder if this does not attribute to new technology, and genetics in particular, a place of importance 
that can obscure other understandings of kinship relations.  
 
The parent of a child with ADHD 
 
I found Bloch’s ethnographic examples (1993, 2006) helpful as a way to further examine notions of 
relations that may be counter-intuitive to the dominant biological and western mode of conceiving 
kinship. Bloch’s work with the Zafimaniry is far reaching and comprehensive, in that it covers wide 
aspects of the social life of the Malagasy people, and here I want to draw on his concerns with their 
kinship system. The main point that Bloch makes in this respect is that the Zafimaniry do not pay 
particular attention to biological inheritance when considering the formation of personhood in their 
society
90
. In other words, births, and all of the relations we associate with it in terms of societal status, 
do not play an important role in the process of becoming a social person. Instead, as he suggests, it is 
through the making of a household that individuals become social beings, which entails house 
building, marriage and reproduction. The making of the household, which includes changing modes 
of living from hunting to cultivating food as well as giving birth to a child, marks the entrance of the 
couple into the social world. The child herself does not become a full member of the society by the 
sheer fact of her birth, instead she is considered as lacking ‘moral responsibility’ and treated like a 
loved pet. What the birth does not do to the baby born, it does to the parents as the child generates and 
                                                          
89
 Whilst my study is situated in the UK, the term used by Strathern (2005) to describe the western world’s 
cultural sphere (Euro-American) can be helpful to describe the entanglement of Euro and Americans when it 
comes to ADHD. But it may be more precise to term it ‘North Euro-American’, as in both continents ADHD is 
particularly recognised and diagnosed in that part of their geography (Ginsberg, 2014). 
90
 The peculiarity of the Zafimaniry people’s conception of kin relations is part of the broader geography of 
South East Asia and Madagascar ‘where birth is more like, “the launching of a ship”’ and the individual remains 
malleable and open to influence through the relationship developed in life (Bloch, 2001: 48). Bloch’s work also 
suggests that biological concepts of transmission are not incompatible with the notions described above (ibid.: 
61). 
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creates parents as full social beings. The transformation of the parents into full social being goes 
further still at the point of the name-giving ceremony for the child. In contrast to Christian baptism 
ceremonies, where naming a child is a ritual entrance into the world as an individual, the Zafimaniry 
people hold a ceremony that, by naming a child, has the outcome of renaming the parents as well.  
The practice of naming the parents from the child, defined and named by Tylor as ‘teknonymy’ 
(1889), is common in many parts of the world, even if it varies according to social context. According 
to Bloch, the Zafimaniry parents are renamed after their first child.  More often than not their birth-
name is abandoned completely, making ‘the name-giving ritual a celebration of the entry into society 
of the parents not of the child’ (1993: 128). Teknonymy is the sign of the growth of individuals in 
society, but following Geertz (1964), Bloch suggests that it is also a move towards losing some 
individuality. In effect, losing one’s name for another that is descriptive of the role one has in society, 
in this case as a parent, is clearly depersonalising. Geertz goes further in describing the Balinese 
teknonymy system as causing ‘genealogical amnesia’ as names of ancestors are forgotten.  Yet what 
Bloch shows is that a teknonym contains a proposition, therefore it is used with a purpose in mind, to 
show respect, or to strengthen relations and this purpose depends on the specific context of the 
relationships.  
In the next section, I want to examine how the insights Bloch drew from the Zafimaniry kinship 
processes may be relevant to my interest in parents of children with ADHD; what kind of proposition 
is made by identifying oneself as a parent of a child with ADHD?  I will answer this by drawing on 
assessments I observed in the clinic, where adults in the process of demonstrating the presence of 
ADHD symptoms in their childhood, also reveal its presence in their kin. I found that in support 
groups, conversations rarely revolved around relations with children when determining the validity of 
an adult’s diagnosis. Mostly it would be in a ‘newcomer’s tale’ that such reference would be found, as 
in the case of Keith’s story.  Instead, the focus of shared stories was laid on an individual’s 
experiences, what ADHD meant to them. In contrast, the clinic was an environment where I observed 
issues of genealogy, kinship and heredity discussed explicitly, and for good reasons, but sometimes 
with unexpected outcomes as I will show.    
P a g e  | 155 
 
The paradox of kinship 
 
Bridget came in for her assessment with a large file that she had compiled herself, comprising school 
reports but also medical reports from psychologists, GPs and psychiatrists. In her mid-thirties, Bridget 
started to describe how she already had a number of diagnoses which she believed to be wrong.  She 
had been diagnosed with depression and anxiety whilst she was still a teenager; then more recently 
she had some difficult times and doctors had diagnosed her with Personality Disorders for which 
treatment did nothing. The clinician, who was looking at the file Bridget had brought with her, started 
asking questions about what kind of problems she had and when they had started. Bridget explained 
how her main problems were about getting organised, that her mind wandered off, day-dreaming, so it 
makes it very difficult to get anything done, and with two young children that is really difficult.’ 
These problems had got her in debt. She forgot to pay bills, lost things all the time and was unable to 
control herself with online shopping and bought things she did not need.  
By this point in the assessment, fifteen minutes had passed, and I was very aware of the visible aspect 
of Bridget’s symptoms, and I am sure the clinician was too. Bridget was barely able to sit still and 
regularly got up and walked round the room for a few minutes. The clinician offered her the chance to 
take a break, but Bridget was not so sure, and looked towards the person accompanying her for 
reassurance and both agreed to carry on. Usually patients bring relatives or partners, but Bridget had 
brought along her child’s support worker, Carry, herself diagnosed with ADHD. Bridget went on to 
explain how helpful Carry had been when her oldest child had been diagnosed; “she is just like my 
sister and she knows what I am going through because she has it too.” Carry had reassured her and 
explained what ADHD was and encouraged her to go to the ADHD course that was run for informing 
and supporting parents. When she was there, she started to see how a lot of the behaviours that were 
described for children, were present in her too. Suddenly, she recalled, she could see herself in her 
child, the impulsive behaviours and constant fidgeting.  Carry explained that when Bridget’s boy 
started medication, it made such a big difference and he was able to catch up with his school work. 
Bridget described how her son also had “drug holidays” in school holidays and sometimes at week-
P a g e  | 156 
 
ends, when he did not take his Ritalin. It was in those moments that she recognised herself in him. 
That was why, Bridget went on to explain, she was hoping for treatment because she saw what it did 
for him; she said “when you have that treatment, you can see the person that should be.”  
Neither the clinician, nor I, had said a word for quite a while as Bridget and Carry were telling her 
story, jumping from one subject to another, the meds, the school, the debts, and then back again to the 
school. The clinician then steered the assessment back to his initial question: how was Bridget’s 
childhood, did she have any difficulties? At first she talked of her childhood, not in terms of problems 
with inattention or hyperactivity, but in terms of being neglected; she was in a special school and so 
had extra support, no more than five per class, so everything was well organised, just as for her son 
who gets lots of help. As the clinician asked more searching questions, Bridget explained that she had 
been taken into care after a number of years of being neglected by her mother who suffered with 
mental health problems. When she was not in school, she was always getting into trouble. As the 
clinician was looking into the file Bridget had brought with her, she explained that she had tried to get 
her mother to fill in the forms for this assessment. But because of the bad memories it brought up for 
her,  bringing all those bad times back again, she got her sister  and Carry to help her fill in the forms 
instead.  By doing that she had found out a lot about her family, things that her mother had been 
ashamed of and did not want to discuss. She had contacted relatives who were abroad and she told me 
how she had found out that: 
“My maternal cousin in New Zealand was diagnosed with ADHD as an adult; another 
maternal cousin committed suicide whilst in her 40s; another maternal cousin had some 
Learning Disability and had always been in his own world as a kid; one paternal cousin had 
murdered his wife.” 
She had written this list down and after reading it, she wondered aloud about how hereditary and 
genetic ADHD might be. The clinician responded briefly that it was complicated, but that research 
showed that it was often found within families. As the assessment came to a conclusion, Bridget 
seemed exhausted and was barely able to listen to the last few comments regarding treatments; the 
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two-part session had lasted nearly three hours. The clinician made sure to explain that, in her opinion, 
Bridget had ADHD, that a full written report would be sent to her GP, and that she should make 
contact with her doctor in the next couple of weeks to start medication.  At that, Bridget was clearly 
relieved.  
The moment of recognition that something was wrong in her and that it could be remedied came 
through her son’s diagnosis and treatment. Now she was hoping to share with him another way of 
being, where she would be more in control, more organised, and able to become ‘the person that 
should be’.  At that point of the assessment I perceived the sense of hope that Bridget attached to her 
son’s transformation after starting his treatment.  He could become someone other than a turbulent 
child who got into trouble. ‘The person that should be’ seemed to me to encompass Bridget’s feeling 
of lack of control over what happened to her, and to suggest that there might well be another person 
within her who needed help to come out. The verb ‘should’ is loaded with a sense of obligation, of 
duty, but it also indicates something desirable. In view of Bridget’s persistent restlessness and 
sleeplessness, the combination of hope and obligation produced a poignant image for me, one of 
someone striving to change, and to be somebody who could have rest.  Her son, who had been 
suffering in the same way, would ask her ‘to stop the thinking that was going on in his head’.   During 
the assessment, she explained how she blamed herself for that, for the ADHD in him, saying; “it must 
have come from me.”   
On the one hand, Bridget could see how her son had benefited from being treated for ADHD, being 
able to sustain focus. She started to look forward to the future – to share with her son a new way of 
experiencing the world, something that her son already had access to, as if she was looking to emulate 
him, as if he was setting an example, and acting as a role model for her. On the other hand, Bridget 
was reminded that she is the parent of a child with ADHD, she attended a course for parents, she 
found out unhappy family stories and discovered that ADHD may be hereditary which suggested the 
role she may have played in producing her son’s condition.  It is as if these orientations were the two 
sides of the same kinship coin; one side is looking up towards her descendant for changes in her life, 
the other is looking down towards herself as an ancestor who has changed her son’s life. To carry on 
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the coin metaphor of kinship, the latter side, the one representing the genealogical line of ascent, can 
be thought of in biological terms, as the natural flow of kinship knowledge. On this side, Bridget has 
passed on her traits to her son. On the other side of the coin, the genealogical line of descent is what 
might be thought of in social terms, what I called the upstream flow of kinship knowledge. On this 
side Bridget looks to her son to pass new traits and modes of existence on to her.  The point I am 
making here is that the social and biological aspects of kinship are not separated, but contingent on 
one another. They overlap over one another and both require work in order to bring them into being, 
but the biological transmission downward, her genetic responsibility to her child,  is experienced as 
more natural than the social effort to be recognised as the parent of a child with ADHD.  In Bridget’s 
as well as Keith’s cases, the teknonym proposition (Bloch 1993) which is made by being called the 
parent of a child with ADHD, does not seem to depersonalise them. It does not reduce them to being 
merely the transmitters of ADHD, but also brings the possibility for change in themselves and the 
opportunity to become ‘the person that should be’. It opens the way for becoming another kind of 
individual, albeit through treatment for ADHD. In addition, the sharing of the same remedy may also 
reveal other dimensions in relationships. As long as patients are prepared to undergo all the effort 
required and have the resources necessary to do so, then the hope and the relief from disabling 
symptoms that medicine can bring may be shared with family members and so become part of 
everyday family  relationships.  
The difficulty involved in maintaining any kind of relationship was a very common topic of 
conversation in support groups. Diagnostic manuals also highlight this inability to maintain 
relationships as a specific ADHD impairment if it is experienced to such a degree that it affects social 
functioning (NICE, 2009; UKAAN, 2013). Support group members described how they tried to make 
and maintain relationships, and spoke of their hope of not becoming cut off from other people. This 
concern was felt at home too with close kin, through the difficulties of caring for young children when 
one suffers from forgetfulness or disorganisation, as Bridget explained. Another member of a support 
group also explained how, when his son started medication, he saw how the boy organised his room 
and homework, and could not help but feel ashamed at his own pile of unpaid bills on the kitchen 
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table. He was worried that he could not care properly for his family, as his disorganisation and lack of 
attention to his finances was getting the family into debt.  In his case and in others I encountered, the 
sense of responsibility to care and to provide good care is entangled with and related to the need to 
look after one’s self and receive help. Kinship consists in caring and being cared for as Borneman has 
shown (2001). Bridget and Keith, in recognising themselves in their ADHD diagnosed children made 
positive moves to seek recognition and care for themselves in the clinic. What they found in the clinic 
is that to be recognised and diagnosed can be closely related to being called ‘the parent of’ someone 
already diagnosed with ADHD.  Often ‘parentage’ is understood in its broader sense, not reduced to 
first line descent alone, but also extending to other branches of relatives as Bridget demonstrated in 
her family résumé.   
The forms that Bridget filled in with help from her sister and Carry asked direct questions about 
family history: does anyone in your family (for example, parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, children) 
have features of ADHD?  Has anyone been diagnosed with ADHD? Has anyone been diagnosed with 
a psychiatric disorder?   The responses that Bridget brought with her covered all these options and 
more as she found out about distant relatives. The content of such questionnaires is indicative of the 
importance which is often ascribed to heredity and genealogy in modern medicine (including 
psychiatry) as a broad proposition that, statistically, traits and characteristics are often clustered in 
families.  But it is worth asking how the information on that form is helpful, and what it does ?  
During all the assessments I observed and in conversations with clinicians during my fieldwork, the 
family information provided by patients was never directly acted upon, checked or tested. By that I 
mean that no genetic testing is made on that basis. If there was some positive response to the 
questionnaire, then we can assume that it would, in the mind of the clinicians, increase the probability 
of them making an ADHD diagnosis for the patient. However, the questionnaire also highlighted to 
the patient that looking into their family history can be of importance for their own future health.   
My purpose here is not to question the veracity of scientific assertions as to the role of genetics and 
heredity, but rather to ask how its impact on the way kinship is then conceived. In the cases of Bridget 
and Keith, how do notions of genes and heredity affect them when thinking about their difficulties? 
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From my conversations with them, I formed the impression that it increased their sense of genetic 
responsibility for their child’s difficulties, and simultaneously raised the hope, that in sharing that 
same connection, they might be able to share the burden of their common difficulties. Yet heredity is 
defined in medicine as the genetic transmission from parent to offspring, not the other way round. 
Maybe there is another element that is implicit in this counter-intuitive logic of child to parent 
transmission of difficulties, one that is posited and accepted by patients and clinicians, and defined by 
Strathern thus: ‘To see a child is … to “recognise” a natural fact.  Whether socially or legally, by 
contrast with the child, parenthood is thus always constructed as an object of knowledge’ (Strathern, 
1992: 148). Writing in her investigations on new reproductive technologies, Strathern argued that a 
child is defined in itself and by itself, we do not need to see proof that she has a parent, it is presumed.  
But on the other hand it takes a child to make a parent; we cannot assume when we see an adult that it 
is a parent; thus parenthood is constructed.  
I am interested here in Strathern’s suggestion that the relationship between the child and parent, which 
is grounded in both nature and culture, is an ‘amalgam of different orders of fact’ (ibid). In other 
words, the child is added to the parent to make it so, and so is the parent made by the addition of a 
child. It is the relation between the two separate entities child/parent (nature/culture), that makes 
something new, a hybrid in which part of one is found in the other. Strathern named these relations, 
merographic connections in that ‘anything may be part of something else’ yet ‘nothing is in fact ever 
simply part of a whole because another view, another perspective or domain, may re-describe it as 
part of something else’ (1992a:73;  see also Franklin, 2003; Mol, 2014). The plural perspectives on 
kinship relations can also be seen in the work put in to keep two separate wholes together; the 
biological and the social aspects of kinship. Thus Bridget was holding together potentially 
contradictory notions of kinship connection: she combined being a parent of a child with ADHD with 
the idea that she might find solace and treatment for herself because of it, yet she also felt responsible 
for the ADHD in her son, as well as other newly discovered connections with distant relatives.  
Similarly Keith had to adjust and push away the sense of genealogical displacement when he was 
presented with the origin of his problems in his progeny, then consider treatment for his son as well as 
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support for himself. Such is the ‘kinship thinking’ (Strathern, 1992a) that takes place in order to keep 
together different elements that are in their connections constitutive of kin relations. Crucially, it is 
holding and mixing together the different elements that makes kinship what it is for Bridget and 
Keith: ‘Thus the logic of the totality is not necessarily to be found in the logic of the parts, but in 
principles, forces, relations that exist beyond the parts.’(ibid.: 76). 
 
Running wild in the family 
 
Towards the end of my fieldwork, I was invited by the clinicians to make a presentation at a scientific 
conference on the work I had been doing with support groups. I asked the groups directly: what would 
they like scientists and clinicians to hear of their experiences?  The three groups responded with 
similar points, such as training GPs to recognise ADHD and easier referral systems. One group also 
highlighted the need to treat the whole family, not just the child. When I asked what they meant, one 
of the facilitators made a gesture with her hand across the room, as if to say “there is your answer”.  In 
the room, around twenty people were sitting together, most of them aged over 30, mostly undiagnosed 
but describing themselves as having ADHD and its symptoms. I also knew that quite a few were 
parents and that some of their children had been diagnosed with ADHD. Yet they still had to convince 
the GPs and their funders of their need to be seen by a specialist clinician. Alan, one of the members 
explained:  
“I am 52 now, and I’ve gone through all kinds of hell, I have been addicted to drugs and alcohol, I did 
a stint inside, I lost my family and, now I have found them again, I don’t want to lose them. My 
youngest was diagnosed nearly five years ago now, and we know it runs in the family, so why can’t 
they assess me and see if that’s what’s causing me all these problems?” 
Another member interjected: “Yeah you can say that, it’s like ADHD is running wild in the family.” 
Once the laughter had subsided, Tessa brought the conversation back to the topic of treating the whole 
family. Other members agreed, it would save a lot of time and misery to be assessing other members 
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of the family if one person had ADHD. By treating the family, they meant literally providing 
treatment, but also treating family members in the same way and providing access to assessment for 
adults as well as children. They wanted to be treated as whole individuals, not just as the parent of a 
child with ADHD.  The conversations I observed in groups rarely referred specifically to genetics to 
explain the causes for ADHD. Instead, as in Alan’s example, discussion would refer to it as ‘running 
in the family’. 
On the face of it, the phrase seems a rather vague statement, but to some extent it does express what 
matters to people when it comes to understanding the impact of presumed genetics in their lives. This 
was expressed succinctly by a member of another group: “Well until someone comes up with new 
treatments, [genetics] is of no interest to people trying to manage their daily lives”. The scientific fact 
that ADHD is hereditary and  ‘aggregates in families …as a result of genetic factors’ (UKAAN, 
2013:25) is experienced directly by people through living with their kin;  siblings, parents, grand-
parents, cousins and hyperactive children running wild in the family, as referred to in the joke. The 
expression is not used only with reference to ADHD and studies have discussed this in relation to 
genetic testing and risks factors (Lock et al., 2006; Lock and Nguyen, 2010). But rather than thinking 
of heredity in terms of risk or even genetics, it seemed that the support group members, were talking 
about the clustering of ADHD in families, in evidential and existential terms. The reasons are as 
follows: firstly as a possible means to support the case that they may themselves have ADHD; 
secondly, individuals can remember and observe how family members behave in ways that resemble 
the description of ADHD. Rather than genetics, these are family traits and characteristics, in other 
words, family resemblances
91
.  
In her assessment, Bridget made reference to her two cousins in response to the questions on the form, 
when she described by the tragedy in their lives (committing suicide and murder) rather than by 
mentioning  any signs of mental health problems. It is not clear why that would be, and my interest is 
not in speculating about the associations that Bridget may have made between ADHD and these tragic 
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events. Instead, it seems to point out how her notions of heredity seemed nebulous and vague. I do not 
mean that she did not have a sense of what heredity and the transmission of ADHD might be, but that 
her conceptualisations did not fit precisely with the genealogical and linear description found in the 
clinic. Indeed she also included Carry as her kin, just like a sister, on the basis of the care Carry 
showed to her and her son, and possibly because she also had ADHD: Carry knew just what Bridget 
was going through. I have touched on notions of kinship as caring and being cared for earlier and I 
want to conclude this section now by discussing how sharing experiences, which may be described as 
empathetic relations, may also be the basis for a certain kind of kinship.  
During the assessments I observed in the clinic, I was often surprised by unexpected ideas of kinship 
connections that were presented by patients. I suspect this was because of the genealogical 
assumptions that form the basis of clinical family history-taking which conceive connections on a 
biological basis, and not in any other ways. My observational notes of one assessment illustrate this:  
‘Connor, Young man late twenties, comes in with an informant, Lisa, describing herself as family 
friend. Dr Gomez asks her who filled in the pre assessment forms, Lisa explains that his mother did 
the childhood scales and she did the current and adult ones. Dr Gomez asks Connor who was his 
Sister in Law. Both Connor and Lisa look at each other. Lisa says that she kind of is and explains that 
she was adopted by her uncle and aunt, who had a daughter, her cousin. This cousin has been 
Connor’s girlfriend for the last four to five years. Her uncle and aunt (her adopted parents) are family 
friends of Connor’s parents. That’s why, she said, family friends and sister-in-law on the forms.  Dr 
Gomez asks how well she knows Connor. She explains that she herself has ADHD and so has her son.  
She also knows someone who is working in an Autism and ADHD service and because she had to 
care for her son, she knows a lot about it. Dr Gomez carries on with the assessment.’ 
After the assessment, Dr Gomez and I shared notes and discussed the confusion that we felt about the 
relationships that were described. As we worked out how Lisa was related to Connor, Dr Gomez 
explained that her input as an informant was not very useful because she had possibly only known 
Connor for about four to five years. He was also clear that the fact she had ADHD and a son with 
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ADHD was not relevant as far as his diagnosis was concerned, because there was no direct biological 
link between them. Even though the prototypical mode of diagnosing was used in the clinic
92
, for Dr 
Gomez, in this case, biological connections trumped family resemblance. As it happened, this 
differentiation was not crucial for Connor as, according to the assessment and scales, he was showing 
definite traits of ADHD and was diagnosed as such on the day. But from Lisa’s point of view, and we 
can assume for Connor too, her personal experience with ADHD in herself and her son was an 
important link between them.  It gave her the ability to recognise herself in Connor, and to see that 
they were sharing similar difficulties and ways of being. I came across the very same sense of relating 
to another when, as shown in Chapter Four, Clara described seeing herself in a stranger, who was 
more like herself than her own twin. It was as if the chaotic and unfocused ways she approached the 
world, something she shared with the stranger, were stronger than the resemblance and familiarity that 
she may have shared with her twin. Of course we could call upon the common adage that ‘we can 
choose our friends, not our family’ to explain that Clara felt a stronger link outside her family. But in 
ways that are similar to Weston’s (2013) description for gay and lesbian couples, the concept of 
choice does not accurately describe what happens in these situations.   
The stories that were shared with me all indicated a lack of choice in that moment of recognition; it 
was unexpected and similar to kinship knowledge as described above by Strathern (2005); impossible 
to ignore. Recognising kinfolk in this way, means recognising that one belongs to the same world and 
shares the same experiences of the world, some good, some bad. This seems a similar description of 
kinship to the one Sahlins put forward recently, defining it as:  
‘mutuality of being: kinfolk are members of one another, intrinsic to each other’s identity and 
existence. Coming in various degrees and forms, such intersubjective relations of being, I argued, will 
account for performative or “made” kinship as well as relations of procreation.’ (Sahlins, 2013:62). 
Sahlins’ definition has the benefit of being inclusive, emphasising that it is what people do together 
that makes them kinfolk. It also seemingly allows the space for biological kinship to be conceived on 
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the basis of sharing experience of life, such as birth and death. Yet as becomes clearer further on, his 
argument is really that the biological representations of kinship are exactly that, representation and 
therefore cultural. In other words kinship is first and foremost cultural in that kin relations can always 
be imagined through cultural actions: ‘[w]hatever is construed genealogically may also be constructed 
socially… Kinship is not given by birth, since human birth is not a pre-discursive fact.’ (2013: 3) 
Through this lens, kinship is therefore culture and nature, but as nature is made through culture, 
kinship is all culture. ‘Mutuality of being’ suggests an idea of kinship as living with and caring for 
one another, and in that sense I find Sahlins’ definition helpful.  Yet Sahlin’s proposition seems to be 
lacking in any of the negative things that may be part of kinship relations. When kinship is examined 
in the details of relations rather than as an abstract concept, then the dependency, oppression and 
vulnerability contained in the relations, are sometimes revealed (Strathern, 2014). The darker side of 
relationships was visible in the clinic as patients shared stories of abuse and hurt received from 
relatives and partners. Whilst I described cross-generational recognition in relation to ADHD earlier 
in this chapter, I also came across group members who were not acknowledged by their parents as 
having ADHD. On one occasion a member described, visibly upset, how his parents, who held very 
strong religious beliefs, did not accept that he had ADHD, thinking it was an excuse for laziness. This 
was despite his being formally diagnosed, and they disapproved of him taking the medication 
prescribed. He explained he had a strong attachment to his dad in particular, but was torn and thrown 
into turmoil by his father’s demand to comply with church life, to marry someone from a church 
background and by his constant remarks about ‘pulling his socks up’ and ‘doing something with his 
life’. 
Overall the patients and support group members who shared their stories seemed to have a very fluid 
idea of kinship, one moment based on their biology and sharing bodily experiences with others, and 
the next moment based on their ‘mutuality of being’, their empathetic relationships.  They called upon 
the biology of ADHD to describe how certain characteristics and traits ran in the family and, at the 
same time, claimed kin relations with strangers on the basis of resemblance and shared vulnerability. 
Cultural and natural kinship were experienced simultaneously in that their mutuality of being was 
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always discussed through their biology, and their reinvented biology was described in terms of 
belonging to a particular group. At home, in support groups and in the clinic, the ways of being that 
they shared with others were understood through physicality and the senses –  the constant fidgeting, 
the intrusive mental restlessness.  Biomedical explanations have clearly been very influential in 
shaping these understandings, bringing in their wake critiques of psychiatry for its role in the 
medicalisation of everyday life. Nevertheless, psychiatric classifications have provided for the support 
group members I met a way to recognise and be recognised and to actively engage in everyday life, 
through their own attempts to change and help themselves and their kin. 
In this chapter I have explored the roles that kinship relations played in the diagnostic process for 
adult ADHD.  By presenting the unexpected recognition of parents in their own children, I have 
described how it triggered memories of their own childhood, and that the child’s present brings to the 
fore the adult’s past. Whilst this kind of collapsing of time is a common experience of parenthood, I 
argued that additional elements caused Keith to experience a feeling of vertigo when recognising 
himself in his child. I have suggested a co-existing ascendant and descendant transmission, whereby 
parents are made by children through the diagnostic criteria as well as through an upstream flow of 
knowledge, and I have shown how parents simultaneously feel the reverberation of their biological 
responsibility for their child’s affliction. For these parents, the reconstruction of their own childhood 
that is required in order to be diagnosed with ADHD is combined and comes together with the 
recognition of themselves in their child; in other words the kinship bond between parent and child 
becomes an extension of the diagnostic process. The kinship relations described were based on 
sharing the same medication, the same biology, but not necessarily the same genealogical descent. 
Through Strathern’s concept of merographic connections I have explored how the separate parts of 
social kinship and biological kinship are kept together so as to make something new, a kind of kinship 
whose practice is dependent on this moment in time. To note the paradox of recognition (Rapp and 
Ginsburg, 2011b) that combines a positive force for becoming ‘the person that should be’ with the 
controlling force exerted by institutions, be they medical, pharmaceutical or educational, is also 
helpful  to describe the entanglement of lived kinship. The paradox of kinship, as I saw it, was that it 
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functioned as much as a creative and positive force, a mutuality of being, as it figured as something 
that was controlling and to be endured. Bridget, Keith and others, who shared their stories with me, 
showed how they reformulated and re-imagined the biological explanations given to them, and in that 
process, how they reached out for new kinship relations. Rapp and Ginsburg (2011a, 2001) examined 
this phenomenon in the context of American families who transformed their lives as a result of living 
with a child with disability. They suggest that these new kinship imaginaries also extended outside the 
family unit to form the basis for wider societal acceptance of disability. How this was done by 
families has been hinted at by Bridget’s widened kin relations to others who are not biologically 
related to her, but who nevertheless experience similar ways of being in the world. It is also indicated 
by Keith, Clara and others who experienced a moment of recognition with others in the support 
groups and thereafter sought to be recognised as belonging to a category as much as to a community. 
The process of teknonymy I described earlier, naming the parent after the child, therefore only applied 
in this way to some of the adults I met in the support groups and clinic. There were many adults who 
were not parents attending the groups, whose interest and orientation was not to think of ADHD 
through children. Yet, the role of regulating social relations, performed through the renaming process 
of teknonyms, as described by Bloch, is also found in the act of naming oneself and others in the 
support groups as ‘an adult with ADHD’ (Bodenhorn and Bruck, 2006) in order to be known and 
recognised by that description.  In my next chapter, I want to explore how recognising and being 
recognised as being an adult with ADHD involves the extension of kinship relations through 
biological traits that are not necessarily genealogical. I describe how adults with ADHD build 
communities which are sometimes defined as neurodiverse, sometimes not, but whose members are 
always active in their attempt to make their different ways of being accepted by others.   
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Chapter Seven Extended kinship: diversity in the support groups 
 
“My butterfly brain is a curse and a blessing”93 
 
In May 2011, Rory Bremner, a well-known comedian and impressionist, made a programme on BBC 
Radio 4 entitled ADHD and me
94
.  I first heard of this programme through Jack, a support group 
member who I introduced in Chapter Five. Jack felt a strong sense of identification with the stories 
the programme told which led him to first seek information about ADHD and then to find the support 
group.  In this programme, Rory Bremner explained that as a child he was always on the go; he never 
could stay still, and whilst he was often called ‘scatty’ and ‘flibbertigibbet’ by his mother, he never 
had a sense that he was suffering from a condition. When a member of his family was diagnosed, he 
became curious and in this programme, he interviewed parents of children with ADHD as well as 
adults attending support groups. In his interview with a renowned psychiatrist, Rory Bremner 
explored some of the issues relevant to his personal life, especially those in which recognition played 
a central role. 
Prof Taylor: “People with ADHD can concentrate very hard, their focus can be excellent. It’s 
more a problem of waiting, in organising things, thinking ahead, planning, all that kind of 
thing you can't do quickly. And the hyperactivity side is acting without thinking, going into a 
situation before you fully understood it, jumping in with both feet, getting things wrong as a 
result, but sometimes getting it right as a result, in an interesting and creative way.” 
Rory Bremner: “It's just like you have been watching me on CCTV for the last 49 years, 
because I mean, this rings such bells with me… It frustrates me when I can't concentrate, 
when my lines wander or I am not able to read because I am reading the same words again 
and again. So there is a weakness in that respect, but there is strength in another respect. In a 
sense, it makes it easier for me to spot analogies, to make illogical jumps to think in terms of 
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interviews by Bremner have been widely shared and discussed on neurodiverse and ADHD websites and blogs.  
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comparison, and to think laterally but in a comedian’s sense, but I have absolutely no 
common sense whatsoever.” 
Professor Taylor’s description of inattention and hyperactivity was also implying that the effect of 
these symptoms may not always be negative. This was a familiar concept for Rory, as he provided his 
own description in terms of strengths and weaknesses whereby his difficulties could also give him an 
advantage for professional comedic purposes. On the one hand, he struggles to focus and remain 
attentive when reading texts but on the other, his wandering mind can lead him to make unexpected 
connections, an ability which is central to comic techniques.  
Following his exploration of how ADHD might be affecting him, Rory asked a direct question of 
Professor Taylor:  
Rory Bremner: “So do you recognise in me symptoms of ADHD?” 
Prof Taylor: “I do, I do” 
Rory Bremner: [laughter] 
Prof Taylor: “I recognise the switching from one thing to another, very quickly, and I 
recognise you occasionally losing the thread of your thoughts, and pausing and retracting.”  
Rory Bremner: “What happens? Do you see my eyeballs going off?” 
Prof Taylor: “No, no, no, just in your speech and when you stop. And yes occasionally you're 
looking away and another thought has clearly come into your mind.”  
Rory Bremner and Prof Taylor: [laughter] 
Rory Bremner: “I am thinking – have I got enough milk in the fridge?” 
The positive answer led to some laughter, some confusion too as Rory wondered how ADHD could 
be observed in him, and in what kind of physical signs. To some extent ADHD was observable, not 
through rolling eyes as Rory suggested, but as Professor Taylor recognised and interpreted, more 
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through a loss of attention and certain speech mannerisms.  In a voice-over conclusion to the 
programme, Rory Bremner returned to considering how ADHD affected his life: 
Rory Bremner: “I quite like the fact that I am a bit scatty sometimes, I quite like being me, but 
there are times when I hate being me. What is interesting is that when I started out doing this, 
it was because I knew from the experience of other members of my family, the kind of effect 
that ADHD can have. And I felt there must be thousands of families who really struggle when 
they have people in their extended families who have this disorder. And the rest of the world 
is saying, “oh well it's bad behaviour and it's bad parenting or whatever”, and it isn't. It's taken 
me five decades to get recognition that I may have a medical condition.” 
The radio programme became very popular on ADHD and neurodiversity websites and blogs and 
captured the central role that recognition played in the lives of the people I met. In the conversations I 
participated in and witnessed, it was this term, recognition, that was used to describe the process 
people went through, in relation to themselves and to others when grappling with their experience of 
ADHD. Chapter Six asked what role kinship might play in the diagnostic process by focusing on 
familial relations, and it showed that recognition was one element of kinship in the way that relations 
require an acknowledgement of the other, recognising the connections, be they biological, moral or 
otherwise. Kinship bonds outside the filial connections were hinted at in the clinical assessments I 
described earlier, and this chapter will examine how, in the process of identifying ADHD, the people I 
met described their relationship with strangers in kinship terms. Here, I am concerned with relations 
that people forged outside their immediate families, not in the realm of reproduction, but in the world 
of work or other institutions and, more specifically, in the support groups I attended. Recognition in 
this context acquired a political connotation that involved mutual acknowledgement between 
members as well as assertions of rights in the context of a contested disorder. The links between 
recognition and identity politics have been masterfully critiqued (Taylor, 1994 amongst others) but 
my interest, guided by my participants’ discussion of these issues, is in the movement from 
‘recognition’ to ‘being recognised’. In my understanding, notions of identity and associated politics 
emphasise the activism of groups and social movements, whereas the term ‘recognition’ allows for a 
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more subtle examination of individuals’ and groups’ relations with the world. The need for ADHD to 
be recognised – or not – was part of the debates, arguments and controversies that circulated in the 
media and academia at the time of my research. Rory Bremner echoed many of the people I met as he 
explained that he had waited five decades to have his problems accepted and to be offered treatment; 
his radio contribution to the topic can be understood as a kind of activism towards the recognition of 
ADHD.   
In this chapter I want to examine how support group members relate to two dominant perspectives of 
ADHD that influence its overall conception. On the one hand there is the critique of medicalisation 
which denounces the over-involvement of medicine in everyday life. In this version of ADHD, adults, 
parents and children with symptoms of inattention or hyperactivity are experiencing ‘problems that 
used to be an expected and tolerated part of life [and] are now diagnosed and treated as mental 
disorder’ (Frances, 2013: 82). In other words, these are not real symptoms and ADHD has only 
recently been invented. In this way, theories of medicalisation run the risk of claiming one single 
reality for ADHD and thereby leading to the experiences of many people being ignored.  
On the other hand, a movement has developed in the last two decades that has promoted the idea of 
‘special differences’ and reimagined the political recognition in health, and autism in particular in 
terms of the acceptance of difference and of diversity, that is, neurodiversity (Ginsburg and Rapp, 
2013; Panitch, 2008; Silverman, 2011; Solomon, 2010).  In this version, ADHD is not considered a 
disorder but an alternative way of experiencing the world within ‘the limitless potential and 
neurodiversity of the human mind’ (Solomon, 2010: 241).  
I found that in the support groups neither discourse was totally accepted or rejected and that people 
did not entirely identify with either perspective, yet they drew on elements of both in their 
discussions. For example support groups showed ambivalence toward pharmaceutical treatments and 
their side effects but members explained that, accompanied with other support, medication may be 
necessary to bring change in one’s life. Similarly, some people described to me how the concept of 
‘neurodiversity’ helped in emphasising the creative and positive aspects of living with ADHD, 
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sometimes described as a gift, but they were also aware that such a description can obscure and 
undermine the difficulties they experience.   
Following a fuller description the remainder of this chapter will explore how people’s understandings 
are shaped by these perspectives but that when used on their own, neither the medicalisation critique 
nor the concept of ‘neurodiversity’ succeed in fully capturing the experiences that people described. 
In particular, I will suggest that the use of the term ‘neurodiversity’ could be seen as an attempt by 
patients and group members to reclaim their experience and distance it from some of the more 
reductive representations of neuroscience, popular and medical critiques of ADHD.  I look at how this 
re-appropriation is played out within the groups through recounting the stories that individuals offered 
of the successes they had achieved because of ADHD rather than despite it.  Thus, I enquire into the 
kind of bonds that are formed on the basis of sharing a particular way of evolving within the world, 
such as being forgetful and disorganised, and I ask, in the context of adult ADHD support groups in 
the UK, if neurodiversity can represent a form of extended kinship. I explore how sometimes the 
empowering force of the word ‘neurodiversity’ might be found in the notion of gift that is associated 
with it and I suggest that success, achievement and productivity may be neurodiveristy’s counter-gift.  
As many people told me, the gift of neurodiversity was perceived with ambivalence because of the 
obligation and the exhausting work required for transforming their idiosyncrasies into positive 
actions.    
I found that the language of neurodiversity was often substituted with that of kinship. For example, 
notions of family, belonging, reciprocity and inclusivity as well as terms used in groups such as, 
caring, sharing, we, us, brought an emphasis on the grouping of people together, on their actions 
together, rather than on their neurone activities. I conclude this chapter by suggesting that as the 
notions of being ‘wired in an atypical way’ (Ortega, 2009: 427), of ‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009) and of 
‘being neurodiverse’ were tweaked and adapted within the support groups and at times individualistic 
concerns were augmented, extended and enacted in caring relationships which resembled kinship 
bonds. My account does not seek to romanticise the relations formed in the support groups,  and just 
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as in filial kinship relations, the web of obligations thus created in the groups (Stack, 1975) is as much 
about inclusion and exclusion, as one group member’s experience showed.   
Although Rory Bremner felt able to tell the world that his public success was related to ADHD, many 
support group members felt unable to take that step, feeling too vulnerable to do so.  In other words 
the stigma associated with ADHD felt too powerful for individuals to ‘come out’ and risk being 
denied recognition. Not being recognised as suffering from a genuine disorder is still a very common 
experience discussed in the support groups and I want to turn to this topic now. As Dumit (2006) 
described so accurately, recognition by institutions and their gatekeepers is required if one wants 
access to treatment and, when it is denied, it is more than resources that are refused. To deny 
recognition is to question the validity of the suffering itself, with the implication that the person is 
faking an illness or even malingering.  At least this is how some of the support group members 
described how they felt when they were faced with the situation. For most, the first port of call in the 
UK in seeking recognition is their GP and, as ADHD is considered a medical condition, only a 
medical doctor’s diagnosis can lead to the prescription of treatments (UKAAN, 2014), or to the 
release of higher education resources (SASC, 2013)
95
. There is evidence that a negative encounter 
with a GP regarding adult ADHD is a common experience (Ginsberg et al., 2014; Matheson et al., 
2013). In the support groups, GPs were described as being unaware that the formal medical diagnosis 
had been extended to adults, and that they needed to be educated by their own patients. At other times, 
people described their GPs as ‘sceptical’, saying that ADHD was ‘an American disease’ or that the 
individual was far too successful professionally to consider that there might be anything out of the 
ordinary. Voices contesting the validity of the diagnosis of adult ADHD and portraying it as a merely 
social construction are common in the UK media and, like the rest of us, GPs do not work in a 
vacuum. As Rafalovich showed,  the general scepticism towards and controversies that surround 
ADHD influence the way practitioners approach an unfamiliar diagnosis (2005). I found a similar 
sceptical approach amongst some of the clinicians attending the training course I described in Chapter 
Two; they suggested that ADHD was not seen as a sound medical classification. Such distrust is 
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partly due to the effect of the broader discourse exposing ADHD in terms of the medicalisation of 
everyday life, the side effects of medicalisation as it were, which in turn made it more or less likely 
for the support group members I met to be given the recognition they sought. 
 
The side effects of medicalisation 
 
Ivan Illich (1977) is often given credit for coining the term ‘medicalisation’ in the 1970s, but there 
were others, such as Zola (1972) and Szasz (1972) who also exposed the intrusive power of medical 
encroachment  into everyday life. More recently, authors such as Conrad ( 1992; 2007; 2000) and 
Moynihan (2002; 2012) have added  to this critique such concepts as disease-mongering  and they 
have identified the role of marketisation and commercialisation as engines of medicalisation. At face 
value, the term ‘medicalisation’ expresses the process of turning a problem into a medical concern, 
and arguably, visiting one’s GP rather than, for example, a priest in order to have a health problem 
identified, diagnosed and treated is exactly that. But the 1970s zeitgeist of critiquing authority within 
which the term appeared explains why, from the start, the term was used as a social critique of and a 
resistance to the medical establishment. Medicalisation in this sense is to be understood as if in 
between speech marks, suggesting that something else lies behind this word, and that using it would 
reveal something hidden. The historical context of the term’s emergence is also the reason for its 
limitations, as many things have changed since the 1970s – medicine for one thing and patients for 
another. The premise that patients are passive subjects onto whom medical treatments are imposed is 
arguably redundant, as patient’s engagement in healthcare bears no resemblance to what it was 40 
years ago. As Rose explains:  
‘Medicalisation implies passivity on the part of the medicalised. One example is when people 
claim that disease-awareness campaigns persuade potential customers to “recode” their 
unease and dissatisfaction in the form of a diagnostic category to extend the market for 
pharmaceutical products and the remit of medical practitioners. With notable exceptions 
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(children, prisoners, people deemed mentally ill and admitted to hospital under compulsion), 
doctors do not force diagnostic labels on resistant individuals.’ (2007: 702). 
As I have described throughout the previous chapters, support group members are anything but 
passive in the way they relate not only to each other, but also to their doctors, health commissioners or 
other health officials. Similarly the clinicians I met in the clinic did not harbour any plans to recruit 
patients against their will. The same could be said of the pharmaceutical company representatives who 
I met in conferences. Yet medicalisation, in the form of denouncing the role of the medical and 
pharmaceutical establishment in imposing their will on the rest of us, is now part of everyday 
language and, as I have suggested, it affects the lives of people directly when recognition is denied
96
.  
Furthermore, by locating the responsibility for these seemingly oppressive actions on the medical and 
pharmaceutical establishment, the term medicalisation obfuscates the role that we all play in engaging 
with this process. The term becomes a slogan, a rallying cry to denounce the wrong doing of a 
particular kind of people. As Stengers suggested in the context of disease-mongering (Nathan and 
Stengers, 2004) and capitalism (Pignarre and Stengers, 2005), denouncing is not only ineffective, but 
counter-productive. It is not effective in the sense that, if denouncing the harmful role of Big Pharma 
or the medical establishment were to make a difference, it would have done so by now, after decades 
of accusations. It is also counter-productive to blame medicalisation for the over involvement of 
medicine in our lives because ‘it can give the impression that there is a [big capitalist] machinery, 
constituted once and for all and that over-determines everything’ (2005:42 my translation). If the 
process of medicalisation is so easily defined and precisely located in the medical and pharmaceutical 
establishments, then it suggests that it could easily be undone and reversed. Consequently we are 
moved further from examining the details, variations and different ways that we implicate medicine in 
our lives. Stengers also points out how the process of denouncing disease-mongering also denounces 
the activity of groups of people actively working to increase resources, or to introduce new treatments 
for contested illnesses: 
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 In defence of the medicalisation critique of the 1960s and 1970s, it would have been difficult to anticipate that 
patients would turn themselves into expert consumers in the following decades and assert choices and claims.  
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‘Thus, the claims of these lobbies can be described as destabilising the landscape of health 
provision, their passionate interest can be perceived as a problem. In brief, the fact that 
incompetent individuals are mobilised and meddle in what does not concern them, can be 
denounced. And the outcome may well be that the definition of the illness must rest solely in 
the hand of the clinicians’ (2012: 191 my translation). 
Denouncing the role of Big Pharma and the medical establishment also has the consequence of posing 
questions about the motivation of individuals and activists in seeking recognition. Their interest and 
their role in participating in ‘informal alliances’ becomes suspect; (see amongst others Moynihan and 
Henry, 2006). This is what I have called the side effect of medicalisation: a health warning that 
medicine may not be good for individuals that has, in itself, an unexpected and harmful effect as 
people are not able to get recognition of their suffering
97
.   
Instead of looking at this unidirectional process, flowing from powerful institutions towards passive 
patients, both Stengers and Rose encourage us to examine the entangled relations involved in our 
engagement with medicine, and to accept our own involvement in seeking treatment and medical 
explanation, as ‘[medicalisation] has made us what we are’ (Rose, 2007: 700). Rose summarises this 
in the following way and his example of depression can easily be substituted by the experience of my 
participants:  
‘It is this process of mutual construction, the intertwining of products, expectations, ethics 
and forms of life, that we observe in the development and spread of psychiatric drugs such as 
those for depression. This process is not a brute attempt to impose a way of recoding miseries, 
but the creation of delicate affiliations between subjective hopes and dissatisfactions and the 
alleged capacities of the drug. In engaging with these formulae in inventive ways, individuals 
play their own part in the spread of the diagnosis of depression and shaping new conceptions 
of the self’ (Ibid.:702). 
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 None of the support groups I attended had any direct connections with pharmaceutical companies, financial or 
otherwise; two of the groups received funding from their local council and raised funds through charity work. 
The patient organisation AADD-UK had no connections with pharmaceutical companies and no regular funding 
of any kind that I was made aware of. ADDISS received grants from the Department of Health and educational 
grants from pharmaceutical companies towards organising their national conferences.  
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Medical and health advancement are naturally attractive to us; why wouldn’t we hope for less 
suffering or an improved sense of well-being?  Of course these advances and improvements are put 
forward, advertised and recommended, but not only by drug companies or doctors. We all contribute 
in this process, discussing and sharing our health concerns and advice with our families and 
colleagues, attempting to discern the benefits and disadvantages of particular treatments. Mostly, we 
engage in a process of ‘self-diagnosing’, trying to make sense of the pain and discomfort, or to 
paraphrase a well-known quote from René Leriche, attempting to decipher the noise of our organs that 
threatens our health
98
. Canguilhem used this quote and the work of Leriche in his study of the normal 
and the pathological in order to put forward the notion that ‘health’ is something that concerns the 
patient and that illness is the concern of doctors. Canguilhem states:  
‘Thus it is first and foremost because men feel sick that a medicine exists. It is only secondarily that 
men know, because medicine exists, in what way they are sick.’ (1991: 229). 
The point made here is that it is only through the relations with a patient that a clinician can consider 
something pathological; ‘the pathologist's intention is not that his object be a matter without 
subjectivity’ (ibid.: 229). 
In his further reflections on the topic of the normal and the pathological twenty years later, 
Canguilhem extended the proposition that sickness starts with the patient, by examining how in 
health, we are made aware of norms through their opposites: ‘Norms are recognized as such only 
when they are broken’ (1991: 209). It is only when our health is threatened that we understand what it 
was, hence ‘it is not paradoxical to say that the abnormal, while logically second, is existentially first’ 
(1991: 243).  Canguilhem’s rich and dense text has much to offer for a conception of health as a 
dynamic process, when ‘to be in good health means being able to fall sick and recover, it is a 
biological luxury.’ (1991: 198). I will return to this aspect of his thinking, defining health as the 
ability to adapt and create new forms of life further on in the chapter, but for now Canguilhem can 
help us understand how noting the deviance in our state of health is also part of our recovery.  
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 ‘La santé, c’est la vie dans le silence des organes’. (Leriche, 1936: 6) 
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In her research on self-medication, Fainzang (2013) asks the pertinent question: when an individual 
self-medicates, who does the medicalisation? She notes that medicalisation is mostly described as an 
‘act of intrusion into the lives of individuals’, that is doctors impose their solutions and remedies onto 
people's problems. She argues that this concept of medicalisation is limited because people engage in 
treating their ailments and problems with pharmaceutical medicine without being directed by a doctor. 
At some point the individual notices a problem, ‘a bodily sign [that] is converted into a symptom, 
whereas the symptom is in turn converted into a sign of a pathological state, leading to the need to 
medicalise the problem’ (ibid.: 495). The transformation from symptom to pathological sign is not 
made by individuals working in isolation from other influences, and some inputs may be more 
invasive than others
99
. But it is still normally through an initial recognition and identification of a sign 
that something is not right that an individual reconceptualises the problem as a symptom. It may be 
because of its duration or its persistence, or it may be because of it acuteness, but the symptom is then 
deemed to be pathological and requires acting upon. Fainzang suggests that the norms that control 
what is pathological are not confined to the medical establishment, as Canguilhem suggested, but that 
individuals set their own norms that may be ‘juxtaposed with - or possibly superimposed on- those 
established by biomedical discourse...’ (ibid.: 495). In other words, choosing to access medication, 
with or without consulting a doctor, requires first conceptualising the problem as requiring medical 
intervention, that is self-medicalisation.
100
   
In this way we could say that medicalisation, taken at face value as the process of involving medicine 
in our daily lives, is and has always been attractive to us as it offers help towards recovery. Our 
present situation in the 21
st
 century, with the proliferation of interventions, pharmaceutical and 
otherwise, may have given a darker shade to this lure and ‘medicalisation’ as a social critique has set 
about warning us of the risks. But one cannot be without the other. That is the paradox of 
medicalisation in that it provides undeniable benefits whilst at the same time changing us in the 
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 ‘Direct to Consumer’ advertising of medication in the USA comes to mind. See Dumit (2012) and Singer and 
Baer (2008) among others.  
100
 Fainzang concludes that ‘self-medication is the acting out of self-medicalisation’ (ibid.: 500).  We could also 
talk of a de-medicalisation process in which patients interrupt or stop their treatment as some support group 
members did, as I show in Chapter Eight.  
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process, taking us into a perilous unknown. It is both creative and controlling, limiting access to 
alternatives and creating new forms of life. Crucially this process is undertaken in relation to others, 
in a network of relations, between doctors and patients, pharmaceutical representatives and scientists, 
between individuals in the support groups.  Contrary to the argument that medicalisation contributes 
to ‘the individualisation of social problems’ (Conrad and Schneider, 1992: 250), medicalisation can be 
understood as a collective process which is both reliant and dependant on relations. Without the 
encounters and exchanges between all the actors involved in this process, including virtual encounters 
through internet forums, medicine would not exert the influence that it does on individuals seeking 
relief.  The situations I came across in the clinic and the support group suggested that ADHD is made 
across both sets of sites by medical and lay experts and that they are equally conflicted about 
involving medicine in the details of people’s lives. I have found clinicians, like Dr Goodman or 
Warren, to be cautious in the use of labels and aware of the potential negative effect of diagnosing. 
Similarly, I met members of support groups, like Maria, who was hoping to be diagnosed yet did not 
want pharmaceutical treatments. Without denying the positions of power that continue to be 
contested, I am suggesting that the polarisation that may be found theoretically between anti- and pro-
medicalisation was not so evident in the practices found in the clinic and support groups.
101
 I want to 
turn next to a recent concept, neurodiversity, which represents an unexpected move in involving 
medicine in everyday life, in that it suggests biological and neurological conditions that are identified 
by medicine yet for which no cures are sought; in other words medicine is called upon to detect and 
initiate a process of social acknowledgement and, ultimately, of empowerment.  
 
‘Diversity is not disease; the anomalous is not the pathological.’ 
(Canguilhem, 1991: 137) 
Neurodiversity is a concept developed in the late 1990s by  advocates and self-advocacy groups who 
have reconsidered disabilities such as dyslexia, ADHD and autism figuring them as acceptable and 
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   The methodological decision to work across clinical and support groups has influenced my approach to 
these two perspectives. By holding together sites that are often kept apart, similarities became apparent that 
would otherwise have remained invisible.  
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seeing them as ‘alternative forms of natural human difference’ (Armstrong, 2011:8). Spearheaded by 
activists with autistic spectrum disorder (Singer, 1999)
102
, the term rapidly grew to encompass a range 
of neurological conditions such as Asperger’s syndrome, ADHD, Dyslexia , Dyspraxia and Tourette’s 
syndrome. As with other sciences, neuroscientific concepts have influenced the way notions of 
selfhood are imagined and they have foregrounded how biological and natural metaphors may be 
applied to the workings of the brain (O’Connor and Joffe, 2013; Vidal, 2009; Weisberg et al., 2008). 
Thus, the brain is compared to an ecosystem that adapts and changes like a ‘unique rainforest, 
teeming with growth, decay, competition, diversity and selection’ (Edelman 1992, quoted in 
Armstrong 2011:10). Following Carrithers (2005), we can consider how the word ‘neurodiversity’ 
may be used by activists for its rhetorical force as it contains implicit references to both scientific and 
cultural concepts. Through its wide circulation in the media, films and academia, the term 
‘neurodiversity’ spreads a message of change, of departure from concepts of disability towards ideas 
of creativity. It is used by activists, in the broad sense of the word, to advance the idea that a new era 
has come, in which brain sciences can lead to a more tolerant and accepting society.  The circulation 
of the word also suggests its participation in making and forging communities based on the principle 
of sharing the same neurological make up, of being the same in being different (Bagatell, 2010). Thus 
the rhetorical work of the term ‘neurodiversity’ combines a message for tolerance based on science 
and the possibility for kinship bonds which are based on being different.  
The emphasis in the neurodiversity literature is laid on the positive elements that diversity and 
plasticity bring to the lives of people with the conditions listed above. Just as in the rain forest, 
diversity is an asset; it nurtures possibilities, variations and different versions of entities that enrich 
the whole system.  Neurodiverse activists also suggest that in order to turn this internal diversity into 
an advantage, the surrounding environment must be adapted and moulded, something described as 
‘niche construction’, a notion borrowed from biology to describe the work of an organism in adapting 
its environment to its needs. The suggestion that adaptation is taking place within an active and 
changing milieu, not in relation to ‘a static, fixed or normal environment’ (Armstrong 2011:17) 
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 For further details on the history of the neurodiversity movement see Baker, 2011; Cascio, 2012; Orsini, 
2012; Ortega, 2009; Silverman, 2011; Solomon, 2010. 
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echoes Canguilhem’s definition of health as dynamic, which I referred to earlier. The interaction and 
interdependence between organism and environment was, in his view, crucial because life is not only 
changed by its milieu but makes it its own environment too, what he called ‘biological normativity’ 
(1991:228). ‘[T]he organism is not thrown into an environment to which he submits, but he structures 
his environment at the same time that he develops his capacities as an organism’ (1991:284). In other 
words, norms are not fixed but are fluid and changing, and normativity becomes an activity, not a 
state (Rabinow in Canguilhem 2000). Such a concept speaks directly to the concerns of the people I 
met in the support groups as they described to me their constant activity in relation to norms, 
including social norms, that they experience as restrictive throughout their lifecourse. The norms 
around them change and as I will describe, if they can adapt to this fluid environment and adapt those 
norms according to their own ways of being in the world, then despite being ‘untypically wired’, they 
can live not only ‘normal’ lives, but successful ones too.  
A psychiatrist specialising in ADHD in a private clinic told me of two of his patients, both well-
known comedians, who were taking stimulant medication to relieve some of their symptoms some of 
the time. One was taking stimulant medication during the day so that he could focus effectively on his 
chores, administrative tasks and even his writing but, he would never take medication prior to 
performing as he explained that he wanted the benefits of his excitability. The other man did the 
reverse and always medicated prior to going on stage in order to help him deal with the nervousness, 
anxiety and over-excitement of performing.  There are more examples in the public domain, of 
athletes in particular who, whilst not apparently taking stimulants as these are banned for use during 
competitions, also find ways to make their excess energy an advantage
103
. I would suggest that this is 
a kind of re-appropriation of ADHD whereby what has been described in medical and moral contexts 
as a deficit, a lack or an excess, is reclaimed as a different way of being that can be positive, given the 
right environment and nurturing. As I mentioned, the language of neurodiversity calls upon the notion 
of niche construction and, as well as ecology, self-help literature makes numerous references to 
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Ashley Mckenzie, Bronze Olympic Medallist, appeared at the  ADDISS conference 2013 and UKAAN 
conference 2014 to share his experience of living with hyperactivity and taking alternative treatments to 
stimulants.  
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business endeavours. The character of the entrepreneur is often used as an exemplar for the art of 
turning a deficit into a productive result (Hartmann, 2002; Martin, 2000). 
 I came across the model of the entrepreneur in some groups more than others, and saw how it 
sometimes created tension between group members. On one occasion, in April 2013, a professionally 
successful individual identifying himself as having ADHD presented a suggestion to set up a 
crowdfunding venture. He described the project as social innovation which was intended to “make 
people with ADHD the drivers, not the passengers, in their lives”. The aim was to raise money to fund 
a research project and services that ranged from a directory of private ADHD specialists (‘Docfinder’, 
that would  “beat the long waiting time in the NHS”), to a mentoring project for offenders within 
prisons. As the presentation went on, the energy of the presenter was visible and it was clear that the 
project was ambitious. The reaction of the group was mixed and, whilst some were clearly impressed 
and wanted to be involved, others were questioning the presenter’s financial motivations. Terms such 
as investment, shares and funds were not well received by some of the members, and a tense 
discussion ensued as to the value of support, and how people should help one another.  On another 
occasion, I had a conversation with the presenter of the project and, with the same energy and 
excitement, he started telling me how his social enterprise and crowdfunding project had been 
inspired by a Danish individual.  When his son was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD), Thorkil Sonne started a charity organisation, Specialistern, in order to provide work suited to 
adults with ASD by utilising their skills. As Mr Sonne was an IT manager, the work on offer was IT 
related ‘with technically oriented tasks and jobs, such as data management, software testing and 
quality control’ (for more details see Wareham and Sonne, 2008). As my interlocutor saw it, 
individuals with ADHD have an even wider range of skills to offer: He said, “knowledge is not the 
problem with ADHD, it is turning it into action that is difficult. It is also unfortunate that most ADHD 
people don’t get on with each other, as you saw when I did my presentation.”  Whilst I agreed with 
him that the group was heterogeneous in its membership, it was not clear to me that the disagreement 
I witnessed was related to ADHD characteristics. Instead it seemed that, amongst group members, 
conceptions of self-help and enterprise differed. 
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What I observed in the support groups, in the main, was another kind of re-appropriation, not one 
based on turning deficit into capital, including social capital, but something that was less visible, less 
assertive and, most of all, coloured with ambivalence. The literature and websites discussing 
neurodiversity use powerful language to emphasise a hidden potential in ADHD that can be turned 
into success: ‘unlocking the power of ADHD’, ‘celebrating the opportunities’, ‘tapping the inner 
muse’, ‘ I will be the best me I can be’, ‘succeeding with ADHD’ 104. As many of these authors 
explain, there is a great deal written about ADHD and other neurological disorders that lists the 
problems, the difficulties and impairments. It is therefore important, they argue, to provide another 
vision of and perspective on ADHD. Neurodiversity, when presented in this way, is directly 
influenced by neuroscientific concepts and language; descriptions of natural variations in the 
neurological make-up of humans are discussed as though these have a direct relation to the special 
abilities experienced by individuals. Whilst the material quoted above is all written in the self-help 
style, that is, providing explanations, guidance and tips for readers to make changes to their lives, the 
articles are written by individuals who identify themselves as neurodiverse, and these writers often 
provide an abridged version of their own stories. As Hacking (2009) suggests when discussing autistic 
autobiographies, the stories told in this way have less to do with describing the life of people with 
ADHD than they have to do with creating a new language, albeit an ordinary one, to enable the rest of 
us, neurotypicals, to grasp the experiences of the neurodiverse. The distinction is important for 
neurological conditions, Hacking continues, because if we read these texts as straightforward 
descriptions of a way of being, then many other autistic or ADHD individuals with either less or more 
severe impairments will not recognise themselves in them. The concept of a spectrum for autism is 
also valid for ADHD and is accepted, in that some individuals will experience some but not all of the 
ADHD symptoms and to varying degrees of severity
105
. But in contrast to the autobiographies 
Hacking is discussing, the language used in the narratives of adult ADHD self-help literature stems 
from neuroscientific discourse and hardly qualifies as ordinary language. This is quite an important 
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 (Kelly, Ramundo, and Ledingham, 1997; Levrini and Prevatt, 2012; Potgieter, 2014; Roberts, 2012; Weiss, 
1997). 
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 ADHD is described in the scientific literature as ‘the extreme and impairing tail of continuous traits of 
inattentive and hyperactive-impulsive symptoms and behaviours’(UKAAN, 2013). Thus individuals may have 
more or less of the symptoms and be more or less impaired than others.  
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distinction. If we take Hacking’s main point, that a language is being created to describe the 
experience of being neurodiverse which in turn affects the way neurodiverse individuals live, the now 
well-known looping effect, then how is this played out within the adult ADHD support groups I 
attended?  
 
The gift of neurodiversity 
 
In one of the support groups I attended, a young man in his late twenties had a motto of his own to 
describe his relation to ADHD. He called it ‘the 3D rule: not a Disorder, not a Disability, just 
Different.’  He used it regularly in the course of the group sessions and just like a slogan in a rally, it 
had a political ring to it, saying what ADHD wasn’t and what it was. Yet in conversation with him, I 
was surprised to find out that he was not so familiar with the neurodiversity movement. Instead he 
explained that the 3D rule was something he had heard somewhere and he liked the fact that he was 
different from other people and thought he should not be stigmatised for it. In this conversation, he 
referred to the group of people around him as untypical, and as I asked him if he meant neurotypical 
or neurodiverse, he looked bemused for a moment and told me they were just different to other 
people. The more I attended support group sessions the more obvious it became that members did not 
often use the term neurodiversity or its derivatives. At most it was used to describe the difference 
between a variation, a divergence from the norms, and it allowed for discussions of normality and 
abnormality yet without using such loaded terms, something quite important if one finds oneself 
described ‘abnormal’. But as this person put it, being different did not necessarily have to be 
associated with the brain; being untypical can replace being neurodiverse and still denote a 
commonality with others. I found that the word neurodiverse was used not for representing a different 
neurological make up, or to explain particular behaviours, but to describe a group of people who felt 
similar to each other, yet who were, as a group different, in contrast to others. Furthermore, when in 
the support groups ADHD was defined by the benefits it can provide, it was usually with ambivalence 
just as when Rory Bremner described his brain simultaneously as a curse and a gift. I introduced Ray 
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in an earlier section of this thesis, when he described how being outside of the norm, which he called 
his ‘bounciness’, helped him to be where he was. When I asked him if there were positive aspects of 
having ADHD, he responded:  
Ray: “I retired at the age of 36, I am a millionaire, I was a millionaire at 30, I reached a stage 
where I was increasingly unhappy doing my job. I was at the point of burn out, which is 
something ADHD people do anyway, but I stopped working two years ago, yeah I don't need 
to work,  but actually I reached the point where work is important, for the purpose it gives, I 
am a lot more ADD when I am not working.  I put down my success in business… I don't 
consider money as a major success and people are very funny about money success ....., but I 
would not have been in my [financial] situation if I had not been able to tune in when I find 
something interesting and focus. Is it a pathology?” 
Claude: “What do you mean?” 
Ray: “So would you define somebody in my situation as having ADHD, when it can be 
argued that I am who I am, I am where I am and I have achieved what I have achieved largely 
due to the characteristics that are on that DSM list. And if they are not having a negative 
effect, then is it a disorder at all? You know what I mean?”  
The reason why Ray had been successful, he told me, is linked to his ability to hyperfocus and to have 
extra energy, that is hyperactivity. Yet it is also why he is not sure that this can be a disorder if he is 
not suffering any negative effects. In a roundabout way, Ray echoes the neurodiversity literature I 
referred to earlier, as unleashing his potential and constructing the right niche and environment to suit 
his way of being. Yet in the many hours that we talked, he never used the term ‘neurodiversity’, even 
though I am sure he was aware of it. Nevertheless, it seemed that Ray had doubts that ADHD as a 
diagnosis was helpful; similarly he was not sure that its symptoms could be useful. His ambivalence 
towards the psychiatric term and its negative depiction extended to the overtly optimistic vision of 
neurodiversity.  As I asked him if he had experienced ADHD symptoms in his childhood he 
responded:  
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“As a child in school I was very disruptive and I was diagnosed as gifted, my IQ was around 
150-160. My hyperactivity was attributed to being bored, so I had to get up and do something, 
entertain myself and get into trouble. But it’s not really much of a gift.  It’s a gift I would 
happily leave under somebody else’s Christmas tree. What gets me, is when I come to the 
group and see some very dysfunctional people, and I can see some of them in me, and the 
characteristics that were helpful to me are eating these people apart.”  
Ray concluded his interview with me by expressing his ambivalence in the following terms:  
“If you take anything from this, is that I am still dazed and confused, about the diagnosis, the 
identity, the tribalism and more or less what constitutes a disorder, because at a lot of levels 
ADHD is associated with success, but success which is a small margin away from failure.” 
Sonia
106
,who attended a different support group, also talked to me about her mixed feelings towards 
the creativity and gifts that are associated with ADHD through the discourse of neurodiversity. She 
was a professional performing artist, successful in that she had built a career, making recordings and 
going on tour, even though, as she explained, she felt she should be doing better. When I met her she 
had recently started attending the support group, and during the year of my fieldwork she attended all 
the sessions without fail, becoming an active member of the group. In an interview we discussed how 
she had been diagnosed a few years earlier when already in her early forties and how prescribed 
medication had helped her with the chaos and disorganisation in her life. When I asked her if she felt 
that ADHD had anything positive to offer in her life, she responded at length:  
Sonia: “I probably would get rid of it [ADHD] if I could, because it causes more problems 
than it causes goodness. My theory about all that, is that, errrrm, you know, necessity being 
the mother of all invention. The quality of the problem that we carry with us means that we 
get inventive, we develop. I don't think ADHD automatically brings along extra creativity or 
that kind of thing. We need those resources of improvisation.  This was true when I was quite 
young, if I left my homework too late, then I had to think of a way, and I got quite clever at 
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 I met Sonia on ten occasions in support group sessions and in an interview lasting approximately one and a 
half hour. We also met on two occasions during patient organisation conferences.  
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doing that, because I had to. So we put ourselves in a position where we learn skills and tricks 
because we leave ourselves in the position where that is all we've got. Maybe the fact that we 
are distracted means that we do make connections that other people may not make, but I don’t 
think that we are superwired for that. So maybe that would be something I would miss, but 
frankly I don’t think I would.” 
 
Claude: “You are working in a creative industry, but you don't think of ADHD in terms of 
creativity?” 
 
Sonia: “No, I mean, I remember reading about all that before [I was diagnosed], and I 
wondered if I would want to stay un-medicated while performing. But that went out of the 
window, because with the medication I could be more focused and more in the role. So it 
helps me be less distracted, as long as I am not over medicated. Because without meds it is 
too scatty so even brainstorming is no good, because what’s the point of having good ideas if 
I can’t hold on to them long enough to use them. No I think this creative special thing, is 
over-inflated a lot. There is nothing wrong in highlighting that, you know, I like my 
personality, ADHD and all, but I want bigger things. I want to make things, may it be music 
or changes, but I feel trapped on a kind of treadmill of effort that does not get me anywhere.” 
 
As with Rory Bremner, Ray and others, Sonia felt that if there were positive aspects in having ADHD, 
such as the unusual connections and the inventiveness, these were marred by the toil and hard work 
required to deal with her other experiences of ADHD.  If ADHD was a gift, then for Sonia and Ray, 
its cost was too high and what came in exchange turned it into something they did not want.  
In asking what kind of a gift this might be, I make reference to Marcel Mauss and his seminal work, 
Essai sur le don  (1923) which explored the many facets  of social practices associated with the 
exchange of gifts; his worked showed that a gift is accompanied with an obligation to reciprocate. In 
the first instance Mauss tells us in his examination of Germanic law that, through particular 
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contractual practices associated with gages and guarantees, the word ‘gift’ in German acquired the 
double meaning of gift and poison, denoting that there is an intrinsic danger in the thing given. In 
Ray’s case, being a child with a gift was experienced as toxic. As another member described it, 
ADHD was ‘polluting him’, it had harmful effects, such as the inability to keep still and focus, that 
got him into trouble and turned the gift into something he did not want. Seen through this lens, 
neurodiversity is both a curse and a gift.   
I want to briefly explore what kind of gift neurodiversity might be and how the gift might be 
contained in the word itself.  As I described above, ‘neurodiversity’ is a concept that has been 
circulating widely in the western world and it has accumulated connections with different 
communities such as autism, ADHD, Dyslexia, Asperger’s and more.  I have suggested that one of the 
rhetorical forces of the term is the portrayal of creativity and adaptability and these attributes are often 
coupled with the word gift, as in ‘the gift of neurodiversity’. Can the circulation of words have the 
same characteristics as the exchange system of goods described by Mauss and others?  Might we see 
in the rhetorical force of ‘neurodiversity’ an equivalence with the life force (la force des choses) that 
Mauss described in the Hau of the Maori (2012)?  Just as goods gain value with every exchange, 
‘neurodiversity’ circulates and confers an increased sense of empowerment for those that use it to 
describe themselves, offering self-worth where previously there was deficit.  Following Mauss’ 
proposition that the gift consists of ‘three obligations:  giving, receiving, repaying.’(ibid.: 142) in 
order to close the circle of exchange, one has to ask – what may be given in return for the concept of 
neurodiversity?  One possible answer, can be found in the descriptions contained in the self-help 
literature mentioned above, where achievement, success and performance become the counter-gifts 
for the rhetorical force of ‘neurodiversity’.  Thus one is obligated to make the most of the gifts given, 
“to be drivers, not passengers”. And just as the denial of reciprocity in the exchange of goods, 
described by Mauss, brings dishonour and loss of face (ibid.: 151), the failure to construct an 
ecological niche where hyperactivity or distractibility are turned into assets and skills brings shame 
and stigma.  
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Situating responsibility onto individuals for their successes and failures within the context of societal 
productivity is a feature of neoliberal ideology which the combination of the terms ‘neurodiversity’ 
and ‘gift’ seems to endorse. The assertion made by ‘neurodiversity‘ for tolerance and acceptance of 
different ways of being also promotes self-improvement and progress  as part of the neoliberal vision 
of  rational, self-reliant and productive citizens. The limits of the ‘politics of neurodiversity’ have 
been critiqued by Runswick-Cole who showed how ‘neoliberalism tolerates those who can mimic the 
neoliberal ideal type’ ( 2014: 1126). She has also suggested that the limits are intrinsic to identity 
politics’ reliance on making categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The discourse of neurodiversity associated 
with success and gifts that I have discussed provides a means to promote self-worth and creativity 
where there was deficit and disability, yet it does so at the risk of excluding those who may not be 
able to sustain employment or relationships, something that may explain the low uptake of the term in 
the groups I attended. I want to juxtapose the circulation of abstract concepts, as described above, 
with a return to the local groups I attended and to examine how ‘neurodiversity’ featured there. I have 
already suggested that the term was used loosely, if at all, and often with ambivalence, yet it seemed 
nevertheless to play a role in people’s ability to create bonds with each other, and this last point is the 
one that I want to explore next; how is ‘neurodiversity’ enacted in the support groups?  
 
Autism is the second cousin of ADHD 
 
I have described the social events and activities (in Chapter Four) and the archival work support group 
members pursued to define what ADHD meant to them (in Chapter Three), which contributed to the 
formation of relationships and bonds between members of the group. In Chapter Eight I will expand 
on the webs of obligation thus created in which ‘individuals risk trusting others because they want to 
change their lives’ (Stack, 1975: 39). I found that the collective actions that made relationships and 
bonds between strangers possible were augmented by an implicit inclusiveness in the membership of 
the groups, something that took me by surprise.  All the groups I attended advertised and presented 
themselves as ‘adult ADHD’ support groups, but half way through my fieldwork, it became clear that 
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they were open to a far broader membership than adults with ADHD. They welcomed the relatives 
and partners of adults with ADHD, and also of people who presented themselves as having 
Asperger’s or Tourette’s syndromes.107  It was only as I attended Group B in March 2013 that I came 
to notice what had been there all along. On that day, some members recounted their attendance at a 
conference in which a workshop had been set up to provide a ‘near experience’ of what it may be like 
to have Asperger’s syndrome. Participants were asked to button and unbutton their shirts with gloves 
on, or to put fizzy sweets in their mouth whilst blocking their ears. These ‘experiments’ aimed to 
replicate the way in which sensory information is processed and experienced by people with autism 
(Solomon, 2010). As the conversation grew around me, I recalled how in previous sessions a number 
of members had presented themselves as having Asperger’s, and these people were now very much 
engaged in the conversation. On the same day I noted a poster, hand drawn, that was stuck on the 
outside of the door of the meeting room.  It joined the letters of ADHD with ASPIE, a diminutive of 
Asperger’s. 
ASPIE 
D 
H 
D 
 
Later on that day I told one of the facilitators, Caroline, about my surprise, and asked her if this was 
something the group had started to do recently. She explained that it had always been the case that 
people who might have been diagnosed with Asperger’s came to the group, sometimes because they 
were relatives of other members, but also because there were no other places for them to receive 
support and advice. She went on to discuss how they had found that what made the two conditions so 
different, concreteness and order (Asperger’s), and chaos and flexibility (ADHD), can become a 
strength when shared and brought together.  In her view, Caroline continued, both were part of the 
same family, which did not mean that people were the same; people shared some differences and that 
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 The DSM-IV criteria specifically made Asperger’s syndrome an exclusion criteria for diagnosing ADHD, 
therefore little data has been available on the comorbidity of the two disorders. Clinical practice has suggested  
that both are often diagnosed together and the possibility of co-occurrence of ADHD and ASD in DSM-5 will 
likely increase research in this area (UKAAN, 2013).  ADHD has been reported as the most common comorbid 
disorder with Tourette Syndrome (TS) with 60% to 80% co-occurrence; the percentage of TS comorbid with 
ADHD, whilst much lower, remains significant, 8% to 10% (Rizzo et al., 2013) 
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was why they could get on here in the group.  She pointed out that there were also one or two people 
who I had met suspected of having Tourette’s syndrome, and they were waiting to see a psychiatrist.  
The practices of the group, discursive and otherwise, took place within a context where diversity and 
difference were valued and encouraged. Yet this was rarely expressed in terms of neurodiversity, of 
brainhood or other neurological grouping. Instead group members enacted neurodiversity, or at least 
one kind of neurodiversity, by making it possible to have in one place ‘alternative human differences’ 
(Armstrong 2011). In all the support groups I found notions of neurodiversity and the purchase of its 
language to be both changeable and interchangeable with the language of kinship, of family, groups, 
us and we. Such diversity was enacted in the relations between people attending the groups, not 
between neurones and synapses, but between people who recognised each other as being different 
from the norm.  Paraphrasing  Rapp and Ginsburg, I suggest that the members of the support groups 
became pragmatic philosophers of human diversity (2011a: 406), because diversity and their attitude 
towards diversity was expressed in actions rather than words.  In this way, rather than re-imagining 
the narratives of neurodiversity, they have reimagined it through their practices and relationships. 
Neurodiversity was put in practice not through loud lobbying or activism, but through kinship 
practices that extended family resemblance beyond psychiatric boundaries. In line with the caveat I 
provided in Chapter Six regarding the familial context, kinship relations formed with strangers should 
not be romanticised, as they can be double-edged, comprising of positive and negative qualities 
(Carsten, 2013).  Within the reciprocity and the sense of belonging I observed between members, 
there were also tensions, reprimands, and sometimes mistrust and rejection.    
One incident in particular highlighted how belonging to a support group relied on being accepted by 
other members. Whilst it was never made explicit why Mark did not fit in on his first visit, it seemed 
to me that he was being excluded. Mark, as he described himself, was in his early sixties, from a 
professional background and had lived in the USA before returning to settle in the UK after retiring. 
He had been diagnosed with ADHD in the USA in the mid-1990s following his son’s diagnosis, and 
had tried a number of medications, most of which could not be prescribed in the UK. Throughout the 
meeting he contributed in a soft voice and with a gentle manner but he interjected when others spoke 
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by referring to psychiatric criteria, the DSM or to his experience in America.  At one such 
interruption, another member jumped up and angrily pointed his finger right in Mark’s face, shouting 
at him to shut up with all his nonsense. This incident was followed by the facilitator taking the young 
man outside the room to calm him down. Meanwhile the other facilitator told Mark how his behaviour 
was too disruptive for the group and that he needed to listen to other people, saying that ‘sharing was 
like taking medicine through the ears’; Mark was visibly upset and crying.  Eventually the other 
member returned to the group, shook hands with Mark without saying a word, and the group 
discussion resumed whilst I felt that the tensions had not been resolved. Mark attended once more, the 
following month, and he expressed his confusion about advice he was given by the facilitators; on the 
one hand he was told to find closure about being diagnosed, on the other he was constantly asked 
questions about the past, which re-opened old wounds. Tearful, he concluded with a question: should 
he come to the support group if it brought back painful memories?  There was no direct response from 
other members and the conversation moved on. Mark did not join any more sessions for the remaining 
nine months that I attended, nor did I have any further contact with him.  
In this situation, my thoughts as to why Mark did not return, why he might not have fitted in and 
possibly excluded by the group, are speculative. Yet it seemed to me that his age, his professional 
background, his deferential acceptance of psychiatry, were all in stark contrast with other members. 
Most of the others were young and their main focus was on training for employment. More 
importantly, through his mild manners, Mark seemed to refuse to take the listening medicine as 
prescribed by the facilitators. For each piece of advice he was given, he would respond with questions 
and would not readily accept the memory practices that were at the heart of the ‘sharing’ in the 
support group. Somehow the resemblance that he may have had with members of the group in relation 
to his symptoms of inattention and hyperactivity was not enough to develop bonds and connections. 
Similarly, this incident showed limits to the inclusivity and sense of belonging that might be 
generated by support groups. Importantly, it also highlighted the importance for members of this 
group to accept rules and hierarchy in order to fit in.  In the 31 support group sessions I attended 
during my fieldwork, this was the only occasion that I came across what appeared to be the rejection 
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of a new member, a reminder of the limits of tolerance and acceptance suggested by ‘neurodiversity’. 
That said, the incident should not obscure or negate the kinship bonds and connections that I observed 
and described above.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The last two chapters have been concerned with the role that kinship plays in the diagnostic process of 
ADHD in adults and they have queried the kind of bonds and connections that may be formed due to 
ADHD  as well as exploring the basis on which such connections are made. Recognition and 
resemblance featured in my analysis of this process on two counts; firstly, I have discussed how 
recognition implied the notion of kinship bonds in that recognising someone is already to 
acknowledge their existence.  I have shown how this acknowledgement may be withdrawn and  have 
illustrated the impact that this might have on people with symptoms of ADHD, including that of 
becoming accidental activists (Panitch, 2008). The self-recognition of parents in their children showed 
an unexpected flow of knowledge from child to adult and suggested that, currently, adults with 
ADHD are made by their children. Secondly, the concept of family resemblance (Wittgenstein, 1972) 
that was applied concretely between child and father in Chapter Six became relevant to describe the 
relations between strangers which were based on neuro-biological resemblance and not on filial links. 
Not only could the people I met recognise themselves in strangers, but their resemblance became a 
classificatory mode for describing themselves as belonging to the same family. I described how 
kinship relations based on sharing common symptoms related to neurological conditions, on being the 
same by being different, has been coined as ‘neurodiversity’ and I have shown that in the groups I 
attended, the term was used loosely to distinguish between those resembling each other as 
neurodiverse with others who were seen as neurotypical. More importantly I have found that the 
support groups, rather than being influenced by neuroscientific vocabulary to discuss their 
experiences, used kinship-like language to talk about it – belonging, caring, sharing, reciprocity – and 
they enacted diversity by stretching family resemblances to include people other than those with 
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ADHD.  I have suggested that the webs of obligations which were formed in the support groups 
transformed the individualistic concerns of self-improvement into extended kinship relations that were 
evoked through familial care.  
We could conceive the basis on which these relations are formed in a number of ways;  as biosocial 
(Rabinow, 1992) whereby our social worlds and relations are made and unmade on the basis of our 
biology; or as kinship and genealogies of afflictions (Rapp, 1995; Rapp et al., 2001) emphasising the 
relations formed on the basis of some form of disability.  Through my encounters in support groups, I 
found that biology, genes or disability did not fully capture the basis on which people made 
connections and bonds. The sharing that took such a central place in the activity of the groups, was 
centred on sharing those experiences that showed peoples’ vulnerability. The general unpredictability 
of life or a lack of attention could result in their taking a disastrous wrong turn: as Ray put it, “success 
is a small margin away from failure.” Similarly, Sonia described how relying on inventing and 
improvising solutions as a necessity and last resort left the future uncertain, as if precariously walking 
a tight rope. In previous chapters and the forthcoming one, Bridget, Jack and others in describing their 
struggles to keep their work, housing and relationships going also opened their vulnerability to be 
reciprocated with care, attention and support by clinicians and support group members. What I have 
described might be kinship based on vulnerability as a shared condition (Han, 2012), which does not 
restrict sharing to particular disorders or classifications, but extends family resemblance to a mutual 
lived experience of precariousness.  
To some extent, if there is a gift in neurodiversity, maybe it is found in the way that the circulation of 
the term has enabled helpful social interaction between people who might not otherwise have had any 
relationships. As I observed, it was possible not only for people with ADHD, Tourette’s and 
Asperger’s, but also their parents and relatives to exchange support and care in the groups in the hope 
of making their lives better. More than that, it seems that re-appropriating ADHD and other conditions 
as their own, and seeing these conditions not as discrete and unconnected experiences or 
classifications, but as mutuality of being, was in itself a kind of activism, an ontological politic (Mol, 
1999). As I saw it, the support groups assembled and affirmed ways of being, or ‘forms of life’ as 
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Canguilhem would have it, celebrating their diversity, building a community on their existential 
experience of vulnerability – acts which gave people a voice, and by extension, the chance of being 
recognised by others. The next chapter will explore this activism to show that it was  not directly 
engaged in changing policies or influencing research (Rabeharisoa et al, 2014), but was instead 
concerned with producing pragmatic knowledge for living every day with ADHD.  
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Chapter Eight Ordinary problems: living with ADHD 
 
Specialist training for an ordinary disorder 
 
In November 2012 I attended a three day training course for clinicians delivered by UKAAN. The 
course taught specialist skills for diagnosing ADHD and covered such topics as DSM criteria, 
neurobiology of ADHD, recognising co-morbidity, and it included a whole day dedicated to 
treatments, pharmaceutical and otherwise. It was mostly attended by 30 or so psychiatrists
108
 working 
within adult psychiatric services in different parts of England and Wales, whose daily practice in the 
NHS was orientated towards diagnosing and treating psychotic and depressive disorders. From them, I 
found out that ADHD had not been part of their training in psychiatry, but that they were coming 
across it more often in their practice. Referrals from GPs and other health professionals were 
becoming more frequent and most felt ill-equipped to diagnose let alone initiate treatment that 
involved controlled drugs. It is a NICE recommendation that adults ‘should be referred for assessment 
by a mental health specialist trained in the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD’ (2009: 19) and the 
clinicians attending the course were there for that purpose.  
After registration, we brought coffee into the training room and the first session started, led by two 
psychiatrists who began by explaining how the course would not be engaging with debates on the 
validity of the diagnosis nor would it question whether ADHD symptoms were part of ordinary life; 
this had been done in other forums
109
. Instead we were told that the course would go through a 
diagnostic process which was based on evidence and good practice. The presenters continued by 
describing how diagnosing ADHD was ordinary and in line with diagnosing any other psychiatric 
disorder. A film of an assessment was then played, showing how the Mental State Examination 
interview was conducted; questionnaires were also mentioned as a way to access detailed history. 
ADHD was defined as a common disorder, with a prevalence of 2.5% in adults in the UK,  affecting 
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 My presence led clinicians to raise several questions, all  out of curiosity and interest as to my research 
projects. These questions triggered useful discussions, some of which I described in Chapter Two.   
109
 See (Asherson, 2010; Timimi and Moncrieff, 2010). 
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approximately 1.5 million people. In terms of diagnostic practice and statistics, ADHD was therefore 
presented as regular and ordinary. Yet during the three days, there were many statements and 
conversations that gave the opposite picture of this disorder, as something out of the ordinary and 
unusual. Some comments pointed out how ADHD was still controversial; pharmaceutical treatments, 
such as stimulants, were very contentious as well as complicated to titrate and establish at the right 
dosage. Other conversations highlighted how particularly difficult ADHD was to diagnose because its 
symptoms overlapped with many other disorders, hence the specialist skills required and provided by 
the training.  As I saw it, this group of specialist clinicians running the course were in a bind. On the 
one hand, one way to face the controversies of ADHD was to normalise it, bring out its ordinariness, 
and work towards integrating ADHD within regular adult mental health services. On the other hand, 
to recognise ADHD, clinicians needed special skills to discern in their patients the differences 
between normal and pathological experience of everyday life. Specialised skills and knowledge were 
also needed to prescribe medications that, unusually, came under the controlled drug legislation and 
were unlicensed for adults.  Thus ADHD in this forum was presented simultaneously as ‘ordinary’ in 
order to be accepted in society, and yet ‘out of the ordinary’ to treat. 
In this chapter I will explore how people I met in support groups and in clinical settings described 
what living with a diagnosis of ADHD was like. Previous chapters have followed the diagnostic 
process from the clinic into the groups, tracing different moments on that path when patients and 
clinicians found out about ADHD, how they recognised similarities with others and how they 
accumulated evidence of symptoms. The diagnostic process highlighted various practices that enacted 
ADHD in adults, amongst which some were related to remembering and forgetting through 
administrative work or old documents; others called upon kinship relations in unexpected ways. This 
chapter is a pause in the reverse chronology offered by this thesis and its focus on the experience of 
living with a diagnosis will target two elements; diagnosis as a category, and treatment as its outcome 
(Blaxter, 1978; Jutel, 2011). In so doing, the chapter will suggest that the diagnosis of ADHD may be 
characterised negatively and that people labelled with it may be stigmatised when it is described as a 
lifelong disorder. My focus on treatment will show how receiving treatments, far from being a passive 
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activity, involved active engagement and that, in my analysis, stimulant medications emerge as 
important actors and participators in living with a diagnosis.  
Through observations and conversations I conducted in all settings, a central theme revolving around 
the complex and contradictory use of the word ‘ordinary’ became apparent. The ordinary could be 
summarised as something which can be sought after (ordinary is the norm) or something to be 
avoided (this is extra-ordinary) and may need to be protected from medical intrusion (this is just 
ordinary).  Thus the specialist clinicians I met in the clinic and in the training course were holding 
together the first two propositions, ADHD is ordinary/extraordinary and they were well aware of the 
third proposition that presents ADHD as an exemplar for the medicalisation of ordinary life. To 
disentangle the different uses of the word ‘ordinary’ I am inspired by Wittgenstein’s morphological 
method for clarifying concepts, exploring the use of a word in its variations as a ‘pole of a description, 
not the ground floor of a theory’ (Wittgenstein, 1988 : § 633). Thus, examining the familiar use of the 
word ordinary in context will show the complex ways in which ADHD was discussed and will start to 
unravel some of the opposite and seemingly intractable positions held in regard to this disorder.  As 
much as anthropology provoked Wittgenstein’s thinking (Hacker, 2009; Wittgenstein, 2015), 
anthropologists have been inspired by his reflections (see amongst others Csordas, 2004; Das, 1998; 
Whitaker, 1996). Das in particular cites the philosopher as an influence on her work:  ‘people in their 
lives articulate his questions. It is not a theoretical claim; I just let it be shown in my work. People are 
living certain philosophical questions, however different the languages in which these are thought.’ 
(DiFruscia, 2010, emphasis in original text). 
Das’ work on the ordinary (Das, 2007; 2010;  2012) advocates that we look for the ethics in everyday 
practices rather than in the height of philosophical reasoning.  From what she calls ‘a simple 
proposition that everyday life is the site in which the life of the other is engaged’ (Das 2010: 376), 
Das argues that the work it takes to live every day is not only done in order to fit with society's norms, 
but that it is made of moral actions, actions to live well with one’s self and others. In this way she 
highlights that life in the ordinary is not to be taken for granted, that it is threatened by what happens 
around us all the time, and ‘to secure the everyday…might be thought of as an achievement’ (ibid.) . 
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There are obvious differences between her ethnographic sites and the one I am concerned with – 
differences which are also represented in our approach to the ordinary. I am interested in the way that 
Das has been concerned with capturing how, in the face of extreme communal violence, people can 
not only pick up the pieces, but that through the very act of maintaining everyday habits and gestures 
that are required for staying alive, such as cooking, washing, they start social worlds anew. She calls 
this movement forward, from the actual to the eventual everyday (2012), ‘the descent into the 
ordinary’.  
In contrast to Das’ participants, the people I met in support groups and clinics have not been faced 
with extreme and large-scale violence. Yet, within the context of the UK, I am suggesting that my 
participants have encountered those moments where the ordinary life that they build and maintain 
through routines, strategies and habits has been threatened, shaken, maybe undermined. The scale of 
threat and destruction are worlds apart from Das’, but crucially as I have described, and echoing Das’ 
notion of the work of time (2000), the problems they face are lifelong and require constant work; this 
work is part of their lives.  Rather than a descent into the ordinary which was triggered by an extreme 
event, my participants described an accumulation of the quotidian that made life unbearable, an 
accrual of everyday events that had gone wrong.  As discussed in previous chapters, each singular 
event considered in isolation could be perceived as an ordinary problem, but I have argued that 
through accumulation these events become problems of the ordinary. Time, in this way, is both part of 
the problem and a means for evolving solutions. Das’ concerns with describing the struggles and the 
work required for people to live alongside one another provides a frame for thinking about the way 
people I met described how they made and remade their ordinary over and over again. I heard of such 
continuous toil, with uncertain outcomes, described in their everyday lives as a combination of 
routines and habits; their potentials were tinged by doubt and anxiety and marred by the effect of 
tiredness that resulted from the unrelenting attention required.  
Following the word ‘ordinary’ into support groups and clinics, this chapter will explore descriptions 
of living with the diagnosis of ADHD that were shared with me; some gave insights into the stigma 
people had to face through practices related to treatments. I will explore the work of medication, how 
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stimulants affected peoples’ relationship with the world directly, not only through their 
pharmaceutical properties, but also in the way that they were taken and could be moulded to the 
uniqueness of people’s lives. Sometimes called ‘lifestyle drugs’ (Kadison, 2005; Racine and Forlini, 
2010) as if such practices were a mis-use of the drug, I argue instead that stimulants are actants in that 
they do different things depending on when, how  and where they are used (Goodfellow, 2008; Han, 
2012; Latour, 2005). I will conclude by discussing how carrying on living with ADHD is related to a 
notion of endurance due to the work that it takes to maintain relations with the world.  Through group 
observations I show that enduring involves being active, in the form of caring for one another, but it 
can also mean withdrawing to recuperate.  
 
People with ADHD are extra-normal because being normal is too ordinary 
 
I arrived at 11am at the community centre on the edge of the town centre where support group B used 
a large room that could accommodate 30 or more individuals. The room was divided into a relaxing 
area with armchairs and sofas, set up in a circle. Tables and chairs were set out near a small adjoining 
kitchen area.  People were already there, sitting in different parts of the room and, as Jim came 
towards me, I introduced myself. Jim had been a speaker at the Patient Organisation’s conference 
where he had given a very emotional testimony of his struggles with ADHD and of the way that the 
support groups had helped to turn his life around. As he explained to me later that day, he was now 
‘giving back’ and helping run the support groups so that others could benefit.  The two facilitators and 
founders of the group had not arrived yet, but Jim was quite happy to start the meeting and introduced 
me to the members.  As people started sitting in a circle in the main part of the room, I noticed that 
one wall of the room had a dedicated space for images and photos that were related to ADHD, some 
were well-known such as the famous logo of the hard rock band AC/DC revamped into AD/HD, 
others less so.      
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A poster showed a large fish in a small bowl with a smaller fish leaping out towards a larger bowl. 
During another group session I met the person who brought this poster and she explained that she had 
bought it for the group to thank them for what they did for her. She said, 
“That’s me, I went from the little bowl, being restricted and crowded, to the big bowl where I could 
move better. Before I attended the group, I didn’t know how to deal with my problems, I did not fit in 
there, in that bowl, now I can be myself”.  
On the same side of the room was a wall of fame, with signed pictures of personalities, actors and 
football players who supported the work of the group, as well as pictures of politicians and civil 
servants with the founders of the group, Caroline and Tessa
110
. This montage constituted a record of 
lobbying and advocacy work over many years that led the two founders to raise a petition, and as one 
picture shows, to hand it to the Deputy Prime Minister of the time, Harriet Harman. Later on, when 
recounting this episode, Caroline and Tessa emphasised with delight how they ensured that group 
members attending Downing Street with them were those with the most visible and uncontrollable 
ADHD symptoms, which made a great impact, but also shortened the meeting as it became rather 
chaotic. One of the posters showed the logo of the organisation representing a smiley face made of the 
4 letters ADHD surrounded by the phrase ‘don’t judge me, understand me’. Through the following 
month, I noticed this logo in the room, not only on mugs and leaflets but also on drawings and 
stationary.  It was always accompanied with the © symbol to signify that it was copyright protected as 
the product of this particular organisation.  
A few months later, Tessa explained how her experience of being diagnosed had been very difficult. 
When she had discussed her problems with her doctor, describing how the continuous disorganisation 
which she associated with ADHD affected her family including her diagnosed son, he responded that 
there was no such thing as ADHD. He added that what she needed was parental advice and support. It 
was as if he were judging her a bad parent and she were trying to use ADHD as an excuse.  Other 
people I met in different groups had similar stories, whereby they felt certain that something was not 
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 The wall on the other side of the room was covered with handwritten posters as described in Chapter Three. 
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normal in their behaviour, something they could not control or moderate,  and it was no ordinary 
forgetfulness or run of the mill inattention.  In their experience, GPs were either not informed about 
ADHD or were unwilling to make referrals to specialists.  Such attitudes were exacerbated by the 
media’s use of stigmatising headlines such as ‘Is lazy parenting to blame for Britain’s addiction to 
Ritalin?’111. Tessa explained that the logo was a reaction to that stigmatisation. It was asking people 
not to jump to conclusions but to take the time to hear the full stories that showed the impact of 
ADHD on everyday life. She went on to explain that in her experience the suggestion that single 
parenthood could explain a rise in ADHD (Hjern et al., 2010) is a totally lopsided view of what it is 
like to live with these problems. She felt that ADHD was more likely to cause single parenthood due 
to the sheer difficulty of living every day with problems that do not go away. Her marriage had 
survived, but went through a lot of difficult periods.  As for the copyright, she told me that in 2010 
they had decided to constitute themselves as a social enterprise so that they could get some funding 
for the courses they were delivering.   
Let me return to the support group session of that day. Jim asked everyone to settle down and the 
session finally started as he asked one member to share his story. Michael was in his early 40s, he 
explained that he was diagnosed a year ago and that his stimulant medication really helped at first:  it 
was like heaven, he had never felt that calm. But then he crashed into depression and could not get out 
of the house, so he had six weeks off work.  After that, he recalled, it was up and down with the 
medication, which he finally stopped a couple of months ago. He described how he thought the tablets 
were flattening his mood; he could not be bothered to do anything; he lost his ‘joie de vivre’, no jokes, 
no messing about. He could do his work better but that was boring. Up to that point, the other 
members just listened, sipping their teas or coffees, some checking their mobiles. I noticed that some 
people, three or four, were restless, fidgety; Michael was one of them. His legs were shaking 
uncontrollably and he was not trying to control them either, nor did he seem affected by the 
movements. As he was sitting on a low settee, he seemed to combine a very relaxed upper body and a 
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 (Atkinson-Small, 2012); and more recently such headlines as 'How many illnesses of modern childhood are 
excuses for bad behaviour, stupidity and parental neurosis?' (Liddle, 2014); and 'ADHD and why we, working 
mums need to look in the mirror' (Vine, 2014). 
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very tense, active lower part. Graeme interjected to tell Michael how he understood him, as his own 
life was definitely more boring when on treatment but that, for him, the meds kept him out of trouble, 
out of prison. As he put it, “I just did a stint of 12 months in jail, so taking the meds is the price to 
pay”. Michael responded that he had tried to balance the pros and cons of being on medication but had 
decided that he would rather live with his ADHD than with his meds, because he felt he was more 
aware of his symptoms now. He said, “if it’s what it’s like to be normal, well I’d rather not, thank you 
very much”.  When the laughter had subsided, Jim opportunely reminded Michael that he had not 
attended the group for weeks, jokingly calling him, AWOL (Absent Without Official Leave) and 
saying that he would benefit from more frequent attendance. He then moved on the space for sharing 
and gave another member her turn to talk.   
What I came across in my first visit to this support group, I encountered again and again in other 
groups too, sometimes with slightly different wording but with the following main theme that I 
paraphrase in the following way:   
ADHD is part of ordinary everyday life, it does not go away and you have to learn to live 
with it; yet ADHD is not ordinary because most people don’t have it and because ordinary is 
boring, whereas ADHD is anything but boring. 
That ADHD is described by many as both ‘ordinary’ and ‘not ordinary’ may seem a contradiction; 
how can it be both? It is also related to an earlier description I made of the multiplicity of ADHD, that 
it may be more than one thing and yet less than many. Through this lens, being ordinary/not ordinary 
is more of a co-habitation than a contradiction, co-existing in one person’s lived experience of 
ADHD. 
 But the entanglement of the opposed propositions should not obscure the fact that different scales of 
comparison are being applied in this juxtaposition of ordinary/not ordinary. On one scale, norms are 
compared between an individual and others – how do I compare with others, using social and external 
norms? On the other scale, norms are applied within one individual over time using biological and 
internal norms.   
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In regard to social norms, what is ordinary comes from comparing one’s problems to others, or for 
that matter, being compared. At this end of the scale, the comparison can be painful and distressing 
and Tessa described the way she felt blamed and stigmatised for having ADHD and being a parent of 
a child with ADHD. The logo of the support group is a reaction to this, ‘don’t judge me, understand 
me’; a request to broaden the criteria for comparison and a plea to accept uniqueness. It is also what 
Michael suggested when he stated that “if being ordinary was boring, then being different was good” 
or as another member put it; “people with ADHD are extra-normal”. The comparison with others and 
being out of the ordinary can be turned to your advantage, that is, if it does not get you into trouble or 
into prison.  Nick, who I met in Group C, talked to me in an interview about meeting people who had 
been helpful to him in living with ADHD and of the benefits of attending support groups. I asked him: 
Claude: “Are people helpful to you because they are more knowledgeable about ADHD than 
you?” 
Nick: “It’s more than that, much more. The reason that the support group is helpful is 
because, [silence] because [silence] it brings a sense of normality. [silence] Before, you feel 
not normal, not part of society, [silence] something's wrong.”  
Claude: “Hmmm” 
Nick: “In a support group, I feel normal, you and Anna you're the abnormal one if you can 
understand, [laughter], so being in the support group it gives a sense of brotherhood, 
community, like belonging.” 
Nick was referring directly to the sense of being ordinary, normal, because he was amongst people 
like him, with the same difficulties that can be nurtured into a sense of belonging and of solidarity, 
something I described in Chapter 7 as extended kinship
112
.   
Support group members also applied a normative framework in relation to themselves, internally, and 
they evaluated their own experience in duration, from one day to another.  They often recounted their 
                                                          
112
 Anna, the facilitator of the group, and I were the only individuals in the group who did not have ADHD, so 
according to Nick we were neurotypicals, whilst the group members were neurodiverse. 
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first awareness of ADHD in themselves as problems that were constant, day by day and which never 
went away. As Michael became more aware of his symptoms, he also learned to differentiate and 
recognise triggers, or periods of the day when his problems were exacerbated.  He noticed that alcohol 
either made things worse, or instead helped him go to sleep. By referring to his bodily norms, what 
felt normal, he could choose to affect his problems of hyperactivity or inattention, through medical or 
non-medical means, as he decided.  What the treatments were doing for him could be thought of in 
terms of chemical side effects, the flatness of mood, the loss of drive, but his decision not to continue 
with medication was related to how life felt whilst taking them; boring, no messing about, no jokes. 
That’s how life had been, that was normal and so it was better to live with the side effects of ADHD 
than the side effects of the medication. 
The argument inspired by Canguilhem (1991) that I put forward earlier is of relevance here; 
Canguilhem showed that organisms created norms as part of their lived reality, and did this in 
interaction with an environment, what he termed biological normativity. In other words bodily and 
social norms are entangled and so are the comparisons therein. Thus it may be that my focus is 
affected when in a busy and buzzy room and it is harder to keep on task; on the other hand it may be 
that being very fidgety makes me a better comic, or that my ability to hyperfocus ensures that I can 
work long hours. One clinician described ADHD as context-dependent, so we can think of the 
comparisons based on biological and social norms as intertwined even though they do not always fit 
together – a situation with the potential for causing distress and stigma. In the next section I want to 
return to Michael’s dilemma about his treatment, and look at this issue from the point of view of the 
medication, as it were, so that I can examine what stimulants do and what kind of ADHD might be 
enacted through the actions of stimulants themselves. 
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Pills don’t build skills 
 
The meeting in Group C that I attended on a December night was well attended, some people were 
making cups of tea, others setting up a table with finger food and Christmas treats to which I added 
mince pies. As usual, there were slightly more men than women present and I started chatting with 
those I had met already, mostly about mundane things like the very cold weather spell the UK was 
going through, or the latest movies that people had seen.  Anna asked people to settle down and 
started the meeting, explaining that this would be a shorter session than usual so that we could have 
more informal time afterwards. She then drew up a list of people prioritised to talk on that evening, 
ensuring that the couple of new members were given an opportunity. The first new member started 
describing her difficulties in being diagnosed, having been referred by her GP and then waiting for a 
number of months to be seen by the specialist psychiatrist. She was not receiving any treatment for 
ADHD and was curious as to what might be on offer once she was diagnosed. The facilitator 
described different types of medication and psychological treatments and was keen to emphasise that 
medication was not going to solve all her problems. She said, “meds may help but you will need to 
learn a lot and look after yourself” and she told the group, “pills don’t build skills”. Chris, who had 
been attending for a few months, asked what the medication actually did; how did this tablet make 
you feel? He had only recently been prescribed stimulants about a month ago, and it was still very 
much, as he described, “hit and miss”. The dosage was still being adjusted but he was not sure that 
this was the right medication for him because the effect was really good but only for a very short 
period and then he felt rather awful. Another member, himself a GP, started to provide some details of 
the way the main medication worked:  
“There are two main forms of medication, stimulants and non-stimulants. Stimulants come in 
different forms, like Methylphenidate or Dexamphetamine and the non-stimulants are things like 
Atomoxetine and Bupropion. The stimulants are the most widely prescribed and they come in 
different brands like Ritalin or Concerta.  The difference between the brands is to do with how 
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long they take to act and how long they last in your system.  Ritalin is fast but short acting
113
, it 
kicks in within 30 minutes but its effect is gone after three to four hours. Concerta has a smoother 
start and lasts around eight hours
114
.  The non-stimulant medications are more like 
antidepressants in that they take a while to take effect, a few weeks, and they remain in your 
system longer too.” 
 
Some people were taking notes, and I could see those next to me googling for this kind of 
information. Chris was clearly interested and asked where Medikinet, the medicine he was prescribed, 
fitted in all this. Lindsey, who was a long-standing member, explained that it sounded like Chris was 
prescribed the short acting kind of meds and that was why the effect disappeared quite quickly. “This 
can be a real problem”, Lindsey continued, “because you can get a real dip in your energy, in your 
focus and the rest, just when you need it the most, half way through your working day. Suddenly, 
maybe in a meeting or something, you just feel really lousy, you just can’t focus on what people are 
saying and you just feel like getting up and walking.” Lindsey then described how he talked to his 
doctor so that he could have a dosage combining long and short lasting stimulants. He was then able 
to take one pill in the morning whose effects would last until about three or four in the afternoon, and 
take a short acting tablet if he needed to focus or work late into the evening.   
Chris, who started this discussion, continued and put forward a suggestion:  
“Why don’t we put this information down, between us we have lots of experience that could be 
helpful. I know that there are websites and forums but really I haven’t found them useful, they are 
either too technical or too brash. What I would find useful is a list of people’s experience of 
different drugs. How do they take them, do they have breaks from the drugs, what are the side 
effects, can you break the pills to change the dosage?” 
 
                                                          
113
 Also known as Immediate Release (IR). 
114
 Extended Release (ER). 
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The conversation rapidly jumped from one person to another; a sense of excitement was palpable, 
people adding their thoughts, or agreeing with the main point that what would be useful was not 
manual or textbook explanations, but real people’s experiences. But how to go about it? How to 
collate this information and how to make it available to each other?  Chris suggested that they could 
start with people who were interested in emailing each other and it might take separate meetings to 
agree a format to write these experiences down. Three other members agreed to get involved with this 
and email addresses were exchanged, whilst the conversation moved on to other people, their 
circumstances and concerns
115
.  
I had witnessed similar conversations in other support groups that were more inclined to discuss 
medication, often using scientific descriptions and comparing what was available in the UK and the 
USA.  In particular the flexibility of stimulant treatments was often discussed, how this kind of 
medication can be adapted to what is going on in your life, sometimes taking a break, and at other 
times making sure you function at your best, for a job interview, or other special occasions. There was 
at times an assertive feel to these conversations, in which the right to be functioning to the best of 
their potential was claimed; why would it be wrong to take a pill if it would help you to work better, 
be a better parent, or partner? Of course people were prescribed stimulant medication for a purpose, to 
treat ADHD, but the way stimulants act blurs the boundaries between the relief and the enhancement 
of the individual’s functioning. As I described earlier, the scientific position is that ADHD is 
something that cannot be cured; treatments can only help in reducing symptoms and for short periods 
at a time. Whilst the individual is burdened with ingesting medication a few times a day, as Chris 
described, it seems that for some at least this provides an opportunity to adapt and choose the way that 
medication will make a difference in their lives. If inattention is relieved then focus is enhanced; if 
hyperactivity is contained, then calmness and moments of rest are enhanced. This ambiguity between 
treatment and enhancement is at the heart of the controversies associated with ADHD, linking 
                                                          
115
 I did not participate in this conversation as the feeling in the room, led by Chris, was that this was a topic for 
the group to discuss with each other, adults with direct experience of ADHD in themselves or their relatives. 
The expertise they sought was their own, not textbooks. Not that I ever felt unwelcome in this group, or any 
other, quite the contrary, but I was often reminded, directly and indirectly, that my position of expertise, if I had 
one at all, was not experiential. I was a neurotypical amongst the neurodiverse.  
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treatment with lifestyle choices as well as with the extension of medicalisation of everyday life 
(Conrad, 2007; Donnelly, 2013; Edwards, 2013; Frances, 2013; Racine and Forlini, 2010; Schermer, 
2007). 
As we tucked into the dips and the mince pies, the conversations remained on issues related to 
ADHD, about articles and books people had read. A conversation began about a film that had been 
released earlier that year, ‘Limitless’, addressing the issue of enhancement directly. The story line can 
be summarised thus:  a man on the verge of unemployment tries a mysterious pill that enhances his 
cognitive ability to the point that he rises to the top of the finance world. Problems arise when he runs 
out of pills and he experiences dangerous side-effects, sending him on a roller-coaster of highs and 
lows but, by learning to control the drug, its production and potency, his life settles into success. Our 
conversation, beyond noticing the good-looking actor, or the special effects, revolved around 
experiences that people could relate to. One person explained how she would take her stimulant meds 
only when she felt she needed them, that is, not every day as prescribed, which meant that she could 
keep a stash in case she had difficulties getting a repeat prescription as had been the case in the past. 
Others concurred and Chris returned to the subject of adapting the dosage to fit his needs specifically 
so that he would not be over-stimulated and then unable to sleep. The issue for him was how to 
control the action of stimulant medication to meet his needs, having enough, but not too much. 
Stimulant medications, described like this, have agency: they are entangled in public life in many 
ways, they have a history, mostly turbulent and controversial, and act not only on the brain’s 
neurotransmitters but also on everyday events (Whyte, Geest, and Hardon, 2002). As Latour 
demonstrated, scientific discoveries are often named after their actions, what they do is what is 
observed first, before they are described in terms of their competence (Latour, 2014; Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979). None more so than the stimulants which were defined by their actions in the 1930s in 
a moment often described as ‘serendipity’ (Barkley, 2006; Conners, 2000; Lange et al., 2010)116. 
                                                          
116
 The research on the use of stimulants for the treatment of headaches in child patients showed little impact  
‘but to [Bradley’s] astonishment the teachers reported major improvements in learning and behaviour in a 
number of the children that lasted until the Benzedrine regimen was withdrawn’ (Gross, 1995). Discovering a 
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These drugs were observed to increase focus and attention, boost up energy and repress hunger. We 
can see how the emphasis on the medication’s action remains in the vocabulary clinicians and support 
group members use when discussing it; ‘fast acting’, ‘slow release’,’ stimulate’, ‘focus’, ‘control’. 
Stimulants give control, yet their activity needs to be controlled: stimulants are ‘controlled drugs’ 
after all and come under strict legislation for their prescribing, management and use as medication 
(DoH, 2013)
117
. What I am suggesting is that the specific pharmacokinetic of stimulant medication, 
what the body does to the drug, the speed at which the drug is absorbed and distributed, makes the co-
constitutive role of this medicine in the lives of patients more potent than that of other medication. 
Beyond the direct effects that stimulant medications have on the body, they act directly on the 
relations shared with others, as hinted by Lindsey. At another group meeting, a member described 
how she and her son were prescribed the same medication and shared days without taking it, 
described as ‘drug holidays’118. Whether they chose to take medication or not depended on what was 
going on in their lives; for example not taking medication before a football tournament so that both 
mother on the side of the field and son on the pitch could be as exuberant and active as they wished. 
In contrast, the parents’ evening at school required them both to be fully focused and composed so as 
to pay attention.  Through their presence or absence, stimulant medications facilitate relations with 
others; they help shape those relations and participate in helping patients engage with the world in 
positive ways, or so the person who shared this story hoped. Other stories, such as the strategic use of 
stimulants to improve work performance, as in the case of the comedians described in Chapter Seven, 
also show how taking or not taking stimulant medications acted on the relations that people had with 
others. We could think of stimulants and patients as co-producers of relationships which have, in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
drug’s actions in this way is common, for an overview see (Ban, 2006).  See (Rasmussen, 2008) for a 
comprehensive cultural history of amphetamines. 
117
 Stimulant medications also require a license, ‘a marketing authorisation’, issued by the Medicine and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) on the basis of evaluating the beneficial or harmful effects of 
medicine. Despite being NICE’s first line recommended treatment for adults with ADHD, stimulants are 
licensed for children, but not for adults. The one and only licensed medication for adults with ADHD was 
approved during my fieldwork in 2013 and significantly it is a non-stimulant medication. For DoH document 
see http://tinyurl.com/px6z7g2 Accessed on 9/07/14. 
118
 In support groups drug holidays were described as allowing parts of one’s personality to come through, as 
bringing the ‘real’ person out. Thus, taking no treatment brings out the normal state of being and taking 
medication becomes, in contrast and by definition, an altered state.   
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stories shared with me at least, a positive effect.  By paying attention to the details of how stimulant 
medications are used, the agency of both pills and the individuals is revealed. In contrast, the next 
section examines the concerns expressed by some psychiatrists, that stimulant medication among 
others, are a means of intruding into people’s everyday lives for the benefits of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
What’s in a word 
 
‘The question “what is a word really?” is analogous to “what is a piece in chess?”’   
 (Wittgenstein, 1972:  §108). 
 
‘Real psychiatric disorders require prompt diagnosis and active treatment - they don't get 
better by themselves and become harder to treat the longer they are allowed to persist. In 
contrast, unavoidable everyday problems of life are best resolved through our natural 
resilience and the healing powers of time’ (Frances, 2013: xix). 
This quote from Allen Frances’ recent book, Saving Normal (2013), is at the heart of the controversies 
associated with ADHD; how much of a problem is it to be inattentive, forgetful or even over active? 
The book’s subtitle is worth quoting fully:  An insider’s revolt against out-of-control psychiatric 
diagnosis, DSM, Big Pharma, and the medicalisation of ordinary life. An eminent American 
psychiatrist, Dr Frances had been involved in the editing of the DSM-III and was head of the DSM-IV 
task force.  By the time work towards the publication of the DSM-5 had started over a decade ago, he 
had retired but, as he described, he felt compelled to come back into the public arena and ‘take sides 
in what has become a civil war for the heart of psychiatry – fighting a mostly losing battle to protect 
normality from medicalisation and psychiatry from overexpansion’ (ibid.: xii).  
In contrast to the medicalisation literature that I have introduced earlier in this thesis, which mostly 
offered a sociological critique on the construction of illness, the critical voices of psychiatrists have 
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focused on issues of boundaries and the delimitation of disorders.  When does a behaviour become a 
symptom of pathology?  By doing so, their attention is not on disputing that ADHD is real, but that, 
for most people, the behaviours associated with ADHD, inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity, are 
just ordinary problems that are best left to resolve without medical intervention.  
So far I have suggested that the word ‘ordinary’ had a fluctuating meaning when used by support 
group members as part of a normative frame; comparing themselves with others as well as evaluating 
their own behaviours over the passing of time. But the word ordinary has further nuances. When we 
use the word, as Wittgenstein’s quote suggests, it also plays a role and participates in the making of a 
reality; the reality of having problems deemed  too ordinary to be real disorders, or the reality of 
having  problems in ordinary, day to day life that do not get better. For a start, ordinary is both a noun 
and an adjective, it can define or be defined; its role in a speech act can shift from being the main 
point of attention to being out of the ordinary for example, or it can act to describe or transform 
something else, for instance behaviours that are deemed ordinary and that may be mistaken for 
ADHD. To switch from one sense to another is common and therefore can be confusing, as I 
experienced in the training course mentioned above.  
The etymology of ‘ordinary’ points us towards other derivations such as: a quantifying sense that 
resides in the words ‘average’, ‘standard’ and ‘commonplace’,  as well a meaning of order, ordering 
and possibly ranking too (Roget, 2012).  In the first instance ordinary may be used to describe 
something that may be usual, traditional, familiar, even natural.  This is what Dr Frances was referring 
to when he described ADHD as being an exemplar of the medicalisation of ordinary life: ‘Problems 
that used to be an expected and tolerated part of life are now diagnosed and treated as mental 
disorder’(Frances, 2013: 82). In this view, forgetfulness and impulsivity are part of our nature, and 
should be endured, letting time heal as Dr Frances suggests by quoting Voltaire: ‘the art of medicine 
consists in amusing the patient while nature cures the disease (ibid.: 100). In this sense, ordinary is 
unexceptional and a hierarchical connotation is present too, in which our object of interest, by being 
ordinary, can be conceived as tolerable, passable and acceptable. Of course what appear to be neutral 
categorisations are also tainted by other traces that impart negative values. Ordinary can easily 
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become too ordinary, trivial, not worthwhile and possibly, mediocre
119
.  I came across a portrayal of 
negative links between the ordinary and ADHD amongst support group members such as Michael and 
Maria (introduced in Chapter Five). Maria described with good humour how she first came to see the 
relevance of ADHD in her life. In the same conversation she also described how the ordinary in life 
had always been a problem and caused her difficulties:  
Maria: “Although I am very bright, I'm not good at – you know – at life, at the ordinary things 
in life. I can do extra-ordinary things sometimes, but I can't do ordinary things.  I had a job as 
a waitress, and I –  I  was hopeless [laughter]  it was really really  difficult, because I couldn’t 
keep track of the people eating, you know, people would have just left. So I quickly found I 
couldn’t do that. And I often think actually that if I had been able to be a better waitress I 
would have had a better career in the theatre, because I would have been able to support 
myself doing that. But anyway, the very thing of turning up on time every day, doing a boring 
job and earning a salary is impossible so I have been constantly poor.  I thought that if I could 
get diagnosed, then, it may help, it may help to do the jobs I am not able to do.”  
Claude: “So you have not been able to keep jobs, or get jobs?” 
Maria:  “I get jobs but they get boring and I can't bear it, it becomes insufferable, and I get 
depressed and so I leave.” 
Maria talked about how she thought her main problem was, and had always been, forgetfulness; 
losing things, not attending appointments and not paying attention.  She recounted childhood stories, 
of being always in a dream, and getting into trouble for losing things like lunch passes or forgetting 
school bags, not once but many times.   
Maria: “You just add that to the way you think of yourself as a person, as part of your 
personality. The leaving things behind, the dreaming away, it's always, always happened.”   
                                                          
119
 Dr Frances does not describe ADHD as trivial or not worthy of attention and he openly recognises the need 
to treat ADHD when experienced in extreme ways, that is when it is extra-ordinary.  
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For Maria, it is not ADHD that is negatively linked to the word ordinary, but the actual lived 
experience of ordinary life that makes her feel negative about herself. There are things, tasks in her 
daily life that, if she were able to do them, then her life might be better; she might not be so poor, for 
one thing and her career might have flourished. Ordinary life of this kind is not tolerable, it is not 
natural, instead it is insufferable and requires remediation, which for Maria, took the form of getting 
diagnosed and treated for ADHD. Yet, as with Michael, she was not interested in ‘doing ordinary’ as 
others did it, particularly not through medication, ADHD was an intrinsic part of herself, her 
personality.  
In talking about her ambivalence towards pharmaceutical treatments for ADHD, she explained why 
she sought a diagnosis. She told me, 
“So I thought it would make me feel better about myself if I had an explanation. I have a 
slight handicap in life, but I have lots of other things to make up for it, so I still hang on to 
that. Some people might be [silence] ashamed, but I don’t feel that at all. Because if I know 
what's going on, if I understand what is going on, then I might have a way to cope with it. So 
meditation is helpful, primrose oil also I think helps me too. It is also real fun to be the clown, 
to make people laugh which is all to do with having ADHD and I wouldn’t want that to go.” 
When I met Ray he was keen to explain where he saw himself in the abnormal/normal continuum. He 
said,  
“There’s no doubt I'm not normal, and I am quite happy about the fact that I am not normal. 
My not normalness, my abnormality – I call it my bounciness – gets me in trouble sometimes, 
but without my bounciness I would not be where I am.” 
Both Michael and Maria expressed ambivalence about being ordinary due to the negative 
connotations I have listed earlier; they even embraced being outside the norm, something I touched 
upon in Chapter Seven. But what interests me here is the oscillation between the two poles, 
abnormal/normal, as part of everyday life with ADHD. 
P a g e  | 215 
 
Allen Frances applied ADHD-like symptoms to his own life to illustrate how ordinary life should not 
be medicalised into ADHD:  
‘It is 6.00 am, dark and rainy and I am driving to the airport. I can’t put up the top of my 
convertible because it had been broken for months but I keep forgetting to get it fixed. I 
arrive, double park to check my bags, leaving the lights on and the radio blaring golden oldies 
from the 1960s. On returning a week later I can’t find my car in the garage. This is surprising 
to me but it shouldn’t be, because I never parked it there. I forgot it altogether, just checked 
the bags and blithely boarded the plane. Good-humoured security officers call in their buddies 
to enjoy a hearty laugh at my expense. My secretary, Tammy, has similarly found her life 
enriched by the delectation of my magical ability to lose papers going the ten feet from her 
office to mine…and my capacity to forget meetings and appointments. My life has been a 
kind of sheltered workshop. The kindness of friends and strangers has protected me from any 
serious impairment.  Am I an absentminded professor or psychiatrically sick? In the old days 
I was a normal, if sometimes ridiculous, person. But things are different now. ADHD is 
spreading like wildfire’ (Frances, 2013: 140-1).  
Whilst the strategies described by Maria and others I met were often linked to techniques of the self, 
betterment of oneself, here they are enacted through  other people; secretary, wife, friends and even 
strangers are able to remediate the effect of losing and forgetting things. Of course one could point out 
that without his status and secretary, things at work might be different for Dr Frances, or that both 
wife and friends might not be able to shelter him from impairments indefinitely.  But my concern with 
the way that the word ‘ordinary’ is put to work, is that Dr Frances emphasises its connection with the 
natural, the normal and more importantly the familiar. His own familiarity with some of the listed 
criteria for ADHD, forgetfulness and distraction, renders them ordinary and common. By extension, 
the implication is that these symptoms are not worth paying undue attention to: that these problems 
are unimpressive and to be expected.  
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In a counter-intuitive way, his call upon an empathetic connection for ADHD symptoms – ‘I have 
experienced this myself’– removes a potentially sympathetic response. As noted with chronic 
illnesses, when milder versions of symptoms are experienced in a large part of a population, it renders  
claims of illness problematic (Bury, 1991; Richardson, 2005). Because diagnosing ADHD relies 
entirely on the description of symptoms by individuals, and because there are no biological tests 
available, the stories of lateness, forgetfulness and inattention, all play a crucial part towards receiving 
help. To declare that problems of inattention and hyperactivity are ordinary human problems may 
have for effect the denial that individuals might have their own experience within their specific 
context. Not everyone might have access to the social scaffolding described by Dr Frances, to keep 
them sheltered, propped up and prevented from falling.   
Words, as Wittgenstein put it, may be seen as chess pieces ( 1972: § 108), they do things, they exude 
webs of influence, on this part of the board, rather than this one, supporting or threatening, changing 
the configuration of the initial set up. The word ordinary, in particular as an adjective used and 
applied in the varied contexts I have noted, does exactly that. It appears self-contained, one word, yet 
under this cover it does more than one thing. Just as the tools in a tool-box have different uses, so it is 
with the word ordinary (Wittgenstein, 1972: § 11). In the field of controversies in which Dr Frances’ 
book, Saving Normal is situated, a question remains, what kind of ordinary life is being threatened 
and needs saving?   
Implicit in many of the uses of ‘ordinary’ described above is a temporal element, in terms of 
occurrence, day to day, usual and continuous. When applied to ADHD symptoms, ‘ordinary’ has 
affinity with ‘persistence’ and ‘lifelong disorder’, as in the NHS Choices’ online advice:  
‘There is no cure for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), but treatment can help relieve 
the symptoms and make the condition much less of a problem in day-to-day life.’ (NHS Choices120) 
                                                          
120
 The NHS choices website is described as the ‘front door’ of NHS services and its mission is to give online 
information to the public to facilitate making choices about their health.  See http://tinyurl.com/ngwyruw 
Accessed 9/06/14. 
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The implication is that if you were to stop treatment, either pharmaceuticals and/or psychological 
ones, then the symptoms would reappear, unchanged. In other words, once you are diagnosed with 
ADHD, you may be able to alleviate its effect but it won’t go away, it will remain part of you. This is 
what is meant when ADHD is described in psychiatric manuals as ‘lifelong’: it is part of your 
ordinary, everyday experience of life, from birth onwards (UKAAN, 2013). It is also more than that, 
as it is defined as a trait, a characteristic, something integral to your person which persists over 
time
121
. During the three years I attended scientific conferences in the UK where the concept of 
lifelong disorder was discussed, I noted the increased use of the term ‘chronic disorder’ to describe 
ADHD.  What are the implications for the ‘chronopolitics’ (Ferzacca, 2010) of realigning and 
representing ADHD through a chronic paradigm? Estroff classically exposed the view that chronicity 
‘consists of a fusion of identity with diagnosis’ which transforms individuals, through time, from 
having a diagnosis to being that diagnosis and thus associated negatively with a concept of chronic 
illness (1993). The association of chronicity with mental health problems in particular has been shown 
to stigmatise and mark individuals for life through being excluded, devalued, discriminated against 
and humiliated (Link and Phelan, 2001; Estroff, Penn et al., 2004; Good, 2010). Thus, labelling an 
illness as chronic conceals the nuances and range of experiences; moments of ill health and moments 
of wellness, moments of hope and moments of despair.  As well as reflecting medicine’s temporal 
concept based on the linear chronology of human life, referring to ADHD as chronic reflects what 
medicine can or cannot do; caring – yes , medicating – yes,  but not curing,  and it follows that ADHD 
is then considered in terms of its duration.  Can this ‘chronicisation’ of ADHD equate to Estroff’s 
definition of chronicity as the ‘stabilisation, exacerbation and perpetuation of the sick role and thereby 
of sickness?’(1993: 274). Diabetes is often cited as an exemplar of chronic illness, as it was in the 
ADHD conference I attended (UKAAN, 2012), yet when the detailed practice of doctoring and of 
living with diabetes is studied, a different picture emerges, more fragmented, with multiple ways of 
being with diabetes, requiring work by all parties involved; in other words there is nothing typical in 
diabetes’s chronicity (see Mol, 2009). And so I found that in regard to living with ADHD over a 
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 With Serres (1995) we could think of ‘trait’ as the line drawn between two points, connecting and linking the 
events in a person’s life through time.  
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lifetime, support group members and patients described a myriad of ways of living with their 
symptoms, and in some of those stigma played a role, sometimes as a motivator, as with Tessa, and 
sometimes as a dark shadow to be endured.  
 
« Les gens vulnérables n’ont rien d’exceptionnel »122 
 
This chapter asked how people live with the diagnosis of ADHD. It has answered this question by 
examining the multiple and often contradictory ways that the word ‘ordinary’ is used, focusing on two 
aspects:  being labelled and taking treatments. People in support groups explained how ADHD and its 
symptoms constituted their normal way of life as they had experienced hyperactivity and inattention 
throughout their lives. They also described how, by taking stimulant medications in order to bring 
their symptoms within norms, they found being ordinary to be boring and not worthwhile. When 
people did use stimulant medications, they told me that a great deal of work was required to adapt the 
treatment to their individual lives. Their descriptions revealed how stimulants acted on people’s lives, 
swaying relations one way or another, exerting influence by either their absence or their presence in 
making life fast or slow, exuberant or focused. In contrast, the concern that pharmaceutical companies 
may be imposing their treatments to solve ordinary problems suggested that symptoms of ADHD 
might need to be endured without any medication and let the ‘tincture of time’ do its work (Frances, 
2013:98). As I attempted to show, people I met often felt outside the norm; sometimes that was 
something experienced negatively and they felt stigmatised, yet at other times, being outside the norm 
made them feel alive. Either way, living with ADHD involved some tweaking, tinkering, 
experimenting, including with medication, and suggests an active engagement. Nevertheless, when 
addressing the question – how do people live with a diagnosis of a lifelong disorder? – the trope of 
endurance looms large. In contrast to its use to denote a passive tolerance and acceptance of a state of 
being as suggested by Dr Frances, people I met described ‘enduring’ as punctuated with actions, rests 
and exhausting repetitions.  As Povinelli (2011) showed, endurance is not equally distributed and we 
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  ‘There is nothing exceptional about vulnerable people.’ (Paperman, 2011, my translation). 
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could ask why some people sustain the effort to endure and live with ADHD and its symptoms while 
others do not. Jack’s contribution to a support group session showed how the stories he recalled 
consisted of ordinary events of forgetting, but these had dire consequences, so much so that his 
account remained as poignant as when I first heard it. 
Jack was in his forties, tall, with a gentle kind face, and calm manners when speaking.  He explained 
how he was a carer for his wife who had a serious and debilitating medical condition, for which she 
needed to go into care on a regular basis. Jack was not formally diagnosed with ADHD at that point, 
and was working towards a referral from his GP to a specialist. He shared with the group how he 
suffered with forgetfulness and inattention which affected his life to such an extent that he needed to 
do something about it. For example, being disorganised meant that he often forgot to give his wife her 
medication, which led on one occasion to her hospitalisation and got him into trouble with social 
services who deemed this to be neglectful, and a form of abuse. My fieldnotes recorded how I was 
struck by the contrast between his calm and upbeat tone and his situation which seemed to me very 
difficult.  Jack was a civil engineer by profession, but ended up demoted at work due to numerous 
incidents, all related to being disorganised and forgetful. On the occasion that led to his demotion, he 
was managing part of a very large civil engineering project, which required some tight coordination 
between different teams. As he put it, if one cog in the machine is missing, the whole project would 
grind to halt. Jack described how one night, he got a call from the building site as he was about to go 
to bed. They were missing the equipment essential for the work planned. Jack had forgotten to 
organise its delivery and attend the site to oversee the work. The work had to be postponed causing 
financial loss to the company and one of the longest traffic jams in that part of England. The 
comments of other members were highlighting how bad he must have felt, how awful it would have 
been, that maybe he should have asked for help from his work. Very quickly the conversation moved 
towards pragmatic advice and suggestions; one man suggested that he joined him and a friend in 
meeting weekly in each other’s houses and help each other keeping on top of chores and tasks. Jack 
was obviously interested; his house, as he described it, was in a real mess, falling apart, and he wasn’t 
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able to bring it back to order. One of the facilitators offered to meet with him in order to chase the GP 
for the referral, and suggested that the discussion moved to the person next to Jack.  
The question of how some people endure and others do not has to be situated within the lifespan; thus 
people sometimes endure and carry on and at other times become overwhelmed, reducing their 
relations and contact with others or even  stopping them altogether. ‘To live with ADHD’ may mean 
withdrawal from the tiring activities and the perseverance for a while. It may mean not being able to 
sustain employment, being demoted, being out of work, or isolating oneself and neglecting 
friendships as some of the people I met described.   Beatrice, a support group facilitator who had been 
actively campaigning nationally for many years, described how she had found herself worn down by 
the expectation of government institutions on patient organisations to be representative. She explained 
how, without resources and with ADHD, her symptoms could not always be kept under control. She 
had not been able to carry on being involved in consultations and other public activities; she dropped 
all that for six months and, with the help of her husband, gradually felt able to resume with running 
the local support group. Beatrice shared with me the darker side of running a group, explaining that 
behind the caring space, there are demands, expectations and endless challenges which limited her 
ability to care. It seems that endurance in this case is made and remade; things stop and start again, as 
ADHD and its problems, private and public, do not get resolved, it is experienced as a never-ending 
and exhausting cycle. In Chapter 7 I introduced Sonia, a performing artist who was not entirely 
convinced of ADHD’s positive attributes. She described how she felt ADHD was holding her back,  
“I want to make things, may it be music or changes. Still I feel trapped on a kind of treadmill 
of effort that does not get me anywhere. So unless things are set up for me I don’t make 
things happen, I have to concentrate really hard and be helped by my partner. It doesn’t mean 
that I have not done anything, but even then, like getting my diagnosis, it took me years to 
click-on to what was not going well, what to do about it. With my career I still don't know 
what to do, it's horrible, much worse than I could imagine ten years ago. It is true that you're 
going to get a propensity of people with ADHD  that are resilient because there is something 
about dealing with ADHD that you need to pick yourself up, over and over again. So it 
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teaches us – we can try again – until we get diffraction of course, but it teaches us [silence] to 
[silence]... It's not all due to ADHD but without it I don’t think it would have happened this 
way. It’s the, I don’t know, the 30% that makes the difference, it's awful, I don’t like that, and 
it's still there.” 
In this interview and through conversations in the support group, Sonia made reference to ADHD as 
an enduring problem that lasted and required resilience because finding solutions or remediation had 
to be repeated over and over again. Sonia told me how making decisions was often done off the cuff, 
by improvisation rather than based on calculated choices. Of course, such an approach had 
disadvantages, and when I met her she felt that it had held her back in her career. During one group 
conversation, this aspect was discussed directly by older members of the group advising younger 
ones, suggesting that things did not get easier with age and still required the same amount of effort 
and attention. I recall Sonia explaining that it gets harder to find the motivation and stubbornness 
required to deal with ADHD as years went by.  That is one lens through which we can see endurance 
as life-draining, but accompanying it there is a parallel vision that suggests endurance to be life-
forming. A lens through which ‘[w]e see a multiplicity of life forms each with their own immanent 
forms of belonging, enduring, disregard and obligation’ (Povinelli quoted in Reimóndez, 2013: 441). 
Over the fourteen months that I attended Group C, Sonia developed a stronger role, asking questions 
and making suggestions to other members and, on one occasion, putting forward a proposal to 
organise support between the group meetings.  
She explained her difficulties with keeping on track with tasks, procrastinating and being distracted 
away from the calendars and other lists she had set up. She wondered if she could pair with someone 
in the group and create what she called an ‘ad-hoc link for activation’, causing both laughter and 
puzzlement amongst the other members. What would be helpful, she explained, would be to have 
regular contact by emails, phone or other digital media from someone to remind her and check if she 
was on track with that day’s tasks. Someone said, “You need a PA, a personal assistant, that’s what 
you need”.  Sonia persisted and suggested that she would reciprocate with something that would be 
helpful to the other person; “what I need is somebody to be accountable to, who can chase me, and 
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remind me of what I promised I would do”.  Nina agreed that she could do with some help too in 
chasing her doctor’s appointment, as she had been on the waiting list for an assessment for too long. 
They exchanged contact details and as other ‘ad-hoc links’ were being explored, such as going 
jogging, helping with tax returns, Sonia suggested that she would email group members and people 
could start organising themselves
123
. 
By exposing the fragility of ordinary life and her vulnerability to things going wrong, Sonia was also 
creating a possibility to receive the caring attention of others.  The forgetting or impulsive actions that 
were frowned upon, or even disciplined at work or at home, were as a result likely to be denied or 
hidden by those who experienced them. In contrast, the support groups offered the space to express, to 
verbalise, to voice the idea that forgetting and being hyperactive happens in ordinary life cannot be 
ignored, and needs paying attention to. Within the space of the support group, Sonia was aiming to 
form webs of obligations between members, reciprocal arrangements, risking to trust each other in 
order to change their lives (Stack, 1975: 39).  When taking care of each other in the groups, members 
paid attention to each other and reached out to one another by working with the thought that:  we are 
both disorganised; how can we help each other?  We are too active; would you come running with 
me? In Saving Normal, Frances (2013) suggested that the prevalence of these symptoms was often a 
reason for not acting, for enduring quietly, but I have suggested that, on the contrary, the familiarity of 
this experience is the basis for group members reaching out and caring for each other. In other words, 
the fragility of ordinary life becomes the loci of creative possibilities. Sonia’s experiment revolved 
around an ‘activation’ which I took to be the activation of reciprocal attention and care, emphasising 
that care was not to be taken for granted, but actively practiced and purposefully done. In this way 
care is the tinkering, interfering  and attentive experimentation as proposed by Mol (2010) and, in a 
broader sense, it is ‘everything we do to continue, repair, and maintain ourselves so that we can live in 
the world as well as possible’ (Fisher and Tronto, 1990: 511). Whilst the ethics of care has a clear 
genealogy in feminist theory (Fisher and Tronto, 1990; Gilligan, 1982), Laugier shows how it has a 
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 It remains unclear to me if the arrangements made came to fruition; in conversation members sometimes 
described going to the cinema or the gym with other members. I did not have the opportunity to ask Sonia 
directly after the meeting described here.  
P a g e  | 223 
 
broader purchase on life as lived by all, by proposing  that ‘dependence and vulnerability are traits of 
a condition common to all, not of a special category – the “vulnerable”’(Laugier, 2013). In other 
words vulnerability is part of ordinary life and this thesis has attempted to show how, in regard to 
ADHD within its multiple versions and life forms, vulnerability can also act as a life affirming 
counterbalance to the darker side of the condition.  
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Chapter Nine An open window 
 
This thesis has explored the diagnostic practices through which ADHD in adults was enacted in a 
clinic and in support groups in the UK. I have shown that there were features particular to the 
diagnostic process and these were due to the opening of an historical window that rendered the 
diagnosis of ADHD newly available to adults. This move encouraged specific practices aimed at 
enabling the remembering of childhood events. I found that these elements had implications for the 
people I met as they deployed various forms of memory practices through acts of recognition, 
recollection and archiving as well as in the way that they conceived their relations to others, whether 
family kin or strangers.  
The practices I have described are continually changing and the findings of this thesis do not suggest 
otherwise. Some elements that have changed the practices of diagnosing adult ADHD since I was last 
in the field include the publication of the DSM-5, the introduction of a new diagnostic tool (DIVA) 
and the rapid expansion of support groups meetings in both frequency and numbers. Furthermore, it 
may be that as the diagnosis of ADHD in children becomes more widespread, the cohort of 
individuals being diagnosed in adulthood will reduce – a change which may alter the diagnostic 
practices too. For that reason I am cautious about drawing definitive conclusions and instead aim in 
this chapter to re-trace the praxes that I came across, to explore what they might be pointing towards 
and finally to suggest what areas would bear further exploration.  
 
A window of time 
 
The questions raised in this research project reach back to when I first came across the diagnosis of 
ADHD in adults, in the late 2000s, when the academic literature and popular media were reporting a 
binary opposition in views.  On the one hand, the controversies associated with ADHD were 
presenting the expansion of the diagnosis into adulthood as a prime example of the medicalisation of 
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the everyday (Conrad, 2007; Timimi and Moncrieff, 2010). On the other hand, scientists were 
revisiting the claims that children with ADHD could grow out of it, suggesting instead that it was a 
lifelong and persistent disorder (Asherson, 2010). Given my background of working in mental health 
services, including campaigning groups in the UK for a number of years, I was intrigued to 
understand how these two contradictory propositions would manifest themselves in the lives of 
individuals.  What did this mean for the adults concerned; had they remained undiagnosed and 
untreated since childhood, or did they develop ADHD later in life?  If the former was true, then what 
was the impact on their lives? I also wondered how the diagnostic criteria applied to children would 
be adapted for adults. Were the symptoms in adults similar to those seen in children and did that make 
adults equivalent to children; did they regress into childhood?  What, if any, was the role of ‘Big 
Pharma’? Was adult ADHD a modern disorder, as some claimed, and what benefits might there be in 
claiming to have this disorder?   I did not cover all of these questions during fieldwork and 
opportunities to meet adults diagnosed with ADHD helped me narrow my field of interest prior to 
commencing my fieldwork. In particular, the stories people shared with me suggested that the practice 
of diagnosing children in the UK that grew from the mid-1990s onwards meant that they could not 
have been diagnosed in their childhood, despite their ability to recollect severe difficulties related to 
hyperactivity and inattention.   
In other words, this is a unique window of time, when adults over the age of 30 years old, for whom 
no diagnostic opportunities had existed during childhood now have the possibility of re-imagining 
and/or confirming their lifelong difficulties in the light of the diagnosis of ADHD. The rates of 
diagnosing children in the UK, combined with the increased awareness of the diagnosis, suggest the 
situation will change within the next five to ten years (NICE 2009)
124
.  This is not to suggest that 
ADHD will no longer need to be treated in adults but that it is more likely to be detected in childhood 
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 NICE guidance described the situation thus: ‘There has also been a large increase in recognition of the 
problem and a corresponding rise in the numbers treated: from an estimate of 0.5 per 1,000 children diagnosed 
in the UK 30 years ago (Taylor, 1986) , to more than 3 per 1,000 receiving medication for ADHD in the late 
1990s’ (2009: 16). 
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and that if symptoms are persistent, treatment will continue into adulthood
125
. The window remains 
open to further changes and new practices, but what remains specific to the present moment in time is 
the large number of individuals who may experience the detection, recognition and identification of 
their difficulties as ADHD in their adulthood. For that reason my research questions focused on 
exploring how the diagnosis might be carried out to respond to this specific historical context. 
Furthermore, the concerns expressed by the people I met suggested that the work required for 
diagnosing ADHD in adults was not restricted to clinicians but that, in line with other disorders 
(Dumit, 2006), it involved efforts and advocacy from the affected adults themselves. By examining 
the diagnostic process, my intention has not been to ask, what is ADHD? Instead, I have explored 
how people develop knowledge about working and living with ADHD whilst the controversies and 
debates about the condition continue.  
 
Influential methodologies and concepts 
 
Probably due to its being a recent phenomenon, social scientists’s attention to ADHD in adults has 
been scarce. Mostly work has been based in the USA, Australia, Canada and it has adopted either a 
theoretical approach, often related to medicalisation (Conrad, 1975, 2007; Conrad and Potter, 2000; 
Tait, 2003, 2006, 2009) or a historical one (Lakoff, 2000; Smith, 2011, 2012; Rafalovich, 2001a, 
2001b). Ethnographic explorations of ADHD are rare and this section highlights some that have been 
influential to my research. Emily Martin, who touched upon ADHD as part of a fuller examination of 
Bipolar Disorder as a diagnosis enmeshed in American culture, noted it sometimes as a pathology and 
at other times as a quality (Martin, 2000, 2007). In a brief autobiographical text focusing on ADHD, 
Attention, Martin explored the controversies associated with stimulant medications and suggested that 
norms of attention are being set in children, only to be broken down in adulthood:  
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 The prevalence of ADHD in adults in the UK and Europe is estimated as ranging between 2% and 5% 
(Kooij, 2010; Matheson et al., 2013b). 
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‘We are creating a notion of an ideal child who is disciplined and attentive to adults. This 
child then ideally becomes an adult whose attention is creatively dispersed and fragmented. 
The goal of marketing campaigns can then ironically come to be capturing a good market 
share of those fragmented adult attention spans.’ (Martin, 2002: 36 -37). 
Goodwin ( 2010),who produced another autobiographically inspired project,  specifically explored 
Hyperactivity in the San Francisco Bay, in children and adults. He argued for a notion of 
hyperactivity which transcended the condition’s medical and pathological definition so as to 
encompass dynamic and creative aspects of life. In the UK Sarrami Foroushani ( 2009) explored 
clinicians’ approach to diagnosing ADHD in adults and found high variations in diagnostic outcome 
due to lack of awareness and training as well as varying social factors, for example  media and public 
controversies which  influenced clinicians (on this theme see also Rafalovic, 2005). 
The work conducted by EPOKS (European Patients’ Organizations in Knowledge Society)126  was 
influential in the development of my research. Vololona Rabeharisoa and Madeleine Akrich and their 
colleagues examined the contributions of patient organisations in influencing the governance and 
delivery of health issues across five countries in Europe and in regard to four health conditions, 
including ADHD (Akrich et al., 2014; Rabeharisoa and O’Donovan, 2013). Together they have put 
forward the concept of ‘evidence-based activism’ to describe the knowledge production activities that 
patient organisations engage with, not in opposition to the medical establishment but ‘from 
within’(2014). They suggest that “‘evidence-based activism’ entails a collective inquiry associating 
patients/activists and specialists/professionals in the conjoint fabrics of scientific statements and 
political claims’ (ibid.: 2). Some of the specific circumstances and particular demographics related to 
the patient organisations studied 
127
 might undermine the possible generalisation of the concept, 
nevertheless ‘evidence-based activism’ questions and challenges the notion of evidence that circulates 
in biomedicine. Chapters Eight and Five of this thesis discussed the kind of experiential knowledge 
that is produced in support groups and explored how collective experience circulates when there are 
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 See http://www.csi.ensmp.fr/WebCSI/EPOKSWebSite/ Accessed 05/03/2013. 
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 The Rare Diseases Organisation is particularly interesting for the impact it had at European Policy level 
despite the numbers involved, (see Rabeharisoa, Callon, et al., 2014). 
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no explicit collaborations between patients and clinicians/scientists.  I showed that in some cases the 
collated experiences are subsequently shared online on forums that are also visited by clinicians who 
engage in professional debate. In other cases I have discussed how support groups may seek to 
establish collaborations not only with clinicians and their institutions but they also, at times, favour 
making closer links with non-medical bodies, such as the employment agency and criminal justice 
systems.  In this respect, the use of the knowledge produced by support groups is strategically and 
often simultaneously deployed across different sites in the public domain for different reasons.  
Exploring and exposing the complexity of living with and being treated for ADHD is also at the core 
of Ilina Singh’s work and has promoted the voice of children in the debates surrounding stimulant 
medication. In particular, Singh has shown how the importance of considering biological alongside 
familial and social factors which influence children with ADHD, a model she described as the 
‘ecological niche’ (Singh, 2012b). Singh argues that ‘children’s behavioural development must be 
seen as a fundamentally situated and relational process in which there is an ongoing and mutual 
process of shaping and of transformation between child actors and their immediate and proximal 
social and physical spaces.’ (Singh, 2011: 890). By emphasising the agency of children, and at the 
same time the constraints surrounding them, Singh shows that the impact of treatment should be 
considered within a ‘whole system method’, through a ‘social efficacy approach’ (see also Van der 
Geest, et al., 1996; Whyte et al , 2002). Thus Singh contends that stimulant medication does not 
change children’s sense of self at a crucial time in their development per se; she argues that dialogues 
with children show that most children do not feel that their ‘authentic self’ is at risk, but that there are 
circumstances, often dependent on the socio-political environment that might impact negatively on the 
efficacy of the treatment (Singh, 2012a).
128
In Chapter Eight of this thesis, the role of stimulant 
medication is explored in the lives of adults, who described how their pharmaceutical treatment was 
neither all good nor all bad, but changed depending on the situation they found themselves in. I have 
found it helpful to think of stimulant medications as ‘actants’ (Latour, 2005) in that they are the 
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 The Voices Report (2012b) provides examples of the impact of ‘playground ethics’ on treatment, such as the 
way a bullying environment might undermine the role that stimulant medication might have in containing 
impulsive behaviour.  
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source of actions  beyond their pharmacological properties;  stimulants acts on people’s lives and  
their use can be moulded to the uniqueness of an individual’s everyday life. Thus the fast and short 
acting element of the medication’s compound, its pharmacokinetic property, provides flexibility for 
its ingestion; in other words medication can be taken strategically for optimum effect on people’s 
social, professional and family lives. Paying attention to the details of how stimulants were used 
revealed the agency of both the pills and the individuals. 
 
Collaboration 
 
My research project and its design started in the conversations I had over a number of years with 
members of the patient organisation AADD-UK which eventually led to a formal collaborative intent. 
How this would be translated into practice was left quite open and undefined and remained so 
throughout my fieldwork. It was clear that my research benefited from access to support groups and 
conversations with the organisation’s founders but how that was beneficial to their aim was not 
always clear. For example, the survey I conducted provided helpful data for my research and it was 
published on AADD-UK’s website, but its collaborative value remains unclear.  In contrast, the 
agreement I had with the clinicians and scientists was clear and explicitly formulated through the 
bureaucratic procedures required for ethical approval; these spelt out my role and position at least in 
broad terms.   
The fact that collaboration with the patient organisation was easier said than done and did not need 
further spelling out in the clinic, took me by surprise but, on reflection, this may be indicative of 
asymmetrical relations within collaborative networks. In a recent collection of essays, Konrad (2012) 
noted how calls for collaborative work were ubiquitous in all kinds of research arenas, including the 
bio-medical and the social sciences, due, in part to collaboration having an inherent positive attribute 
attached to it. Thus to collaborate is to open opportunities for exchanging knowledge, expertise and 
resources from different sources in the belief that this accumulation of views will bring positive 
outcomes including the resolution to a common problem. Such a vision of collaboration is particularly 
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evident in health-related research as it provides the means to include different contributors and often 
different disciplines in the hope of alleviating suffering.  This representation applied directly to my 
research as it found itself at the intersection of an already-existing collaborative network, some 
arrangements being more formalised than others, for the purpose of understanding adult ADHD, 
biologically and otherwise. UKAAN and AADD-UK are both organisations that engage in 
collaborative networks , including with each other, which could be described as  ‘dispersed 
collaboration’ (Konrad 2012). This collaborative mode favours virtual and fluid connections  and 
forms what Callon has called ‘hybrid forums’ (2009) where lay and specialist experts debate and 
discuss common issues.  Yet all is not always what it seems as the moral reward for those entering 
collaborative agreements has the potential to render the actual collaborative practices obsolete 
(Strathern 2012). The contrast between the collaborative expectations of the clinic and the patient 
organisation, one unsaid but acted upon and the other formalised yet stumbling to get concretised, 
leads me to reflect on how the rhetorical force of collaboration affected my position in the field. 
Through the numerous conversations and questions that I engaged with in the support groups and the 
clinic, it became evident that initially I was perceived by all parties as an outsider bringing in some 
expertise. The ethnographer as an outsider is a classic trope in anthropology, which, in the context of 
my fieldwork, requires some nuancing.  In the first instance this trope calls upon the image of the 
anthropologist who comes from afar, spatially and culturally, who studies a group of people through 
becoming sufficiently familiar with the language and ways of life, and yet remains distant enough to 
formulate some theoretical conceptions of a particular situation. Being an insider-outsider has been 
part of the knowledge toolbox and methodological orientation of anthropologists since ethnography 
was theorised (Malinowski, 2002; Nader, 2011; Stocking, 1984).  The latter end of the 20
th
 century  
saw some challenges to this ‘exotic anthropology’, and ‘the distances between ethnologists and the 
people they observed – once seen as informants – have constantly decreased’ (Peirano, 1998: 105) 
and thus anthropologists turned to study at home. Anthropologists do this within their unique 
circumstances and the home element of their research varies from one person to another depending on 
their connection with it, leading some to describe themselves as native anthropologists (Ohnuki-
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Tierney, 1984), or as partial insiders (Narayan, 1993). A number of factors in my circumstances 
rendered these categories inadequate; I was born and brought up in France but have lived for 32 years 
in London; I have worked in the field  of mental health for twenty years, but never in an ADHD 
related field
129
; I was a non-clinician in the clinic and a neurotyical in the support groups.  
In Partial Connections, Marilyn Strathern (2004) described herself as feminist and anthropologist, 
explaining that each separate identity  was contained in the other and connected, not fully but at least 
partially. Similarly I found it hard to position myself into separate identities of outsider and insider as 
I am always both, to myself and others and my presence in the field was no different. Inspired by 
Mol’s call for research to improve care practices, rather than proving them right or wrong ( 2006),  I 
have striven to contribute to the debates I found in support groups and clinic. In practice, this has 
meant that I attempted to establish a symmetrical positionality (Latour, 2012) that required the 
suspension of value judgements, a kind of reflexivity that offered opportunity for  negotiation and, 
most importantly, considered that participants might know more about the phenomena at hand than I 
did.  It also involved learning ‘the art of speaking well to people about things that really matter to 
them’ (ibid.: 58 my translation), requiring me to enter into dialogues so as to check my 
understandings before suggesting ways to resolve difficulties. The collaborative process I have 
described was always negotiated and re-negotiated in the different sites of my fieldwork. Sometimes it 
led to nothing discernible or even to disagreements, but at other times it has informed my argument. 
In this collaborative spirit, this thesis aims to contribute to an anthropology of ADHD by exploring 
how the condition is made in the social and political contexts of the UK at the beginning of the 21
st
 
century. My research is conceived as an opening for further explorations and is intended to be 
complementary to other medical and non-medical studies.   
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 My familiarity with the mechanics of the NHS proved to be very useful and significantly simplified the 
process for being awarded an honorary contract which allowed my presence in the clinic.  
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Widening the diagnostic process 
 
Ray : “There isn't one ADHD. Look at genetics, they were hoping to find a gene, but they are 
many, and it makes me think it isn’t one condition. And a spectrum idea is more useful for 
having strategies, sometimes my ADHD is a pain, other times I don’t mind it, it can even be 
helpful.”  
Nader’s  clarification of her classic concerns from ‘studying up’ to ‘studying up, down, sideways 
simultaneously’ ( 2008), encouraged me to retain an open mind as to how the diagnosis might be done 
and I decided to work across clinic and patient organisations (see also Bowman, 2009; Hannerz, 
2003).  At the point of formulating my research project, I was warned of the complications associated 
with extending my fieldwork across clinical and non-clinical sites; for example there might be 
practical and ethical problems of access, but also of positionality as an ethnographer.  I found those 
complications aplenty. Yet this strategy opened possibilities for me to move beyond the seemingly 
stubborn divisions between these sites. Rather than confronting head-on and statically the intractable 
and polarised positions taken towards ADHD –  for/against, real/not real, experts/non-experts – 
(Asherson, 2010; Timimi and Moncrieff, 2010),  I moved back and forth, at times within the space of 
a day, between a range of support groups and clinics. Sometimes they were at odds with each other, 
and my position became uncomfortable. Sometimes I was regarded with suspicion or, on the contrary, 
I was sought as an ally
130
. At other times I found the clinic and the support groups to be in accord with 
each other, even supportive of each other, sometimes from a distance or via virtual means, but at other 
times engaged in close face to face encounters
131
.   
Veena Das and colleagues (1998) showed the clinic to be an extension of other spaces where caring 
and looking after others also take place, albeit through other modes and practices. Rather than a flow 
of techniques and discourse that would proceed from the clinic to permeate other domains of work, or 
                                                          
130
 In such situations I aimed to develop what Van Der Geest (2007) described as ‘permanent sensitivity’, which 
I experienced as providing patient listening, sometimes avoiding thorny topics, and not jumping to conclusions. 
131
 Patient organisations were invited to contribute to all scientific conferences during my fieldwork, as well as 
to more expert forums and policy working groups. Some support groups invited their local NHS psychiatrists, 
not always with comfortable results; nevertheless, dialogues were initiated.  
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the home, I suggest that there is more of  a looping connection, within which practices and concepts 
circulate, albeit the origin of such exchanges remains an object of speculation. Extending the 
diagnostic process in space and time outside its traditional clinical context also provided a means to 
include the voices and concerns of ‘experts by experience’ alongside those of the ‘experts by 
profession’. Chapter Seven discussed some of the ways that support group members re-appropriated 
ADHD for themselves, transforming deficits into skills adapted to their environment as well as 
making the condition the basis for connecting and making kin with strangers.  
It has been the aim of this thesis to describe the actants involved in making ADHD from a variety of 
sites so as to dispel the binaries listed above that represent ADHD as field of contestation (Crossley, 
2006).  Recognising that power imbalances exist between the parties involved should not obfuscate 
the complexities of their relations, but the practices that I observed have highlighted the connections 
that can be found between biomedicine, patient activism and pharmaceuticals. Thus I described in 
Chapter Eight, how the distinction between expert and lay knowledge became blurred, as support 
group members charted their experience of taking medication, in terms of dosage and timing, 
activities which in time influenced clinicians in their prescribing practices. In Chapter Four, 
pharmaceutical medications were described as one option out of an array of strategies for living better 
with symptoms. I showed how such strategies were neither an easy solution nor a ‘magic pill’ 
imposed through a medicalisation process, but an act that would engender engagement and adaptation.  
Similarly, the notion of activism in relation to contested illness was shown in Chapter Two to be 
nuanced by the actions and determination of clinicians towards a broader recognition of ADHD in 
adults.  I have aimed to show how support groups contributed to the diagnostic process by producing 
knowledge concerned about living with ADHD; sometimes this knowledge worked in accord, in 
parallel or in dispute with medical and administrative institutions. Widening the lens of the diagnostic 
process and including non-clinical actors is to attend to the voices of those directly concerned with 
health as well as those concerned with illness (Canguilhem, 1991). It is also an attempt to redress the 
balance of representation of knowledge production in matters of health and to suggest a 
transformation of ‘a political landscape that is defined as much by existing scholarship as it is by the 
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exclusion of those that are defined as incapable of producing knowledge that matters.’ (Nathan and 
Stengers, 2004: 191 my translation). 
By listening to and bringing together the voices and actions of clinicians, patients, stimulant 
medications, support groups and old documents, this thesis has shown the complexity and multiplicity 
of the relations between them  which arguably make different versions of ADHD and  ‘facilitate 
different realities’(Van de Port and Mol, 2015). In as much as this is my argument, the same idea was 
partially present in the conversations and interviews I had with by the people I met. Ray’s quote 
above was one example, showing how the multiplicity of ADHD seemed to be accepted; it was made 
of many genes, it had many realities and ways of being experienced by one person, yet it remained 
ADHD.  Similarly the conversations with clinicians documented in Chapters Two and Five highlight 
the many ways that ADHD was categorised; for example, as Specific Learning Disability in the 
education milieu, as neurodevelopmental disorder in the mental health clinic and previously as 
neuropsychiatric disorder or Minimal Bain Damage.  The important element here is not the different 
realities that are enacted in living ADHD in these different contexts, which could suggest that they are 
mutually exclusive or as if moving in separate worlds. Instead my research shows how the different 
versions/realities of ADHD made through diagnostic practices can be connected to one another, and 
how they are often experienced simultaneously. In the  preceding chapters, I documented how people 
described the way that they lived with ADHD in ambivalent terms; it is never all bad, nor all good, 
but changes from one day to another, often more rapidly than that, and ADHD is experienced through 
relations with others.  Thus school reports, themselves records of good or turbulent relations, were 
able to bring useful biographical continuity whilst at the same time negatively colouring memories of 
childhood. In other words, the multiple realities of ADHD are connected through the continuously 
changing webs of relations between people and/or things.  
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‘Remembering is the discovery of kinship connections’ 
(Lambek, 2007:220-221) 
 
My account of the diagnostic process outside the clinic highlighted the network of relations and 
practices across sites which in turn enabled this thesis to draw out two interrelated themes concerning 
memory and kinship. The chapters in this thesis have followed a temporal organisation starting from 
the point at which a clinical diagnosis is confirmed and they have then moved back in time through 
the journey described by the people I met inside and outside of the clinic. Chapters Two to Five have 
examined the central role that remembering and forgetting played in the clinic and the support groups 
in order to identify ADHD. By examining the emergence of the neurodevelopmental concept, I asked 
how normative notions of progress could impact on the way adults with ADHD might narrate their 
life stories as part of the diagnostic process.   I have shown that in both sites people used structures to 
support and aid the process of remembering childhood events by using questionnaires and old 
documents, or by creating archives for reference and by devising appointment systems which 
functioned as caring practices. I have suggested that their purpose in doing so, was to create particular 
versions of ADHD, some more authoritative than others but not necessarily in opposition. Practices of 
remembering were also shown to be exercised towards the present in order not to forget daily tasks. 
Support group members called these practices  ‘strategies’ which I described with reference to 
Foucault (1988) as transformative practices. Members regarded such strategies as requiring repetition 
in order to achieve the aim of living a better life. 
In contrast the flash-like ‘moment of recognition’ identified by many support group members 
happened when they saw themselves reflected in another as if in a mirror. Their first encounters with 
ADHD were recounted to me as the unveiling of a knowledge that had already been with them, a ‘re-
cognition’, which the morphology of the word suggests in this case to be a combination of identifying 
and taking to be true. Such moments of recognition figured in the narratives of many support group 
members and provided them with a sense of continuity in their lives. Just as old documents could be 
seen as evidence that hyperactivity and/or inattention had been present throughout their lives, the 
flashes of recognition were discussed as triggers and turning points. Other stories suggested that it 
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took the interventions of others, relatives or clinicians, in order for individuals to consider that their 
difficulties might be related to ADHD.  I found that clinicians also discussed the process of 
identifying and discerning ADHD from other possibilities in terms of recognising something that was 
familiar. The interviews, informal conversations and observations in the clinic suggested that 
diagnosing was based on pragmatic and practical clinical skills that are developed over time. As I saw 
it, the face-to-face encounters with patients over months and years helped clinicians develop a 
repertoire of case studies from which to draw and recognise symptoms. Similarly to the ways that 
people in the support groups explained how they recognised themselves in others – the way they 
moved or talked – the clinicians described recognising traits and signs in patients that fitted with the 
typology they had built.  In other words, memory as recognition played a central role in the diagnostic 
practices of ADHD, in and out of the clinic, as clinicians and support group members relied on 
recollection and recognition in order to make ADHD. Thus I have shown that the practices for 
identifying and diagnosing ADHD in adults in the different settings were part of a family of practice 
that sought the whole picture of an individual rather than focusing on a singular essence for the 
disorder itself (Wittgenstein, 1972).  
It is important to note that for clinicians and support group members alike, recognising and 
diagnosing could still leave them in doubt and uncertain that the difficulties being experienced would 
best be explained by the concept of ADHD.  Thus clinicians often brought complicated cases to ‘case 
formulation’ meetings where colleagues were encouraged to contribute to the hypotheses. Similarly, 
support group members may have recognised themselves in another diagnosed with ADHD yet 
remained ambivalent and not sure if ADHD encapsulated what might be wrong with them. Just as 
clinicians referred to their peers, so individuals attended support groups for the same purpose, putting 
their suppositions to the test.  By highlighting the common diagnostic practices between clinicians and 
patients, this thesis is contributing to a better understanding of ‘self-diagnosis’, a non-medical process 
which is often portrayed negatively
132
. In line with Canguilhem ( 2009), I suggest that the process of 
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 My argument is that the specific moment in time of my fieldwork highlighted common diagnostic practices, 
but there are of course many practices that differ between the clinic and support group; I have described the 
formal, statutory and gatekeeping role that the clinic played, and the informal and voluntary organisational 
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identifying ill health starts with the lived experience of the patient, which as I have shown, is 
hypothesised and tested, often before any contact with formal medicine is initiated.  It is further 
proposed that when this process is misunderstood by clinicians, the clinical encounter is rendered 
ineffective (Matheson et al., 2013a).  
The connections between remembering and kinship were explored more specifically in Chapters Six 
and Seven of this thesis. I have suggested that recognition was a part of memory, but it is also a part 
of kinship, in that kin can be recognised or disowned, accepted or rejected. In line with Lambek’s 
(2007) suggestion that kinship should be thought of as a verb, as a set of practices, just as 
remembering is, I explored the unexpected recognition  that can occur between a parent and child 
through ADHD. Whereas the moment of recognition described previously concerned strangers, 
Chapter Six explored how parents with children who are diagnosed with ADHD found themselves re-
examining their past through their own childhood memories and their child’s stories. In this way I 
suggest that memories of childhood associated with ADHD were triggered upstream from a child to 
its parents, as parents recognised themselves in their child. Whereas common traits and characteristics 
are usually seen to flow downstream from parent to child, confirming a sense of identity and 
belonging, here a new sense of identity is suggested through a descendant. In line with the notion of 
‘teknonymy’, where parents are named after their child (Bloch, 1993), the parents I met were made 
into adults with ADHD through their child’s involvement with the condition. Thus parents adapted 
their family life to living with ADHD and embarked on re-imagining kinship relations with their own 
children whilst in the process of being diagnosed. The clinical practices for diagnosing ADHD in 
adults encouraged the movement of memories and stories between generations and traced a lineage 
that was also understood through biomedical paradigms in terms of the causation of ADHD. In the 
context of the stigmatisation of ADHD for both children and adults, I found that for some of the adults 
I met, the need to share a different way of being with their child provided a sense of empowerment 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
position the support group occupied, each with their distinct administrative and bureaucratic practices. At times 
clinic and support groups were clearly not in agreement; waiting times was one such an issue, and generally 
access to resources caused disagreement. I have described the complicated and at times uneasy collaboration 
attempted between these actors.   
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and solidarity which unexpectedly turned them into activists, advocating for resources and more 
broadly for an acceptance of diversity (Rapp and Ginsburg, 2011). Re-imagining kinship relations in 
view of the unexpected recognition in their children, was for some an experience imbued with 
contradictions, as they felt both relieved about having treatments for their symptoms, and yet guilty 
that their child’s difficulty was probably due to them.  
In the support groups, I found that the recognition given to biological kin was also exercised towards 
strangers on the basis of a biology grounded on difference, described in this context as neurodiversity. 
Thus the vertical biological links were augmented by horizontal relations described through kinship 
language. People described how their similar ‘brain wiring’ marked them as different from other 
people and from the norm. As I saw it, sharing a particular biology and sharing stories and memories 
became practices through which kinship was forged. I found that discussion about neurodiversity took 
place, more often than not, with language depicting relationships and a sense of belonging, rather than 
neuroscientific discourse. As in other parts of this thesis, the heterogeneity of the people I met brought 
certain nuances to the notion that kin relations were being shaped on the basis of a neurological 
diversity; they highlighted how the description of ADHD as ‘gift’ was often experienced at the same 
time as a curse. Yet, as the membership of all the ADHD groups included individuals who had other 
neurodevelopmental disorders, principally Aspergers’133 and Tourrette’s, I suggest that  diversity is 
celebrated through the relations between people who share being different, rather than because of the 
connections between neurones and synapses. The mutual recognition that members gave each other in 
the support groups gave a voice directed towards the re-appropriation of ADHD, a call for caring and 
paying attention to ordinary problems. As invisible and quiet as it may be, the on-going care and 
sharing taking place in the support group formed a kind of activism, an ontological politic based on 
the making of pragmatic knowledge directed towards alleviating suffering which in turn shaped a 
particular reality. 
 
                                                          
133
 This nomenclature is no longer formally used since the publication of the DSM-5 at the end of my fieldwork. 
Apsergers’ syndrome forms now part of the Autistic Spectrum Disorder (DSM-5, 2013). 
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Vulnerability as a shared condition 
 
I have described the journey that led to getting a diagnosis, from the kinship relations that were 
formed through recognising a different kind of biology, as well as memory practices in the support 
groups and the clinic. If I have presented the process by starting at the end, it is partly to recognise 
that my own starting point in the research inquiry was the clinical diagnosis. To start my inquiry in the 
clinic allowed me to unpack what seemed to be a finished, complete category, stabilised through a 
number of DSM editions over the last 35 years. The reversed chronology of the chapters also 
paralleled the retrospective work undertaken by the people I met. Collectively the chapters suggest 
that giving and receiving a diagnosis does not bring solutions in itself and that living with ADHD is 
on-going and requires persistence and endurance. In Chapter Eight I showed how treatments, which 
can alleviate symptoms rather than effect a cure, required attention and effort in order to make them 
‘work’ for individual needs. Thus people adapted their stimulant treatments to meet their life 
demands, as much as they had to adapt to the properties of the chemical compound. As a result I have 
suggested that stimulant treatments acted on people’s lives beyond their physiological affect. When 
they were ingested, just as often when they were not, these treatments co-produced and participated in 
the making and maintaining of relationships with others. The presence and absence of treatments in 
people’s lives were parts of the balancing act that was described to me; being able to do ordinary 
things that made for a better life, whilst wanting to keep all that is ‘extra-normal’ with living with 
ADHD. Paying attention to the contradictory use of the word ‘ordinary’, as used by support group 
members and ‘opponents’ of the concept of ADHD, helped me to show the complex practices that 
people put in place and worked to maintain in order to live with ADHD.  The notions of never-ending 
effort and repetition were often used when people discussed the fact that there was no cure for ADHD 
as it was lifelong. For the cohort of adults aged 40 plus, the condition was often accompanied by a 
sense of unremitting exhaustion.  
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Whilst they are part of enduring, bearing with and carrying on living with ADHD, the caring practices 
I described in support groups suggested that endurance itself can also be life-forming and 
empowering.  The activation of reciprocal attention that Sonia was hoping to put in place was one 
such caring practice which showed how vulnerability and dependency were part of enduring. In this 
thesis I have provided glimpses of the care given by partners, relatives, doctors, parents and have 
illustrated the difference such care made to enduring and living with ADHD. I have highlighted in 
detail the care-exchange practices which I am suggesting followed from a shared vulnerability, for 
example the archival and classificatory work described in Chapter Three and the clinic’s appointment 
system documented in Chapter Two. As I saw it, such activities were initiated through the 
acknowledgement and disclosure of vulnerability to others; sometimes the sharing of confidences 
made in despair opened an opportunity for being cared for.  By contrasting  the different kind of 
relations and exchanges taking place between neighbours or relatives in her neighbourhood, Han 
(2012) showed that neighbours did  not share and gave to each other on the basis of a shared intimacy, 
but instead on the basis of vulnerability as a shared condition. Han suggested that neighbours 
concealed their acts of kindness and giving so as not to openly acknowledge the crisis that each 
person might be facing. Through quoting Cavell ‘We are endlessly separate, for no reason. But then 
we are answerable for everything that comes between us.’ (ibid.: 88), Han argued that acknowledging 
another’s vulnerability generates a responsibility to respond134. Sonia and the other members of the 
support group were seeking that accountability and reciprocity through sharing their vulnerability, 
precisely because it was a shared condition in that space. Other conversations taught me that at work 
or in other public spaces, members of the group concealed their vulnerability, possibly for the reasons 
suggested by Han but also in view of the stigma attached to the diagnosis. Whilst vulnerability can be 
theorised as part of the human condition and of ordinary life, exposing it to others poses a risk that it 
                                                          
134
 This is reminiscent of the reciprocity and obligation implied in the exchange of gifts described by Mauss 
(1923) and discussed in Chapter Seven. To follow this trope, Han’s argument posits the disclosure of 
vulnerability as a gift to another, requiring a response that is experienced as a burden by the person 
acknowledging. The example I provided situates the disclosure of vulnerability as a pre-requisite for attending 
support groups with the expectation of exchange that is often named ‘sharing’. The burden linked to such 
obligation has been hinted in different part of this thesis; such as when Beatrice was overwhelmed by her role of 
facilitator or when Michael was reprimanded for not attending the group more regularly (in Chapter Eight). 
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may not be recognised or acknowledged
135, as I described in the ‘coming out’ stories in Chapter Five. 
The support groups, as I saw them, were networks of relations that recognised and acknowledged that 
vulnerability was at the core of living with ADHD and that maintaining relations with the world was a 
fragile balancing act, which if it failed could leave people isolated or bankrupted.  In this thesis I have 
attempted to show the variety of practices that people deployed in the context of acknowledging the 
vulnerability in their lives, such as practices of remembering, of making kin at home as well as with 
strangers, and taking care/paying attention to each other in support groups. 
Memory and kinship are concepts which are difficult to distinguish from one another when embedded 
in everyday life. The way in which they were experienced was not named or discussed using those 
terms within the support groups and clinic. Lambek offers a convincing argument when describing the 
word ‘care’ as capturing the entanglement of memory and kinship in everyday life.  
‘To remember is to care…to care for and to care about; but also to take care of someone; to 
take care, as in to be careful; to have cares, as to be full of care; and to be vulnerable, to care 
what other say and do. Caring is the form of remembering generally characteristic of the ethos 
and practice of kinship everywhere.’ (Lambek, 2007: 220) 
Throughout this thesis the diagnostic process I have described has been enacted through caring 
practices that called upon remembering and recollecting whilst making kinship relations; for example 
Chapters Seven and Eight showed how the relations forged in the support groups were described 
using the language of kinship, an extended kinship based on the shared condition of being vulnerable; 
Chapter Six described how a father recognised himself in his son, calling upon practices of 
remembering his own childhood,  of caring for his son and being cared for by his partner. The chapter 
also showed how the father re-imagined his kinship relations to his son and family on that basis. An 
important element arises from my exploration of memory and kinship practices in the making of 
ADHD: adults with ADHD are made by children. I have noted in Chapter Six, drawing on Strathern 
(1992), that adulthood is always a constructed concept which requires social and legal intervention, 
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 Vulnerability is theorised in many ways and sometimes not as part of the human condition, but as a result of 
specific economic and political conditions (Quesada, Hart, and Bourgois, 2011). 
P a g e  | 242 
 
whereas childhood is accepted as a natural fact, in itself.  I demonstrated that such a notion was 
enacted in the ethnographic example of the Zafimaniry who only became social beings at the point of 
building a house and giving birth to a child (Bloch, 1993, 2006).   
The role that reproduction plays in making adults into full members of society can also be recognised 
in UK society in a general sense, but I want to suggest conversely that during my fieldwork there were 
practices specific to the concept of ADHD which position children as makers of adults
136
. Firstly, 
there were institutional practices, in particular within psychiatric institutions, which have clustered 
symptoms under the category ‘ADHD’ and theorised it as being lifelong. As I described in Chapter 
Two, it followed from this recent reconceptualisation that, in order for adults to satisfy the diagnostic 
criteria, the presence and persistence of symptoms in their childhood must be demonstrated. Such a 
conception has placed the act of remembering childhood as central to the diagnostic process, and has 
located memory practices within the individual patient, thereby making them good or bad historians. 
Secondly, diagnostic practices in the clinic have augmented the identification of symptoms through a 
list of criteria with a prototypical mode, in which resemblance and recognition have extended the 
location of both memory and kinship. Thus it became possible to remember turbulent childhood 
events with the aid of old documents and family friends, but importantly this process served to find 
the origin of an adult in his or her childhood. The prescribing practices have strangely emulated this 
image as adults could only be prescribed with licenced treatment intended for children as there were 
no stimulant medications licensed for adults. Finally, in support groups, children diagnosed with 
ADHD made ‘accidental activists’ of their parents, leading them to seek support, resources and, 
ultimately, for some to be diagnosed and so become adults with ADHD.  
The practices for remembering and making kin were enacted in various ways but always remained 
central to the way of identifying ADHD. Kinship relations developed and were maintained with 
strangers on the basis of vulnerability as a shared condition; remembering was done collectively in 
making archives and classifications, and memories were triggered upstream from child to parent, in a 
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 Strathern suggested that the Euro-American concept of kinship imagines that parents create children in 
reality, and that children create parents metaphorically (2011). Here I am bridging both propositions in 
suggesting that in our window of time, adults with ADHD are created in reality by children with ADHD.  
P a g e  | 243 
 
cross-generational version of Wordsworth’s line. As in the clinic, remembering and making kin in the 
support group was stimulated and mediated by and through objects, such as medication, mobile 
phones and archives. I have argued that it is the recent changes in classification from which clinical 
practices were developed to diagnose adults that has created a specific moment in time when a large 
cohort of individuals rendered visible how it is that parents can be made by children.  
By showing that children made adults with ADHD, the expanded diagnostic process I proposed 
highlighted that identifying and diagnosing ADHD in adults required a range of caring practices. 
These included developing  kin relations with strangers and mapping memories of lived and shared 
experience of symptoms; such actions evolved within networks of relations, between actants, people 
and objects, family members and medication, doctors and employers, as well as between formal and 
informal classifications and between parents and their children. 
 
What next? 
 
‘The strength of the anthropological approach, certainly when it attempts to come closer to 
the experience of pain, illness, and suffering, is not that it can pride itself on capturing exactly 
what the other experiences. Its strength, rather, lies in its modesty and in the awareness of the 
incompleteness of the attempt. The anthropologist, who sincerely tries to participate, has done 
what he can; there is no better option.’ (Van der Geest, 2007) 
I started this chapter by pointing out how this study does not claim to offer a finite description of the 
diagnostic process of adult ADHD in the UK in view of continuing changes in that field. There are 
also limitations to the areas of inquiry that this study has engaged with, in particular through the 
limited access to the greater part of the everyday life of the people I met. I was able to observe and 
participate fully in the life of the clinic, albeit this setting was bounded in time and space. In contrast, 
it was only on rare occasions that I was able to interact with support group members in the rest of 
their daily lives. Sometimes I met with them in groups, conferences and cafes but no opportunities 
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arose to visit them at home or at work during my fieldwork. Further study could involve people 
diagnosed with ADHD in research at home and at work
137
  which would require an entirely different 
research design, as well as a different ethical and theoretical emphasis than the one I applied. Below I 
suggest other avenues for research that may contribute to the growing field of the anthropology of 
health, and the studies of narration and lifecourse.  
Within the constraints of my study, a number of issues I came across during my fieldwork were left 
unexplored, mostly due to lack of time and difficulty of access. One case in point concerns my interest 
in stimulant medications and the multi-faceted controversies associated with them.  It has been 
remarked that an inside perspective of pharmaceutical companies’ activities is rare and research in 
such contexts could provide better understanding of the logics, principles and values  which underpin 
such organisations (Petryna et al, 2006; Van der Geest, 2006; Van der Geest et al., 1996). I was struck 
in my fieldwork by the fact that stimulants, recognised as the most efficacious treatments and 
recommended by the NICE guidance are licensed for prescribing to children, but not to adults. 
Regulatory bodies have in the last ten years turned down a number of applications by pharmaceutical 
companies for licensing their product for adults, despite these medications already being licensed for 
children
138
. Whilst I engaged in informal conversations with scientists and pharmaceutical company 
representatives on this topic, the complexity of the administrative, ethical and economic issues 
involved in the European-wide process of drug regulation required more resources than this study 
could provide. A research focusing on the political, economic, social and clinical process for the 
regulation of Class A drug treatments for adults would contribute to a better understanding of the 
forces in play that render some treatments available and others not.   
I have touched upon the implications of defining lifelong difficulties related to hyperactivity and 
inattention in terms of chronicity, a term associated, in regard to mental health, with stigma and 
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 The medical view is that ADHD is not observable in the clinic as the artificial context there leads patients to 
compensate and hide symptoms. If this is true, any outside observer/researcher may have the same effect 
regardless of the setting.  
138
 See the Medicines & Healthcare products Regulatory Agency websites for public assessment reports: 
http://tinyurl.com/owt629g. Accessed 18/07/2014. Also see Abraham and Lewis (1999) for an examination of 
the harmonisation of drug regulations process between European countries.  
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exclusion. By focusing on a cohort of adults over the age of 30 who could not have been diagnosed as 
children, this study has mainly examined retrospective accounts of difficulties. In view of the fact that 
diagnosing and treating of ADHD in adults potentially requires very few medical interventions and 
patients can initiate and maintain on-going self-management strategies including medication, future 
study might valuably undertake long-term tracking of the experience of living with the diagnosis of 
ADHD. Qualitative longitudinal research could provide the means to capture both social and 
biographical change over time, and could delineate changes in formal discourse and personal 
narration, and provide insights on the development of ADHD through the life course. I would suggest 
that intergenerational research would be of particular relevance for the topic discussed in this 
research, as the emergence of the diagnostic in adults in the UK would make it possible to examine 
how, at any one moment in time, ADHD may be enacted across three generations simultaneously 
whilst also providing an historical perspective.   
Finally, revisiting studies by other researchers, or adopting the classical anthropological tactic of 
revisiting field sites, could engage directly with questions that arise in regard to the potential 
proliferation of ADHD in the UK.  There are present concerns in the media and in some academic 
circles that ADHD will become part of an over-diagnosis trend which may medicalise all aspects of 
everyday life (Donnelly, 2013; Moynihan et al, 2012; Press Association, 2013; Radcliffe and Timimi, 
2004) . My study has argued for an approach that seriously considers the local determinants in health 
(Lock and Nguyen, 2010) through examining the range of practices and actants involved in the 
making of ADHD. Thus the stability of the present practices and institutions, formal and informal, 
cannot be taken for granted, nor can their progression in line with the USA be speculated upon. A 
repeat study could re-examine such topics as activist practices and prescribing practices as well as the 
impact of the DSM-5 criteria and it could support a better understanding of how the diagnosis of 
ADHD in adult fares in the forthcoming years in the UK.  
This study has aimed to broaden the sites of medicine in relation to diagnosis beyond the clinical 
encounter and has sought collaboration practices with various partners in the clinic, the support 
groups and patient organisations. There are many more collaborations and partners to call upon in 
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future than those who participated in this study and I hope that such alliances will spur further 
research (Viney, Callard, and Woods, 2015). In participating in the range of actions and situations 
described in this thesis, I worked to promote respect for all involved and in the hope of making a 
positive impact against the stigmatisation of ADHD.   
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